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The topic is white collar crime in its organizational form. The research 
question is why otherwise law-abiding people engage in wrongful 
behavior within legitimate organizations and what kinds of dynamics 
are involved in wrongful organizational processes. This is a theoretical 
inquiry the method of which is to bring together relevant literature on 
organizational behavior regardless of the branch of science. In addition 
to criminological and sociolegal writings, I mostly refer to works of 
social psychology and organization theory. 
At first, I discuss the terminological multiplicity related to 
organizational white collar crime. In conclusion from a critical analysis 
of the dominant terms and definitions, I argue for the concept of 
organizational wrongdoing. The approach of organizational 
wrongdoing captures unethical, illegal and criminal organizational 
behavior. Thus, it is not retricted by legislative categories but ethical 
reasoning. The approach aims at grasping a behavioral entity, and state 
law crimes do not constitute an ontology of behavior. 
In order to understand organizational wrongdoing, the dominant 
criminological theories applied to white collar crime are discussed. To 
a surprisingly large extent, they lack a sophisticated organizational 
perspective and do not offer viable frameworks for building a plausible 
theory of organizational white collar crime. In order to fill the gap, I 
incorporate the social psychological dynamics of organizational 
behavior and present several findings on collective behavior that 
criminological theorization must come to terms with. 
IV 
In the end, I assess the criminological enterprise in regard to 
organizational wrongdoing as a whole. Further research is outlined: 
The approach of organizational wrongdoing seeks understanding of 
organizational behavior in its totality and acknowledges the social 
psychology of organizational norm shaping and breaking. In order to 
grasp the internal dynamics of organizational worlds, deep case studies 
are suggested. In addition, policy suggestions are touched upon in order 
to more effectively control organizational behavior. 
"I am afraid I" 
The statement that describes the social 
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Preface 
I became interested in organizational injustice already as a little boy. It 
all started by accident, and that accident was called Chernobyl. 
Suddenly, radioactive radiation fell on my playground and largely on 
the rest of Europe, casting its invisible threat over millions of people. 
The actual damage was -and is- beyond exact knowledge; rumours and 
anecdotes were everywhere. Environmental decline has been widely 
discussed in the media as long as I can remember, and radioactive 
radiation is only a part of it. Similarly, harming the environment is only 
one of the ways organizations are involved in wrongdoing. 
As I grew, I came to observe various patterns of unethical, illegal, and 
criminal behavior like any of us. Criminology became my field of 
interest because in crimes so many factors intertwine in an ultimate 
way. Relations of power, social justice, human behavior and interaction 
all interplay in the dynamics of wrongful behavior. As I considered the 
exact topic of my thesis within the domain of criminology, I first 
thought of concentrating on conventional crimes committed by 
individuals. White collar crime I associated merely with specific 
economic crimes; and economics was something that I was not familiar 
with. However, as I learned further, I realized that in white collar 
crime, the dynamics of crime are on the agenda in a more fundamental 
and intriguing manner than in so called street crime. Even the very 
question what crime really is is of considerable doubt in the study of 
white collar crime. Furthermore, economics is only one approach in 
explaining white collar crime. Much more than economic behavior, 
white collar crime is about human behavior within organizational 
settings. Through this kind of evolution of thought, I finally came to 
concentrate on organizations that are so prevalent in the contemporary 
society, produce much harm, and still generally succeed in maintaining 
their legimate societal stand. 
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Of course, organizations produce also much good. E.g., the 
pharmaceutical industry has made immense contributions to the health 
standards. Yet, also that industry has nurtured much wrongdoing. As 
John Braithwaite states in his book "Corporate Crime in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry", "-- it is the job of criminologists to explore 
the seamy side of human existence (Preface)." And indeed, isn't the 
sunny side of organizational activity already covered in the rnass media 
as well as in the field of scientific research? Social scientists who have 
examined organizations have traditionally been invited by the 
management in the name of enhancing economic productivity. 
Given the ubiquitous stand of organizations today, it is crucial to set 
them under critical scrutiny, and by doing so further democracy and 
social justice. Indeed, seeing criminology as a disc1ipline to lead us 
towards the idea of justice and ultimately to increased social justice has 
provided the guiding inspiration for this work. Criminologists must do 
their part in the huge programme of making life bearable on this 
overcrowded globe with limited resources and bloody history. In this 
effort, organizational wrongs must be recognized, explained, and 
controlled through scientific inquiry. 
I am indebted to the many scholars I have discussed my topic with. The 
greatest thanks I want to address to the International Institute for the 
Sociology of Law in Ofiati, Spain -an organization producing much 
good- for providing the beautiful settings and the very special 
atmosphere for sociolegal studies. In Finland, I would like to thank 
especially Anne Alvesalo for useful comments and the Police 
Department of Ministry of the Interior for financial support. I am also 
thankful to Irina Filonova for the de sing of the cover. 
Still, a practical point to be made is that although most of the cited 
literature was in English, some sources were in Finnish. Thus, 
whenever the latter are referred to, the translations are mine and I 
obviously bear the responsibility for possible inaccuracies. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The Questions that Guide this Study and the Method of 
Seeking Answers 
The first question to struggle with has to do with the definitional 
diversity in the field of white collar crime. I will look at the different 
concepts and their definitions that have been used in relation to 
organizational violations, and try to find out which concept makes the 
most sense in theoretical terms. 
However, the main aim that I will try to approach in the scope of this 
study is to find answers to the question why otherwise morally 
conscious people so commonly engage in unethical patterns in 
organizational settings. Answering this question involves examining 
the various factors that contribute to organizational wrongdoing, and 
the question can be elaborated as: what kind of factors affect human 
behavior in bureaucratic organizations? In other words, the focus is on 
the dynamics of organizational wrongdoing. 
In order to be able to explain the kinds of acts described in this thesis, I 
will look at what has been found out and theorized in the 
criminological domain so far. Thus, I will look at the literature to see 
what kind of theories have been developed in order to explain the 
phenomena that I call organizational wrongs. I intend to deepen the 
current understanding of organizational wrongdoing through 
interdisciplinary approach, addressing the question what kind of social 
psychological phenomena affect human behavior in organizational 
settings. Generally, I will draw from data presented in the domains of 
criminology, psychology, social psychology, and organizational 
theories. 
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As a natural extension of these debates, they are followed by a 
discussion of means to counter the organizational processes that 
contribute to wrongdoing. 
The methodology I employ is a theoretical analysis on the basis of the 
literature that I was able to find and considered relevant regardless of 
the actual discipline the pieces of understanding present. 
1.2. The Structure of this Text 
The structure of this text follows the questions I address. First, I 
discuss the definitional complexity, and draw my conclusions from that 
scholarly debate. Thereafter, the overall introduction to my study 
continues as I argue for the prevalence of organizations in the 
contemporary society, and offer a glimpse of the various and vast 
damages organizations are contributing to. -After the definitions, 
readers already familiar with the topic may move straight on to the 2nd 
Chapter. 
In the Chapter 2, the criminological theories are presented and 
discussed that are relevant in regard to organizational wrongs. The core 
of each theory will be set forth and criticized as well as occasionally 
interpreted and extended in the direction I find essential and 
illustrative. 
The 3rd Chapter deals with the fundamental qualities of human 
behavior in social settings, such as organizations. In the debate on the 
nature of organizational wrongs, the central question has been whether 
the blame should be put on the individuals or rather on the collective 
they belong to. Social psychological phenomena of group dynamics 
will be presented in order to illuminate the foundations of collective 
behavior. It will be addressed how the organization affects its 
individual members, and vice versa. On the basis of the analysis of how 
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groups may produce distorted and undesirable outcomes, some 
counters will be touched upon. 
Finally, in the 4th Chapter the whole study of organizational wrongs is 
critically assessed, mine and others. Concluding remarks are drawn as 
to the relevance and implications of the theories and other data 
presented. 
1.3. Defining the Key Concepts 
Explicit definitions are of particular importance when white collar 
crime is being discussed. Although definitional disagreements often 
belong to social sciences, in this field the definitional confusion can be 
said to be remarkable. In order to both reach exact inquiry as well as to 
make it easier for the reader, I will clarify the main concepts that 
constitute the context of this text. 
1.3.1. White Collar Crime 
Organizational wrongdoing has to do with the overall concept of white 
collar crime. Edwin Sutherland introduced the new criminological 
challenge of confronting the misdeeds of the rich and the powerful, and 
came up with the term white collar crime as early as 1939. The term 
has become one of the key concepts in the contemporary criminology 
and is familiar even to lay people. A different thing is what scholars 
and laymen exactly mean by it. Even today there prevails much debate 
on the most useful definition of white collar crime. It is not clear what 
phenomena exactly fall under the term. (For discussions on this, see 
Helrnkamp, Ball and Townsend 1996) According to Sutherland's 
(1949:9) definition: 
White collar crime may be defined approximately as a crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social status 
in the course of his occupation. 
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Sutherland's definition has been widely referred to in the 
criminological literature, and it has aroused many attempts of 
redefinition. As Coleman (1987:406) notes: "Despite its obvious 
success, a number of social scientists now argue that Sutherland's 
conceptualization of white-collar crime has outlived its usefulness." 
White collar crime has been criticized as encompassing "too many 
diverse and basically unrelated behaviors" on the one hand (e.g., Tonry 
and Reiss 1993, Preface), while others prefer broad concepts -such as 
deviance or wrongdoing- due to the limits of the legislative categories. 
However, Sutherland's definition still provides a reasonable point of 
departure when crime and wrongful behavior is being searched for in 
other places than conventionally. As Braithwaite (1985:19, cited in 
Geis 1992:47) suggests: "Probably the most sensible way to proceed --
is to stick with Sutherland's definition." 
1.3.1.1. The Aura of Legitimacy 
Clearl y, Sutherland's definition contains problematic conceptions: the 
meaning of "respectability" and "high social status" is vague. Actually, 
strictly following his definition, organizational wrongdoing could not 
be defined as a subcategory of white collar crime since people of any 
social status can contribute to wrongful outcomes in their 
organizational roles. However, as respectability and social status are 
defined broadly, it can be argumented that organizational wrongdoing 
is white collar crime because it refers to legitimate organizations. 
Futhermore, due to the rapid expansion of bureaucratic organizations 
and white collar positions, the respectability and prestige linked to the 
title of white collar worker are not so great than they were when 
Sutherland launched the term half a century ago (Schlegel 1996; 
Helmkamp et al. 1996: 117-9). Therefore, the term white collar crime 
essentially functions to draw attention to the criminality of the "non-
criminal", legitimate social circles. 
Illegitimate organizations, in turn, are referred to as organized crime. 
The concept of organized crime must be discerned from white collar 
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crime, however white their collars and in spite of the many similarities 
and connections between criminal organizations and the legitimate 
ones that occasionally break the rules, and the possible difficulty to 
distinguish between them (see Potter and Gaines 1996). Equally, 
Sutherland (1949) explicitly excluded "-- wealthy members of the 
underworld, since they are not persons of respectability and high social 
status." He distinguished between white collar criminals and 
professional thieves on the basis of self-conception and public 
perception. The former did not view themselves as criminals, while the 
latter did and were proud to be thieves. Accordingly, the public viewed 
white collar criminals primarily as legitimate actors who just had 
mistaken. (See Potter and Gaines 1996:36-7) 
As Friedrichs states, the concept of white collar crime has to be 
stretched and used heuristically (Helmkamp et al. 1996:340). White 
collar crime is not a precise sociologically let alone legally defined 
category of offences. Rather, it is used as a metaphor, referring to the 
unique conditions under which certain criminality occurs. (Potter and 
Gaines 1996:35) Seen as a metaphor, white collars refer to the aura of 
legitimacy and relatively high, at least non-criminal status which may 
cover immorality. This must be the case since these type of wrongs 
take many forms and really do not require wearing white collars. In 
Schlegel's (1996:107) words, the term white collar crime is beneficial 
because it "-- in some fashion captures the essence of an entirely new 
phenomenon -- or delineates a large construct in ways that make that 
construct more comprehensible." Accordingly, justification for the 
term can be found in that it is rather illustrative also to lay people 
(Helmkamp et al. 1996:125-6).1 
lActually, the symbolic nature of the concept can be expressed 
through the spelling: I follow Friedrichs (1996) as he argues that although 
white-collar crime written with the dash is the more common and 
grammatically the more correct way of writing, the term is not to be understood 
literally. Therefore, I omit the dash. 
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1.3.1.2. What Kind of Violations Constitute White Collar Crime? 
In addition to violations of criminal law, Sutherland (1949) contended 
that white collar crime includes breaches of civil and administrative 
law as well, and as the study has matured, many criminologists have 
agreed (Coleman 1996:82). Sutherland pointed out that many civil laws 
dealt with practices essentially similar to established criminal offences, 
and argued that criminologists "should be completely free to push 
across the barriers of legal definitions" (Sutherland and Cressey 
1974:21, cited in Brown and Chiang 1993:29). As noted in many 
references, strictly limiting the study according to the legal definition 
of crime leads to an incorrect view since the violations often are 
handled by alternative procedures. Further to be noted is that 
Sutherland argued for a definition including punishable violations of 
the law. This means that no official decision stating the guilt is 
necessary. (Baucus and Dworkin 1991:233) 
As a sophisticated example of the many redefinitions of white collar 
crime, the following is worth mentioning. In a workshop in West 
Virginia in 1996 a number of specialists discussed possible definitions 
of white collar crime and finally ended up suggesting the following 
operational definition of the term: 
Illegal or unethical acts that violate fiduciary responsibility or 
public trust, committed by an individual or organization, 
usually during the course of legitimate occupational activity, 
by persons of high or respectable social status for personal or 
organizational gain. (Helmkamp et al. 1996:351) 
1.3.1.3. What Is Crime? 
Much confusion has derived from using the terms crime and illegality. 
At times, these terms have been used interchangeably, which is 
inaccurate (Baucus and Dworkin 1991:232). The term crime has been 
used in various contexts and meanings; it can be used on political, 
moralistic, legal, humanistic, or purely subjective grounds (Helmkamp 
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et al. 1996:123-4). The point that Baucus and Dworkin (p. 234) stress 
is that corporate crime strictly refers to violations of criminal law 
where a court of law has ruled that the corporation committed a 
criminal act. They define illegal corporate behavior to consist of 
violations of administrative or civil law, resolved through a variety of 
procedures. 
However, if we study crime and stick to this legalistic demand -that for 
an action to be called a crime it needs to have been so judged by a 
court of law- we become bound by the efficiency of the enforcement 
system as well as the political labeling process. Baucus and Dworkin 
(1991) admit this by referring to the limited resources of the enforcers: 
It takes more agency resources to pursue criminal charges --
Thus, agencies rely heavily on civil and administrative 
procedures --. 
Furthermore: 
Cases handled through criminal procedures and resolved 
through a guilty verdict -- represent situations where 
corporations were unable to successfully alter the (judicial 
labeling) system. We know little about how these cases differ 
from civil or administrative violations, for instance, whether 
they involve more serious violations __ 2. (Pp.234-5) 
Baucus and Dworkin mention also other administrative factors that 
affect the choice of the procedure (ibid.). 
I agree with Baucus and Dworkin that clearest is to use the term crime 
in its legalistic sense. What follows, is that a study aiming at the true 
picture of organizational wrongdoing must not be bound to the term 
crime. Still, I argue that the term white collar crime can be used as a 
general concept in its symbolic sense. The rationale is that it is an 
illustrative and inventive concept that has become a useful catchword 
in ralsmg consciousness in the political discourses against 
reprehensible organizational behavior. When referring to the 
2Emphasis mine. 
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subcategories of white collar crime, best would be to employ more 
specific categories of action than crime in its vague symbolic Ineaning.3 
Although the term crime is a powerful concept that conveys the critical 
importance of the issue and can be used to stimulate progressive 
politics (Braithwaite 1995:50-1), it is a serious accusation . Coming 
from a law school, I contend that crime is a legal concept. Strictly 
speaking, criminals are those who have violated the existing and legally 
applicaple criminal code and have been so ruled by a court of law. 
Talking of criminals before a court decision is not in coherence with 
the jurisprudential principle of assumed innocence until otherwise 
proved and authoritatively confirmed. Since the processes that lead to 
the legal label of criminal are so effectively affected by the white collar 
targets of the control, I turn down the concept of crime as determining 
the focus of this study. I prefer to restrict its use either to the symbolic 
general expression of white collar crime or to references to convicted 
violations of the criminal code. 
Sutherland's new category of crime has been criticized for being 
moralistic. E.g., Paul Tappan (1947, cited in Coleman 1996:77-8) was a 
prominent critic who claimed that criminologists only should study 
convicted offenders. It has been argued that unless criminologists 
restrict their attention to criminal law, they could define anything they 
disapprove of as crime and this would weaken their academic 
objectivity (Croall 1992:8-9). However, the line between what is legal, 
illegal or criminal is often blurred, and to which of these categories a 
certain activity falls virtually is a contingent question in the political 
history. As the abolitionist approach argues, there is no ontology of 
crime (clearly expressed, e.g., by Christie 1995: 1). Similarly, Poveda 
(1994:95) states that deviance is not intrinsic but rather" -- a function 
3To illustrate: I didn't entitle my thesis "Understanding 
Organizational Crime" for the subject matter is not limited to actual crimes, 
and crime is not a concept to be stretched. Correct, but awkward, would be to 
talk of "organizational white collar crime". 
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of who has the power to define or label the conduct as deviant." 
Ermann and Lundman (1996:31) share these views: 
Whether a percei ved departure from social norms comes to be 
widely labeled and penalized as deviant depends on the 
power of the accusers to make their labels stick, as compared 
with the power of the organizations to resist labeling. --
audiences rarely label or penalize organizations. 
Thus, crime simply is what is labeled as crime in the processes of 
social construction. In addition to the political elite, corporations, 
powerful organizations, economic and military elite have much 
legislative clout. Organizations wield societal power to such an extent 
that democracy is limited. Corporations lobby against legal controls 
and use their power to promote other than punitive sanctions (e.g., 
Brown and Chiang 1993:30-1; Sutherland 1983:251). Especially in the 
Thirld World countries, multinational organizations' wealth and power 
often exceed those of the state. Consequently, they exert great power 
upon the legislative process. (Coleman 1996:82-3) Economic elites 
regularly affect political processes also in the form of candidate 
selection and monetary contributions to candidates and parties (Simon 
1996a:272). 
Currently, the interests of the state intertwine with those of the 
business. The state has to cope with contraversial expectations: on the 
one hand, it is supposed to further the national economy in order to 
maintain social welfare while on the other hand, the state must also 
maintain its legitimacy by responding to white collar crime. It has been 
argued that this has lead to symbolic state responses like ineffective 
legislation. (Laitinen and Virta 1998: 16) 
Elite agencies are likely to hold less critical attitudes towards white 
collar actors than towards those of lower socioeconomic status. 
Sutherland (1983:251-2) listed the many relationships between 
economic and political elites. E.g., these often include cultural 
homogeneousity, family relationships, intimate friendships, and mutual 
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occupational exchange. Corporations also control information and the 
media, affecting the public perception of corporate action (Simon 
1996a:275; Brown and Chiang 1993:31). Sutherland (p.251) 
elaborates this point: 
The important newspapers, the motion picture corporations, 
and the radio corporations are all large capitalistic enterprises 
and the persons who own and manage them have the same 
standards as the persons who manage other corporations. 
These agencies derive their principal incorne from 
advertisements by other business corporations and would be 
likely to lose a considerable part of this income if they were 
critical of business practices in general or of particular 
corporations. Finally, these public agencies of 
communication themselves participate in white collar crimes 
Due to their power, the elites -be they economic, military or political-
typically succeed avoiding deviant, illegitimate, illegal or criminal 
labels (see Brown and Chiang 1993). Many harmful organizational 
practices do not violate any formal law (Simon 1996a:268), most white 
collar crime go undetected, very few white collar offenders are 
prosecuted and even fewer finally punished. As Coleman (1996:78) 
states, 
-- the central point Sutherland was trying to make (was that) 
white collar offenders have the economic and political power 
to prevent their arrest and prosecution even when they have 
committed serious criminal offences. 
Having said all this, what more would such criminology be that would 
only study convicted offenders than a quasi science, a conservative 
force defending the status quo and escaping its societal as well as 
scientific function. In the same voice, Brown and Chiang (1993) argue 
that social scientists should be free to study acts that should be 
punishable but fail to do so due to the prevailing conservative ideology. 
Also Henry and Milovanovic (1994: 119) can be cited: 
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Law is a very partial list of harms. -- Celebrating, uncritically, 
the existing definition of crime and the rule-of-law ethic, 
then, can further constitute and reconstitute existing power 
relations, suffering and pain in more insidious forms such as 
when the more powerful benefit from otherwise perceived 
'free' contractual relations. 
I will draw my definitional conclusions from this line of argumentation 
in the Chapter 1.3.6. 
1.3.2. Corporate and Occupational Crime 
Looking at who benefits from the violation has brought about a 
distinction between corporate crime -which is intended to at least in 
part further organizational goals- and occupational crime -where 
individuals commit crimes in the course of their occupational activities 
for personal gain. This approach was presented by Clinard and 
Quinney (1973) and is supported by a number of scholars (e.g., 
Jamieson 1994:3; Coleman 1987:407). According to Clinard and 
Quinney's (1973:189) definition, corporate crime consists of "offenses 
committed by corporate officials for their corporation and the offenses 
of the corporation itself'. (Coleman 1996:84; Friedrichs 1996:8; Geis 
1992:39-40) To be noted is that corporate crime typically includes 
individual gain as well, and individual and organizational goals may 
intertwine so that their primacy cannot be defined. -On the other hand, 
the gain itself can be questioned because questionable activities may 
turn out not to be beneficial in the long run 4 • Thus, here the gain refers 
to subjective perception a priori. 
4White collar crime may lead to discontented employees and 
consumers and boycotts, damage the organization's image, give rise to more 
effective controls, and so on. 
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There is also a divergent way to define occupational crime. Green 
(1990, cited in Coleman 1996:84) uses a broader definition: 
"Occupational crime refers to any act punishable by law which is 
committed through opportunity created in the course of an occupation 
that is legal." However, it is useful to distinguish between 
individualistic and collective behavior and goals (see Coleman 
1987:407). 
1.3.3. Organizational Crime 
Organizational crime has been defined by Schrager and Short 
(1978:411-2, cited in Jamieson 1996:20) as 
-- illegal acts of omission or commission of an individual or a 
group of individuals in a legitimate formal organization in 
accordance with the operative goals of the organization, 
which have a serious physical or economic iunpact on 
employees, consumers or the general public. 
Crucial is that organizational crime does not include only corporations, 
but also, e.g., governmental agencies. As Simon (1996a:277) notes: 
Like corporations, government organizations are also goal-
oriented bureaucracies. As such, they always possess the 
potential for deviant behavior. 
Organizational white collar crime may be motivated by also other than 
financial goals; there is nothing especially criminogenic about profit as 
an organizational goal. Rather, any demand for goal achievement may 
be an underlying factor. (Gross 1978, cited in Coleman 1992) 
SChrager and Short's definition refers to the consequences of the 
violation (" -- a serious physical or economic impact --"). Obviously, 
what is "serious" is subject to interpretation. Furthermore, behavior 
that only imposes a risk falls outside their category of organizational 
crime. As an illustration: as a company launches unsafe products it 
would not be regarded criminal -and worth studying- before somebody 
has suffered serious injury. This is not reasonable. Or should such a 
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case be interpreted in economic terms so that consumers suffered 
economically when they bought defective products? However, it would 
be important to acknowledge that behavior can be wrongful in itself 
regardless of the actual consequences. 
1.3.4. Organizational and Elite Deviance 
Ermann and Lundman (1978) advocate the term organizational 
deviance. In addition to individuals, they emphasize that organizations 
can be deviant. Characteristic to organizational deviance is that an act 
that is supported by the internal norms of the organization is contrary 
to the norms maintained outside the organization. The organizational 
support takes two forms: peer and elite support. The latter means that 
the top level management or the administration of the organization 
support the wrongful pattern. The goals furthered by the deviance 
primarily are organizational, although typically there is also personal 
gain. (Cited in Poveda 1994:94) 
Although I accept Ermann and Lundman's conceptualization as a 
particularly fertile point of departure, the term deviance clearly is 
vulnerable to criticism. As Friedrichs (Helmkamp et al. 1996: 120-4) 
reminds, the striking feature of much white collar harrndoing is the role 
of conformity, and "--in many cases those involved are conforming to 
industry-wide standards." He also draws from the Holocaust studies 
that ordinary Germans saw themselves as conforming and were not 
deviating from the standards in their very context. Much organizational 
wrongdoing derives from not breaking the subcultural norms that 
nurture misconduct. If everyone breaks the norms, it is not deviant 
(Stitt and Giacopassi 1993:61). Rather, those who blow the whistle are 
the deviant ones. Given the prevalence of organizational violations, it 
is not well grounded to refer to the ones who participate in the wrongs 
as deviants. Organizational wrongs should not be mystified by labeling 
them something unusual; rather, they are commonly participated in by 
people like any of us. 
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Simon and Eitzen (1993, cited in Poveda 1994:96) reject the term white 
collar crime as too ambiguous. They prefer the term elitc~ deviance 
which is exclusively concerned with unethical and illegal actions of 
economic and political elites. They argue that this kinds of actions are 
deviant independently of their legal status at the historical moment. 
Instead, their deviance is intrinsic, deriving from deeply rooted moral 
principles. According to Simon, there are certain "-- near universal 
wrongs that have been defined by every major religion and by almost 
every culture and in almost all periods of history. -- these are as close 
to moral absolutes as we can get." (Helrnkamp et al. 1996:340) In 
addition, Simon (1996a:268 and 1996b:97) bases the definition of 
deviant on the empirically demonstrable harm caused by the act be it 
deliberate or not. 
The term elite deviance certainly does not suit my purposes. Actually, 
both the word "elite" and "deviance" mystify the nature of 
organizational white collar crime. I would rather want to express that 
organizational misconduct is a day-to-day, commonplace phenomenon, 
and by no means restricted to the extraordinary behavior of the 
superiors. Explicating that the wrongdoers are elites obscures the fact 
that organizational wrongs involve any member's contribution despite 
her status. Although Simon admits that there are many kinds of elites -
federal, state, local elites and elites within different occupations- and 
that the concept of elite is "elastic enough to be inclusive", limiting the 
study to elites still lacks sound footing. As Friedrichs bluntly counters, 
it doesn't make much sense to stretch the concept of elite. (Helrnkamp 
et al. 1996:339-40) Legitimate organizations cannot reasonably be 
termed elites. 
Also to be noted is that although elites do exercise much power in the 
organization, they are also considerably affected by the organization: 
they have gone through a powerful socialization process within the 
organizational world and must meet the organizational expectations 
related to their positions. And, what is significant, is that their will is 
not readily converted into organizational outcomles: much 
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decisionmaking takes place in groups and in mobilizing the 
organization such factors as communication and the worker agency and 
resistance must not be overlooked. In general, elites do not function in 
isolation from the organization. What follows is that the study of elite 
deviance extends into studying wider organizational processes. 
Furthermore, Simon claims that the act would need to cause 
"demonstrable harm" in order to be immoral. However, similarly to the 
criticism regarding Scbrager and Short's definition, on grounds of 
principle, it is important to incorporate also acts that cause risk but do 
not -for contingent reasons- inflict harm on anybody. Behavior can be 
reprehensible in itself, regardless of its consequences. 
1.3.5. Economic Crime 
In Finland, Sutherland's challence of policing white collar crime has 
widely been turned into talk of economic crime (see, e.g., Alvesalo 
1998; Laitinen and Virta 1998; Laitinen and Alvesalo 1994). Also 
Gordon (1996: 157) promotes the term economic crime and defines it as 
-- an illegal act (or a constantly evolving set of acts) that is 
generally committed by deception or misrepresentation 
(fraud) by someone (or a group) who has special professional 
or technical skills for the purposes of personal or 
organizational financial gain or to gain an unfair advantage 
over another individual or entity. 
Coleman (1996:85) suggests that the term economic crime limits the 
study to non-violent offences. Also American Bar Association define 
economic crime as non-violent illegalities (cited in Hagan 1996:244). 
However, and importantly, they acknowledge in a footnote that "non-
violent" refers to the means by which the crime is committed while the 
harm can frequently be described as violent (cited in Geis 1992:39). 
Nevertheless, what follows from employing the term economic crime, 
is that a remarkable range of organizational wrongs are excluded. 
Ignored would be, e.g., such violent organizational patterns as sexual 
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harassment at the workplace or exposing workers to other kinds of 
harmful conditions. 
In addition to the means, the term economic implies that a certain 
course of action is undertaken in order to achieve financial goals. 
However, this doesn't distinguish economic crime from conventional 
crime because the latter often are motivated by money, too -although 
they amount to far less financial gain on the average. Furthermore, 
considering the focus of this study, employing the term economic crime 
would disregard the diversity of other than financial goals that 
organizations strive for5. 
Economic crime has been considered a particular type of organizational 
crime (Laitinen and Alvesalo 1994:7); sometimes these concepts have 
even been suggested to be synonyms (Laitinen and Virta 1998: 11). 
However, economic and organizational crime should be discerned from 
each other: the former rather involves individual swindlers who use 
organizations as a device to commit crime, whereas organizational 
crime is always a byproduct of collective behavior in legitimate 
organizations. The criminological vacuum that Sutherland pointed out 
is not filled with mere economic crime. 
It is also important to note that language guides the way we construct 
our worlds and categorize phenomena. Talking of economic crimes 
helps the perpetrators obfuscate the underlying violent nature of their 
behavior and facilitates neutralizing guilt. Nevertheless, manoeuvres 
that seem to concern only monetary issues may actually contribute to 
substantial physical suffering. For example, fraud that involves aid 
agencies in the Third World countries may result in thousands of 
deaths from malnutrition, and tax evasion reduces the revenue of the 
state which tends to lead to cutting down the welfare services. As 
Braithwaite (1984:190-1) reminds in regard to the pharmaceutical 
industry, it is a mistake to think that wrongs like antitrust violations 
50rganizational goals are discussed in the Chapter 2.4.1. 
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would only deal with money and not threaten human life. Most of the 
world's population do not benefit from "wonder drugs" because they 
cannot afford them. The reason for this situation is the oligopolistic 
structure of the pharmaceutical industry. (Ibid.) 
1.3.6. Definitional Conclusions Regarding this Study: Introducing 
Organizational Wrongdoing 
Having critically assessed the dominant terminology, I find 
Sutherland's term white collar crime still useful. White collar crime 
can be divided into individualistic and organizational behavior. This 
study is focused on the latter which can be called organizational 
wrongdoing. Naturally, also such terms can be interchangeably used as 
unethical, wrongful or reprehensible organizational behavior and 
organizational misbehavior or misconduct. Crucial is that the behavior 
is illegitimate by certain extra-organizational standards. Illegitimacy 
refers to a violation of law or a lack of ethical justification; illegitimate 
behavior is illegal or wrong (Otavan Uusi sivistyssanakirja 1993). 
Thus, the existing legislation does not fully define the scope of this 
study due to its partiality and contingency. Modem view of law regards 
it as primarily instrumental by nature (Laitinen and Virta 1998:9). 
Legislation itself is a product of organizational activity. Law is not 
identical to morals; instead of looking at the legislation, defining right 
and wrong belongs to philosophical and sociolegal disciplines. 
I realize that this stand evokes critical voices. E.g., cited can be 
Coleman's (1987:407) doubtful thinking: 
Because of the absence of clearly formulated public standards 
for elite behavior, sociologists using the deviance approach 
must often rely on their own values and prejudices to define 
the parameters of their work. In doing so they not only 
threaten the integrity of the research process but also 
undermine the credibility of the entire effort to bring the 
problem of white-collar crime into the arena of public debate. 
18 
Not agreeing with Coleman, I stress that it is democratically healthy to 
widely study questionable organizational practices. Such behavior can 
be defined unethical and worth studying where an organization takes 
advantage of the lack of legal norms in order to achieve goals that 
could not be individually achieved without breaking the law (Laitinen 
1990:306). Laitinen (Alvesalo and Laitinen 1994:24) points out that 
white collar criminals may resort to crude legalism and consider any 
activity allowed unless forbidden by law. Therefore, the sense of social 
responsibility -interconnectedness and societal communitarianism in 
Braithwaite's (1989a) terms- must be built through bringing forward 
violations of legal as well as moral norms. Breaches of the sense of 
morals must be associated with crimes in progressive political 
discources (see Braithwaite 1995). 
1.3.6.1. Defining Wrong 
How to determine, then, when wrongful organizational actIvIty has 
taken place? One possible line of argumentation follows Simon's 
recognition that wrongfulness is expressed through inflicting harm. 
However, I include not only harming but also risking to harm other 
people in the concept of wrong. In addition, to be wrongful, it is not 
necessary to be aware of the harm or the risk. Also negligence can be 
unethical, as well as an omission as a failure to take action. As 
Braithwaite and Fisse (1990:29-30) state: "In practice, the predominant 
form of corporate fault is more likely to be corporate negligence than 
corporate intention." Since organizations wield more power than 
indi viduals to produce wrongful outcomes they can also be expected to 
have greater capacity to avoid violations (ibid.). 
The questions that follow concern measuring harm: to what degree 
must harm be approved of? It is not realistic to expect ethical interests 
to remain totally intact. This era of risks inherently includes certain 
insecurity (see Beck 1990). And, above that, what interests should be 
protected in the first place? For example, commercials often give rise 
to critical voices claiming that they offend women, minorities, good 
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taste. Is mere subjective suffering a sufficient ground to label certain 
organizational activity wrongful, and how much suffering would be 
needed? As I contend that these questions ultimately are to be resolved 
on the basis of ethical principles, they fall outside of the scope of this 
study. The exact essence of ethics cannot be totally reached; it is to be 
approached and shaped in social discourses. The acceptable degrees of 
harm or risk and the breadth of the social responsibility of 
organizations are ethical as well as political questions.6 
Something can still be said. As Simon (1996a:289) suggests, the basis 
for the ethical judgement can be found in the traditional ethical 
systems, Western and non-Western. Such established principles as the 
Golden Rule or Kant's categorical imperative provide viable 
guidelines. There are also more recent useful formulations: Henry and 
Milovanovic (1994: 119) present a fundamental approach towards the 
definition of crime -or wrongdoing. They connect crime with moments 
of inequal relations: 
-- crime, as we define it here, is the expression of some 
people's energy to make a difference over others and is the 
exclusion of those others who in the instant are rendered 
powerless. -- Crime then is the power to deny others. 
Wrongdoing can also be constituted through the demands of living in a 
communitarian society characterized by interdependent relations (see 
Braithwaite 1989a). Acts that limit the legitimate options available to 
others, trample on the autonomy of others (ibid., p.11), deny others 
their humanity, their right to make a difference (Henry and 
Milovanovic 1994: 119-20), surely come close to wrongdoing. The 
definition of wrong can also be approached through a negation: 
behavior that does not inflict nor risk any harm on anyone should not 
6Clearly, also natural science has its part to play in determining 
what is harmful. However, how strictly organizational practices are examined 
and to what extent risks should be tolerated are ultimately ethical and political 
issues. (See Beck 1990) 
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be labeled wrongdoing. Furthermore, III borderline cases, ethical 
argumentation may justify bringing questionable organizational 
activities under scrutiny. In general, raising consciousness about said 
behavior furthers social justice. 
1.3.6.2. Common Etiology between Different Kinds of Wrongs? 
While incorporating unethical, illegal and criminal acts into the 
inquiry, I bear the comments of Baucus and Dworkin (1991) in mind. 
They point out that it is not known, whether organizational violations 
of the criminal code have the same causes as violations of other laws. 
Similarly, it can be questioned whether the same etiology applies to 
unethical organizational behavior and breaking the law. Baucus and 
Dworkin conclude that in order to further understanding of the causes 
of corporate wrongdoing we should make a distinction between 
different types of wrongs. However, I reduce their argunlents to the 
recognition that organizational members may not need so strong 
techniques of justification for breaking norms that lack official legal 
support. Actors within organizations might be more deterred from 
violating the criminal code than other legal norms, and, in turn, more 
deterred from breaking any formal law than their sense of ethics. 
The state law surely guides organizational people as it carries "the 
moral bind of law" and the potential of judicial sanctions. Furthermore, 
regulation importantly gives social support to resisting violations7. 
However, breaking moral or cultural codes also is sanctioned through 
shaming by oneself and the significant others. Actually, violating 
informal group norms may lead to more severe sanctions than those 
7When making judgements, a human being is subject to social 
influence. It is easier to resist organizational pressure to engage in wrongdoing 
when one' s personal judgement is being supported e.g. by the legislation. 
Social dynamics of organizational wrongdoing are brought on the agenda in the 
Chapter 3. 
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delivered by the judicial system. In addition, people may have a 
confused view on the applicable legislation and the meaning of the 
norms is given through social processes. In the spirit of legal pluralism, 
it must be acknowledged that the state law only provides a partial view 
on the norms that guide human behavior. In conclusion, it is possible to 
analyze the dynamics of norm shaping and breaking in its totality, the 
norms including official as well as inofficial, state as well as 
organizational laws. 
1.3.6.3. Defining Organization 
It must also be made clear what is meant by the term organization in 
the context of organizational wrongdoing. A dictionary defines an 
organization as an entity adapted to its purpose (Otavan Uusi 
Sivistyssanakirja 1993) or as "several persons or groups -- who share a 
certain goal or work (Galbraith 1983:67-8)." Galbraith exemplifies: 
army, political party, enterprise and administrative unit clearly are 
organizations. Sjostrand (1981:32) provides further analysis and 
distinguishes an organization from a plain collection of people on the 
basis that the former has some traditions and stability. In general, 
organizations are seen to be characterized by three main factors: 
1) Social identity: the members share a sense of belonging 
to the organization; 
2) Coordination: their functioning is arranged to support 
and complement each other; and 
3) Goals: organizing these activities aims at attaining 
certain goals. (Statt 1994:26) 
Organizational action largely takes place in groups, and the concepts 
of organization and group actually intertwine. Groups pervade 
organizational life and can be said to be the building blocks of 
organizations (Statt 1994: 124; Schell 1987 :83). Social psychologists 
often define a group as an entity based on the interaction of two or 
more people who share certain goals and recognize their membership 
(Tiuraniemi 1993:45). A group also is characterized by certain 
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continuity and stability: a disorganized crowd is not a group. In fact, a 
group has been argued to differ from an organization simply by being 
smaller. Therefore, it is more personal and more easily influenced by 
an individual member. (Sjostrand 1981:32) An organization typically 
contains formal and informal groups (see Tiuraniemi 1993:46). 
Organizations that are referred to in this text can be either for-profit or 
non-profit organizations. Thus, in addition to business firms, the study 
concerns governmental, administrative, academic, charitable 
organizations. The focus is on understanding human behavior in overall 
organizational settings that are characterized by such features as 
hierarchical positions, division of labor, specialization, formality and 
general legitimacy. The social psychological dynamics of collective 
wrongdoing can be studied in all such organizations. J amieson 
(Helmkamp et al. 1996:65) supports this approach: "-- they (non-profit 
and government organizations) go through the same kind of structuring, 
specialization and centralization (as profit-making organizations)." 
And, as Simon (1996a:277) pointed out, also governmental 
organizations are capable of committing wrongs. 
Following the earlier discussion, this study primarily looks at 
legitimate organizations. The term organized crime refers to 
illegitimate, mafia-type organizations. Criminal organizations are run 
as means of committing crime (Potter and Gaines 1996:40) while 
organizational wrongdoing rather is a byproduct in the quest for 
legitimate goals. However, criminal syndicates share many features 
with the organizations that enjoy a legitimate label. In consequence, the 
phenomena to be discussed partially apply to illegitimate organizations 
as well. Although, e.g., the Nazi regime was deeply wrongful and 
criminal (at least by extra-organizational standards or in retrospect), it 
can be studied under organizational wrongdoing since it claimed to be 
legitimate and the people involved could claim to be law-abiding. 
Furthermore, it provides valuable data about human behavior in 
bureaucratic organizational settings. Thus, although the line between 
legitimate and illegitimate organizations is not always easily drawn, the 
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primary aim of this study is to look at ordinary people and their 
organizations that have traditionally escaped a deviant label. 
1.3.6.4. When Is the Wrong Organizational? 
Now that the concepts of organization and wrong are discussed, it still 
must be clarified how to put these terms together. How to define when 
the wrong is organizational? Doesn't human behavior always take 
place in some social setting and under the influence of certain 
historical and cultural environment? Yes, this is true but here the focus 
is on the more organized end of that continuum of social settings. I will 
center on wrongdoing that is produced by the functioning of formal 
organizations. In this kind of cases, it is possible that no individual has 
committed a violation of any formal norm and can be legally held 
responsible for the outcome. An organization can be argued to be 
negligent even if its members cannot be blamed individually. Rather, 
the outcome stems from the organizational setup as a whole. 
(Braithwaite and Fisse 1990:29) 
To illustrate the typology of white collar crime: If a corporate 
employee embezzles funds from her employer, it is an individual 
occupational crime against the organization but not an organizational 
crime. Similarly, it is an occupational violation if a surgeon conducts 
an operation while drunk. However, this nears organizational 
wrongdoing as she is allowed to do that by her organizational 
colleagues. The line between individual white collar crime and 
organizational wrongs lies in that the latter require organizational 
support: other members of the organization engage in similar behavior, 
demand or at least tolerate the wrongdoing. In addition, organizational 
wrongs are byproducts of legitimate activities and at least seemingly 
fall in line with the organizational goals. 
At this point, readers already familiar with the topic may be excused to 
move on to the Chapter 2. 
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1.4. The Prevalence of Organizations 
Organizational actors prevail in the contemporary society. Their rapid 
expansion has even been defined as possibly the most striking 
revolution of the 20th century (Reiss and Tonry 1993: 1). Citizens 
simply cannot escape the influence of organizations: At least in the 
West, already at birth a human being usually is at the hands of a huge 
organization, hospital. Child-rearing is powerfully controlled by such 
institutions as the educational system and the social welfare lllachinery. 
In Finland, the next institution that most male citizens get under 
influence of i~ army8. If one doesn't want to participate in the military 
training, one must do civil service -work within some other 
organization. Having passed all these organizations, the individual is 
still to face the ever escalating socialization process into the 
organizational world in the workplace. 
Social scientists widely maintain that organizations are growing in 
importance. Galbraith (1984:67) distinguishes three sources of power: 
property, personality and organization. According to him, organization 
is the most important of them and its importance is growing all the 
time. Property and personality only can have an effect through an 
organization. In conclusion, organization is the ultimate source of all 
power. (Ibid.) 
To a great extent, individual action takes place in organizations. 
Coleman (1982, cited in Poveda 1994:93) states that over the centuries, 
society has been transformed from a system of social relationships with 
individuals as the key building blocks to a society where organizational 
actors increasingly dominate. He refers to the rapid growth in the 
number and size of the corporations in the V.S. during this century: the 
approximate 300,000 corporations in 1918 has increased into 
approximate 3.6 million by 1987. Also the assets controlled by the 
8 Also women are nowadays legally able to join the army III 
Finland. 
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largest firms increased at the same time. Paralleling these private sector 
trends, also the government's role as an employer has grown. The 
proliferation of formal bureaucratic institutions is occurring across all 
the governmental, charitable, and non-profit sectors (Stone 1985, cited 
in Braithwaite 1989a:147). The inevitable conclusion is that in the 20th 
century, employment in large organizations has become the norm 
(Poveda 1994:93). 
Coleman (1982:56-8) elaborates his analysis and argues that social 
relationships are increasingly inequal. Interaction between corporate 
and individual actors is asymmetric, and due to the enormous growth of 
organizational actors these asymmetric relations have come to 
proliferate. The extreme inequality shows in various respects: 
Typically, the corporate actor has very large resources in comparison to 
the individual party and thus controls most of the conditions and 
information surrounding the relation. The corporation also typically 
has a multiple amount of alternative transaction partners to choose 
from. As a result, regardless of nominally equal rights, individual and 
corporate parties end up with very different actual rights. (Ibid.) 
1.5. The Damages of Organizational Wrongdoing 
It is very difficult to estimate the costs of organizational wrongdoing. 
Since only few organizational offences are detected, prosecuted, and 
finally sentenced, the official statistics are likely to represent only a 
tiny proportion of the total damages. Alvesalo and Laitinen (1994:7) 
have suggested that in the field of economic crime -which they 
considered a particular type of organizational crime- the proportion of 
hidden criminality revolves around 90 per cent. The official statistics 
are flawed also because they are based on narrow legal categories of 
wrongdoing, ignoring much victimization. As Friedrichs (1996:50) 
states, according to the conventional view the official crime statistics 
are quantitative measurements of crime and criminal justice system 
outcomes, while the critics contend that the statistics are the product of 
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particular agencies, each with ideological biases, strategic purposes, 
and finite resources. Victimization surveys are not likely to yield the 
true scope of organizational harmdoing either, because the victims do 
not always comprehend being victimized by organizations. 
There are many factors that tend to prevent harmful organizational 
conduct from being regarded as a violation. As Felstiner, Abel and 
Sarat (1981) pointed out, a legal claim takes certain preconditions. The 
first step, naming, refers to a recognition that a particular experience 
has been injuriuos. However, people do not necessarily realize having 
suffered: they may not be aware of the relevant legal, Inoral, or 
scientific9 norms and facts, and may take the status quo as granted and 
feel powerless to even imagine that things could be different. 
Accordingly, disputes are social constructs. 
Ulrich Beck (1990) illustrates the social construction of risks: The 
political nature of risks is being mystified through the technical mode 
of representation. It is practically impossible for an individual to clear 
how harmful a substance really is. Dangers of the risk society transcend 
the capacity of the daily culture to make estimates or decisions. 
Instead, specialists take over and officially define the risks people 
ought to be able to bear. Actually, a glance at the abyss of risks renders 
also regulators powerless: according to the logic of bureaucracy, what 
cannot be controlled, must be treated as legal. This kind of cultural 
mystification normalizes hazards and renders naming organizational 
action a violation unlikely. (Ibid.) 
In the social construction of disputes, the second phase is blaming. 
Here, the perceived injury is transformed into a grievance: the victim 
attributes the undesirable occurence to the fault of another individual 
or entity. (Felstiner et al. 1981) This is even more demanding than 
naming: it may be very difficult to be able to blame a certain 
9Stating, e.g., the nature and amount of the substance one is 
exposed to. 
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organization for the damage, let alone to find the guilty ones inside the 
organization. Again, the environmental example is illustrative: it may 
be practically impossible to disentangle which of the many 
organizational sources of environmental damage is causally linked to a 
particular harm. In addition, victims of faceless organizations may feel 
partly or wholly responsible for their victimization and blame 
themselves for not using sufficient caution -e.g., in case they have 
bought defective products (Croall 1992:24). 
The final step, claiming, occurs as the one with the grievance expresses 
it to the person or the entity believed to be responsible, asking for 
remedy (Felstiner et al. 1981). In the case of white collar crime, 
claiming is unlikely for many reasons: E.g., the victim may be 
uninformed of how to report the violation and pessimistic about 
receiving sufficient assistance from the criminal justice system 
(Friedrichs 1996:60). The inequality of the relationship is likely to 
deter an individual from confronting a powerful organization. 
Typically it is the organization with the most power: information, legal 
expertise, financial resources, etc. Furthermore, the damage is often 
diffused among many victims. Thus, the share of each victim may be so 
insignificant that no one bothers to take action. Distinct victims may 
expect someone else to act which may lead to overall passivitylO. 
Furthermore, claiming doesn't necessarily show in the statistics since 
even if the wrongdoing organization failed to escape confrontation, it 
typically would prefer settling disputes quietly in private in order to 
avoid negative publicity. 
The statistics of organizational wrongdoing are incomplete due to these 
kind of factors. For an incident of organizational misbehavior to be 
officially counted as a violation, it would have to be successfully 
lOThis is the problem of the freerider: it may be rational for an 
individual not to act if she can achieve her goals through other people's effort. 
From the social psychological point of view this situation can be approached in 
terms of bystander apathy which is discussed in the Chapter 3.2.1. 
28 
named, blamed and claimed. The total amount and the costs of white 
collar crime in financial -let alone human- terms are beyond 
estimations. As Braithwaite and Pettit (1990: 186) argue, there can 
never be a systematic comparison of the volume of white collar crime 
with that of other crime (Croall 1992:42). Nevertheless, there prevails a 
general agreement among criminologists, and also increasingly among 
the general public (Evans et a1. 1993), that the scope and the costs of 
white collar crime by far exceed those of conventional crime. In fact, 
we all are multiple victims of various kinds of organizational wrongs. 
As Brown and Chiang (1993:33) conclude in a melancholic way: 
There can be no doubt that the seriousness of harms produced 
by corporate crime far outweigh those that result from 
conventional crime. -- victimization by corporations is as 
inevitable as death itself. While many individuals can take 
steps to minimize the probability of being a victim of street 
crime, there is no way to prevent being a victim of corporate 
cnme. 
Organizational wrongs take many forms. This can be illustrated by 
classifying them by their primary victims: the general public, 
consumers, employees, corporation's competitors, and so on. 
Organizational wrongs can also be categorized according to their 
perpetrators such as business firms, governmental agencies, academic 
institutions. The wrongs could be divided into categories in several 
ways and placed under different headings. E.g., an environmental 
wrong may have several groups of victims like the general public, 
employees, or other organizations. In the following, damages of 
different types are brought out. To be noted is that the forthcoming list 
is by no means complete since organizational wrongs are so versatile 
and pervasive, and their perception ultimately is a matter of social 
construction. Rather than to provide a systematic analysis, my purpose 
here is to present some exemplary forms of organizational wrongdoing 
in order to provide the reader with a glimpse of the problems that 
constitute the subject matter of this thesis. 
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1.5.1. The Damage in Monetary Terms 
To begin with, let us consider organizational wrongdoing in monetary 
terms. According to the Finnish data, the financial costs of traditional 
crimes are under 5 % of those of organizational crimes. In the US, the 
figure has been estimated to be even lower, 1.7-2.3 %. (Alvesalo and 
Laitinen 1994:46) According to Simon (1996a:269): "Corporate crime 
alone accounts for an estimated $200 billion a year in avoidable loss. 
This huge loss is larger than that of all other types of crime combined, 
plus the cost of running the entire US criminal justice system." The 
loss attributable to organizational crimes is huge enough to have 
national economic relevance (for estimates, see Laitinen and Virta 
1998:69). 
Fisher and Green (1992) note that the financial costs of economic 
crimes have considerably and steadily increased in the US during the 
last few decades. Given the transboundary nature of economic 
criminality, it can be suggested that this escalating trend applies. 
(Laitinen and Virta 1998:68) 
Just one corporate crime episode, the savings and loan scandal, is 
estimated to cost the American public from $325 to $500 billion 
according to governmental estimations, and as much as $1.4 trillion -or 
over $5,000 for every American household- by other estimates. The 
victimization related to this scandal was diffused indeed, including 
legitimate investors, savings and loan employees, taxpayers, 
government agencies, and other corporations. (Brown and Chiang 
1993:34 and 36) 
A form of economic organizational misconduct with wide societal 
implications is tax avoidance. Friedrichs (1996:85-6) points out that 
major US corporations with net incomes of hundreds of millions of 
dollars have been paying virtually nothing in taxes. Active lobbying 
and close relations between the governmental and the economic elite 
affect the tax legislation in favor of corporations. Corporations also 
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have highly paid lawyers and accountants who help them to minimize 
their taxes. 
1.5.2. Damaging the Employees 
Workplace injustice can be traced back to the very foundations of 
work. According to the Marxist approach, workers are subject to 
systematic exploitation in the capitalist societies. Marx (1867) regarded 
corporation as one of the capitalist instruments to exploit and 
dehumanize workers. Owners of the means of production take unfair 
advantage of workers by not giving them the full outcome of their 
work. Engels (1845/1958) went as far as to claim that the ownership 
class is guilty of murder because they are fully aware that workers in 
factories and mines will die violent premature deaths due to unsafe 
conditions. (Friedrichs 1996:67 and 233) 
The exploitation of workers takes various forms. E.g., corporations 
drive the wages down in a number of ways: they may employ foreign, 
part-time or other low-wage workers, or directly violate the laws 
concerning the minimum wages and benefits. (Friedrichs 1996:89) 
People in organizations are replaceable: they are frequently hired, 
transferred, and fired. When the economic conditions are 
unsatisfactory, organizations have the power to major lay-offs. It has 
been suggested that lay-offs, downsizing, reorganizing, corporate 
takeovers are, regardless of the terminology, remarkable organizational 
crimes where employees are sacrificed in order tlO enhance 
organizational profits. (Brown and Chiang 1993:49-50) 
In line with Engels, dangerous working conditions have been brought 
out in the white collar crime literature. Due to inattention to safety 
regulations, workers can be injured or killed, or subjected to long-term 
health risks from working in unhealthy environments or with hazardous 
or carsinogenic substances (Croall 1992:22). Alone in the US, more 
than 100,000 workplace deaths and 2 million workplace injuries occur 
each year. In fact, work-related accidents and diseases are estimated to 
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be the single greatest cause of disability and premature death in the US 
today. Corporate violence far exceeds the magnitude of violent street 
crimes: e.g., in the US, work-related deaths have been calculated to be 
over ten times more frequent than homicides. In many industries, 
workers are routinely exposed to dangerous conditions. Especially this 
is the case in the mining, textiles and chemical industries. A prominent 
example of harmful substances is asbestos, to which workers -and 
consumers- continue to be exposed despite the conclusive scientific 
evidence of its lethality. (Friedrichs 1996:80-2; Brown and Chiang 
1993:39-40) 
Although not all workplace accidents, injuries and deaths result from 
violations, a sizeable proportion does, and may be blamed on the 
management. Pierce and Tombs (1990) conclude that "in at least two 
out of three fatal accidents, managements were in violation of the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 in terms of their general duties to 
employees."(Croall 1992:40) 
Although these findings originate from the US, also in Finland a 
considerable share of worker accidents is attributed to labor crime 
(Alvesalo and Laitinen 1994:47-8). In the similar vein, Carson (1981, 
cited in Croall 1992:40-1) found that many fatalities which often are 
attributed to the inherent dangers of working on the "frontiers of 
technology" in fact resulted from routine breaches of safety 
regulations. Furthermore, even if the "accidents" didn't include 
violations of formal norms, they may fit the category of avoidable 
harms (Friedrichs 1996:81; Brown and Chiang 1993:39). This concerns 
other kinds of organizational harmdoing as well. Frequently in cases 
where employees have been exposed, there is evidence suggesting that 
the corporation has long been aware of the risks and actively resisted 
regulation (Friedrichs, p.82). 
In addition to the above mentioned wrongful patterns, several 
misbehaviors could be listed. Workers may be mistreated through 
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seXIsm, raCIsm or other inhumane treatment. (Brown and Chiang 
1993:49-50) 
1.5.2.1. Examples of Organizing an Employee Hazard 
Chicken Plant Fire 
An often cited episode of organizational wrongdoing took place in 
North Carolina in 1991 as 25 workers died in a chicken plant fire. The 
plant didn't have any alarms nor a sprinkler system. The workers had 
tried to open the emergency exit doors but they were locked. (Brown 
and Chiang 1993:43) The reason for keeping the doors locked was to 
prevent the workers from stealing chickens (Simon 1996a:279). 
Continued Exposing of Employees to Hazardous Substances 
Also the case of Anne (Rothschild and Miethe 1994) will do as an 
example of severe organizational wrongdoing against the ernployees. In 
1990, Anne was hired as a casting operator for a company that makes 
rubber belts. Her job was to mix the chemicals needed in the 
production. After a few days in the job, she started to note unusual 
physical reactions. However, having worked for two nlOnths, her 
supervisor gave her a special commendation stating that no one had 
ever learnt the job so quickly, and asked if she would assist in training 
of the others. A coupple of weeks after that, her symptons developed 
into significant physical problems. Therefore, Anne told her boss that 
she wanted to study more about the chemicals she was dealing with and 
their possible side effects. As a result, she was fired. (Ibid.) 
After her dismissal, Anne heard from the other employees that she had 
not been the only one to have medical problems in that job. In studies, 
it was found out that the company was exposing its workers without 
warning nor protection to more than 100 times the levels of certain 
chemicals that the law allowed. The effects of the chemical exposure 
had been in the company's knowledge for over a decade. As a result of 
this continuous organizational criminal pattern, Anne had developed 
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tumors in her mouth, permanent liver and lung damage and her skull 
began to soften. She learnt the full extent of the damages only after 
consulting independent doctors; first, the company had referred her to 
the local doctors who tried to suppress the problem. (Ibid.) 
1.5.3. Damaging the Consumers 
Also consumers are being victimized by various organizational wrongs, 
ranging from minor financial harms to severe threats to their health. 
There is a vast range of ways to offend against consumers: roulette 
systems may be manipulated, products forged, unsafe products 
launched on the market, and in bogus sale offers consumers may be 
misled into thinking that they are being offered a real bargain when in 
reality no higher price has ever been charged. Consumers can be 
deceived about the quality as well as the quantity of the goods they are 
buying. Although some of these wrongs may sound trivial, it is to be 
noted that they may amount to surprisingly high illegitimate profits as 
you add up the dispersed losses of the numerous customers who are 
charged a little too much, given too little, and charged for services they 
did not need. (See Croall 1992) 
Many consumer products have been found hazardous to various 
degrees. In the US, defective products cause more than 30,000 deaths 
each year (Brown and Chiang 1993:39). According to some estimates, 
about 70,000 Americans die annually from product-related accidents, 
and millions suffer disabling injuries (Friedrichs 1996:75). During the 
making of this thesis, media have been rife with news related to 
organizations risking or harming their customers in Finland. E.g., many 
defective products have been withdrawn from the market, and there 
have been serious transport accidents in which several passengers have 
got killed or injured. In addition, the debate on the possible health 
effects of mobile telephones is still going on, and the researchers claim 
that sure knowledge will not be obtained for a long time (Tikkanen and 
lokela 1998). Such phones radiate radio waves, which have been 
suggested to be linked with various health problems. Meanwhile, over 
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40 % of the Finnish population regularly use a mobile telephone. 
(Ibid.) 
In automobile advertisements, corporate responsibility toward the 
consumers has become more visible with time and it has even become a 
trend to advertise cars by referring to safety issues. Nowadays, 
accidents and injuries are more widely attributed to automobile design 
defects, and not only to driver errors or the road conditions. However, 
unsafe vehicles are still launched on the market, and automobile 
companies have suppressed data on unsafe designs even in the 80s and 
90s. (Friedrichs 1996:77 and 79) 
Some consumer products threaten life even when they are used as 
intended by the manufacturer and contain no defect. In addition to 
automobiles, tobacco and alcohol are among the primary health 
problems universally. Yet they are being forcefully advertised. In 
addition, the tobacco industry has long refused to acknowledge the 
causal link between tobacco and illnesses, and lobbied against controls 
on smoking. (Brown and Chiang 1993:48-9) 
Corporations commonly engage in false advertising as they present 
exaggerated or totally false claims concerning, e.g., the product's 
nutritional value or the demonstrations that have been calTied out in 
order to secure safety. Quite recently, several such cases have been 
revealed in the US: E.g., cars that were sold as new had in fact been 
driven hundreds of miles by the selling company's executives and in 
some cases even been to accidents. In another case, a cheap mixture of 
sugar and corn syrup was mislabeled and sold as apple juice. 
(Friedrichs 1996:88) 
Corporations entice especially children to consume nrisleadingly 
named foods with an unhealthy high content of sugar or fat. Food 
products are also widely processed with additives that may risk the 
consumers' health. (Friedrichs 1996:75; Simon 1996a:128) Croall 
argues that the excessive use of water, additives and other substitutes 
35 
for real food can be called legalized adulteration. Consumers can also 
be killed or injured by foreign bodies in food and poisoned by food. It 
has been estimated that the majority of people have eaten products 
made from unfit or knacker meat. (Croall 1992:22 and 38) Still in the 
final decades of the 20th century, millions of Americans were suffering 
from food poisoning as a result of unsanitary conditions in 
meatpacking plants, marketing of unsafe meat and bribing inspectors 
(Friedrichs 1996:75). In England and Wales, Environmental Health 
Officers have reported more than 12 % of restaurants, canteens, hotels, 
school and hospital kitchens, and food factories to pose a significant 
and imminent health risk to the public (Croall, p.39). 
Yet another form of corporate misbehavior against the consumers is 
price-fixing which means that competing firms join together and agree 
to set prices at a certain level. Even if this activity didn't involve a 
specific conspiracy, the competitors can adopt parallel pricing wherein 
they adjust their price level to the inflated prices set by the industry 
leaders. According to much evidence from the US, price-fixing has 
been extremely common across a broad range of industries, reaching 
virtually every imaginable product or service. Furthermore, 
corporations have taken advantage of supply shortages and especially 
vulnerable classes of consumers -who cannot control the service, or 
urgently need a specific product- and overcharged in some cases by 
thousands of per cents. (Friedrichs 1996:86-7) Systematic overcharging 
at the expense of patients who need a certain drug is not only an 
economic organizational wrong but a threat to human life. Moreover, 
as an example of exploiting vulnerable consumers, approximately 
15,000 deaths have been attributed to unnecessary medical operations 
in the US each year (ibid., p.57). 
1.5.3.1. The Pharmaceutical Industry 
Serious injuries and death can result from using inadequately tested 
drugs or medical devices. In 1973, Dow Corning Corporation 
announced that tests support the safety of silicone implants. Since that, 
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millions of women have received implants. However, in 1991, reports 
began to surface stating that the testing had been inaccurate. A former 
employee of Dow Corning has claimed that the silicone breast implants 
the company sold could rupture and leak, posing a serious health risk. 
Internal documents of the company reveal that the organizational men 
had been aware of the implant problems but concealed the information 
for nearly twenty years. (Friedrichs 1996:77; Brown and Chiang 
1993:41-2) 
There are a number of other wrongs committed in the pharmaceutical 
industry (in depth, Braithwaite 1984). Among the most heinous ones 
are the cases of Thalidomide and Dalkon Shield. Thalidomide was 
prescribed as a tranquilizer during pregnancy in the early 60s. Chemie 
Grunenthal-the principal pharmaceutical company involved- continued 
to promote Thalidomide despite, according to much evidence, the 
company had had early indications of the drug's dangers. This 
organizational wrong resulted in about 8,000 babies being born grossly 
deformed. The company did not stop promoting Thalidomide until the 
enormous scope of the harm had been widely published and they were 
forced to withdraw the drug from the market. (Friedrichs 1996:76) 
In the 70s, an intrauterine birth control device called Dalkon Shield 
was declared safe and sold by A.H. Robbins Company. The Dalkon 
Shield was used by 4.5 million women worldwide. In effect, using the 
device exposed women to high risk of infection, sterility, spontaneous 
abortions, giving birth to children with major congenital defects, and 
death. It has been estimated that thousands of women died of using the 
Dalkon Shield. Also this case involved suppressing scientific studies 
and concealing the hazards from the consumers. (Friedrichs 1996: 7 6-7; 
Brown and Chiang 1993:42-3) The Robbins company sold the Dalkon 
Shield in some 40 Third world countries after it had been withdrawn 
from the US market. It is argued to be a widespread practice that 
pharmaceutical companies take advantage of the more lenient controls 
in the Third world countries to market drugs and devices banned in the 
West. Also other manufacturers dump unsafe products or waste banned 
37 
in one country into others. (Cass 1996; Brown and Chiang 1993:45; 
Croall 1992:42) 
1.5.3.2. The Ford Pinto Case 
There is still a significant and frequently cited case to be mentioned: 
the making and launching of a defective automobile, Ford Pinto. The 
Pinto case was a milestone in the mobilization of criminal law as a 
response to avoidable consumer injuries and deaths (Brown and Chiang 
1993:40). 
In the late 60s, facing increasing competition from foreign smaller-
sized and advantageous imports, the president of the Ford Motor 
Company called for the production of a car which would weigh less 
than 2,000 pounds and cost less than $2,000. These requirements 
affected the design of the car, and the gas tank was placed in the rear. 
(Friedrichs 1996:78) It has been claimed that before releasing Pinto on 
the market, the executives at Ford were aware that the gas tank was 
vulnerable to rupturing and exploding upon low-impact rear-end 
collisions. The refusal to redesign Pinto's fuel system saved the 
company $137 million, while they had calculated that they would lose 
$49.5 million in damage suits for deaths, injuries and property loss. On 
the basis of this calculation, the company decided not to make the 
improvements that could have prevented the injurious outcomes. It has 
been estimated that there were at least 500 bum deaths caused by the 
Pinto crashes. (Brown and Chiang 1993:40-1) 
1.5.4. Damaging the Environment 
There is no lack of examples of the damage done to the environment as 
a byproduct of industrial activity. In fact, corporate contribution to 
environmental pollution may be the most common form of corporate 
harmdoing. Corporations account for a disproportionately large share 
of the most dangerous pollution. Pollution is associated with a wide 
range of serious health problems, including heart and lung diseases, 
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birth defects, genetic disorders, and sterility. Furthermore, it is 
estimated that 56 million people in the US alone will develop cancer, 
and by some estimates as many as 80-90 % of all cancers may be 
environmentally related. (Friedrichs 1996:71-2). 
In addition to pollution, environment is being damaged by toxic waste. 
Corporations often have employed highly hazardous low-cost methods 
in order to get rid of their wastes, although they have known or should 
have known the risks of the dumping. Furthermore, corporations have 
suppressed information on the dangers of wastes and pollution, and 
typically denied responsibility for the consequences of their 
environmental practices. They also often have carried on with their 
misconduct until forced to change, and actively lobbied against 
environmental legislation. (Friedrichs 1996:72) 
Simon (1996a: 144) points out how fundamentally corporations 
participate in the collective jeopardy: natural balance is being 
disturbed, resources wasted, and the consumption of non-renewable 
resources and energy have escalated. E.g., the American auto industry 
has suppressed a viable mass transit altenative and delayed the 
introduction of vehicle exhaust control devices (Friedrichs 1996:73; 
Simon 1996a: 151; Poveda 1994: 118-9). Corporations also aggravate 
the waste problem by constantly designing new products and new 
versions of the existing products. These novelties are supposed to make 
the older products inattractive through pervasive advertising. (Simon, 
p.144) 
1.5.4.1. The Love Canal: A Scene of Environmental Damage 
In the late 30s, Hooker Chemical Company purchased an area of land 
near Niagara Falls, New York. For about 15 years, the company used 
the area as a dump site for hundreds of tons of chemicals. 
Subsequently, in 1953, the site was sold to the school board and a 
school, a playground, and hudreds of houses were built on or around it. 
The company allegedly had failed to inform the board that the land had 
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been used for chemical dumping. (Poveda 1994: 117; Brown and 
Chiang 1993:44) 
The results were catastrophical: children were burnt by toxic wastes 
and there occurred a disproportionate rate of miscarriages and birth 
defects. However, the history of the dumping was not released until the 
chemicals began leaking into homes in the late 70s. Tests showed the 
presence of 82 chemicals, including 12 known carsinogens. Finally, 
239 families had to be evacuated from the Love Canal. The episode 
came to cost taxpayers approximately $200 million. (Ibid.) 
1.5.5. Damaging the Competitors 
Organizational wrongdoing also victimizes other organizations. 
Similarly to the other categories of organizational wrongs the 
harmdoing takes various forms. 
First, the damage can be indirect: e.g., acid rain caused by certain 
branches of industry falls on the forest economy, and industrial 
landscape doesn't attract tourism (see Beck 1990: 104). Other than that, 
organizations can use their power to directly victimize their 
competitors. They can try to annihilate the competitors by reducing the 
competitors' sales and increasing their costs. These goals may be 
achieved, e.g., through predatory pricing, pressuring other parties to 
boycotts, making special deals with the suppliers of the raw materials, 
or even arranging outright sabotages against the competitors. In 
addition, competitors can be harmed through violating their immaterial 
rights like patent, trademark or copyright. Also false advertising and 
misrepresentation of products harms the competitors as the offender 
gets unfair advantage. (Friedrichs 1996:91; Sutherland 1949:76) 
Numerous additional examples could be presented: e.g., espionage, 
hostile takeovers, bribery and corruption (Croall 1992:22). 
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1.5.6. Governmental Wrongdoing 
Also governmental action can be attributed to people behaving in an 
organizational context, and also governmental entities are capable of 
produring massive harm even on a global scale (Simon 1996:277). In 
fact, the worst crimes have been committed in the name of government. 
Accordingly, Braithwaite (1992: 100, cited in Friedrichs 1996: 129) 
suggests Hitler to be "the greatest white-collar criminal of our 
century". Alone in the 20th century, state actions like wars, genocides, 
massacres and mass executions have killed over 100 million people. 
Activity that involves unjustly depriving people of their property, way 
of life or even their lives can reasonably be seen as criminal. Therefore, 
also imperialistic conquests have been labeled criminal behavior of 
extraordinary width. (Friedrichs, pp.122 and 126) 
Friedrichs (1996: 128-35) regards state criminality as governmental 
crime. There are different forms in which the state can deviate from its 
true mission: The state can be called 
1) criminal when it is used as an instrument to commit 
crimes. This most often applies to crimes against 
humanity. A prominent example is the Nazi regime 
during the 2nd W orId War. 
2) repressive as it systematically deprives its citizens of 
fundamental human rights. A clear example is the 
aparthaid era South Africa. 
3) corrupt in case it is used as an instrument to enrich its 
leaders. This has taken place, e.g., in the Philippines 
and in many African nations. 
4) negligent as it fails to prevent suffering or death, or 
grossly wastes its resources. As an example, Friedrichs 
offers the US policy in regard to the AIDS problem in 
the 80s: both the state level and local governments took 
action in a slow and ineffective way although a more 
efficient response could have saved many lives. Also 
the US policy during the 2nd W orId War will do as an 
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example: although aware of the Nazi deathcamps, the 
US leadership failed to more actively act against the 
genocidal activities. (Ibid.) 
The range of governmental wrongdoing is vast. In addition to the above 
mentioned questionable practices, state officials have also widely 
participated in assassinations 11, criminal conspiracies, spying on 
citizens, selling arms to blacklisted countries, terrorism, etc. (Friedrichs 
1996: 134-7). As Friedrichs admits, allegations of state criminality are 
ultimately subjective and based on ideology. Accordingly, the fourth 
category can be suggested to include such negligence as inadequate 
governmental responses to poverty, crime, environmental degradation, 
and so on. (Ibid., pp.128-35) 
In relation to governmental wrongs, the political nature of the question 
what is criminal surfaces in an extreme way. As Friedrichs points out, 
the abuse of governmental power can be divided into two categories: 
either certain laws are violated or the state exercises power it ought not 
to have. A wrongful governmental practice may not violate any official 
law because the offenders themselves have prevented the legislation 
that would restrict their very power. Not only has the formal legislation 
approved of the heinous destruction of the Jews by the Nazis, but also 
terrible historical crimes such as the annihilation of Native American 
peoples and the slavery trade of African Americans have once been 
celebrated as triumphs of Western civilization. (Friedrichs 1996:124-6) 
In this reference, it becomes strikingly clear that criminological inquiry 
must not be restricted by the legislative categories. 
Also the Vietnam war provides a notorious example of organizational 
violence backed by the government. In addition to the fact that the war 
IIE.g., a Cuban court of law has estimated the US officials to have 
attempted to murder Fidel Castro 637 times (Tuohinen 1999)! 
42 
itself can be condemned as criminal12, the accusations of specific 
violations by the US soldiers include, e.g., illegal detention of civilians, 
torture of prisoners, use of napalm and other chemicals" burning 
villages, and bombing hospitals. Furthermore, the extensive destruction 
of forest can be considered a major environmental wrong. The single 
most wicked incident of the US violence in Vietnam arguably was the 
massacre of about 100 villagers in My Lai 1968. (Friedrichs 1996:127) 
1.5.7. Psychological Damage 
Yet a crucial type of damage is to be mentioned. Both public and 
private organizations typically enjoy general legitimacy and have the 
moral responsibility not to engage in unethical action and to refrain 
from furthering social injustice. Knowledge of the prevalence of 
questionable and even highly harmful organizational practices erodes 
the trust towards them. The violation of the social trust may lead to 
institutional legitimacy crisis, and increase alienation from social 
institutions and values. Also the legitimacy of the judicial system is 
likely to decrease due to its incapacity to effectively name, blame and 
claim the wrongs and their organizational perpetrators. 
It can also be argued that perceived white collar crime increases the 
general level of wrongdoing in society. Awareness of the enormous 
scope of organizational wrongdoing may create cynisism toward the 
law and other institutions of social control. In addition, the wrongful 
nature of one's own unethical, illegal or criminal acts may be 
successfully neutralized and wiped out in comparisons to the severe 
injustice committed by people in legitimate positions. Furthermore, 
societal elites provide rolemodels and their conduct gives signals about 
successful behavior (Simon 1996a:269). 
12Both in the legal as well as a broader sense of the word (see 
Friedrichs 1996: 127). 
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Beck suggests that living in the risk society is a Katka-like experience 
characterized by the absurd situations one is likely to confront in a 
totalitarian, impenetrable, labyrinthine world. The analogy between the 
experiences in the risk society and those of Josef K. is fertile: In the 
same vein as Mr. K is arrested while in bed, the dangers of the risk 
society penetrate into our most intimate walks of life, taking advantage 
of human vulnerability. Risks transcend all boundaries. (Beck 1990:94-
7) 
Protesting against the risks furthers absurdity: The protest must follow 
the same professional discourse in which the risks originate. The critic 
is also bound to the official procedure which, as we have noticed, 
typically fails to challenge organizational wrongdoing. "Die 
organisierte Unverantwortlichkeit" renders proving organizational 
misconduct impossible, which can only result in the victim seeking 
causes for the uneasy awareness of the risks in herself. And indeed: 
Since organizational action is so pervasive today and everyone is 
manyfold victimized, the lack of confidence may be overwhelming. In 
order to reach psychic balance and to cope with the uncertainty 
involved in organizational outcomes and the absurd risks that are 
beyond comprehension, one is inclined to look for justification for the 
wrongdoing in oneself. Exactly in the similar fashion becomes J osef 
K.'s protest suffocated: in the end, he is lead to charge himself. (Ibid.) 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES 
2.1. Introduction to the Theories 
In this chapter, I will present the dominant criminological theories that 
have been applied to white collar crime. Naturally, all criminological 
theories cannot be incorporated. The purpose here has been to select 
the theories that are prominent in the criminological literature (e.g., 
Friedrichs 1996; Poveda 1994; Laine 1991; Braithwaite 1989a and b) 
and have important aspects to offer in the vast programme towards 
understanding organizational wrongdoing. Leaving a certain theory out 
either implies that I have not considered it relevant in this context or 
that it is a relatively unknown or undeveloped hypothesis overlooked in 
the references of this thesis. 
Traditional criminological theorizing has emphasized crime primarily 
as a lower-class phenomenon. In addition, most theories and 
conceptions center on individuals rather than on organizations (Tonry 
and Reiss 1993:3). Consequently, explanations of criminal behavior 
have been sought for in factors like physical deviations" lack of 
intelligence, emotional disturbances, and poverty. Obviously, these 
factors are insufficient explanations of organizational behavior. 
(Sutherland 1983:258) However, as Baucus and Dworkin (1991:232) 
argue, little is known about the factors that lead to corporate 
misconduct. Most likely organizational wrongs derive from an 
interplay of various factors. Thus, several theories may hold some 
truth, and the causes can be looked for on many levels. 
Theories of white collar crime have largely been constructed on the 
basis of the traditional criminological theories. Although these theories 
typically focus on criminal behavior -which in a strict sense refers to 
violations of the penal code only- my interpretation is that these 
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theoretical approaches can be understood more widely and applied to 
breaking other norms, too. Referring to the discussion earlier in this 
text, I don't find it very plausible to search for theories that would 
explain the causes of certain behavior defined by the legislation. The 
label of crime does not directly follow the behavior's nature but is in a 
relatively contingent way due to political processes and human 
imperfection to criminalize the most injurious wrongs. The theoretical 
contributions that are presented occasionally suffer from 
terminological inclarity and contradiction with my conceptual 
preferences. In the following, this simply means that the term crime 
must not be understood in a lawyer's viewpoint but in that of a 
sociologist's. Despite this terminological multiplicity, my intent is to 
draw from these theories at least partial and theoretically viable 
explanations of the problem of organizational criminality, illegality, 
and unethicality: organizational wrongdoing. 
As was the case with the damages of organizational wrongs, also the 
theories can be categorized in different ways. A common criterion of 
classification follows the level of analysis: Human behavior is affected 
by macro- and microlevel as well as situational factors. Accordingly, 
certain theories emphasize structural and societal factors, while others 
are more individual-oriented. In the case of organizational wrongs, the 
organization is a central level of analysis. 
As I invoke the theories, I reach for escalating understanding. As I 
chose the theories' order of appearance, I looked at their implied 
conception of human being. Totally overlooked is the demonic 
explanation of criminality since it perceives human beings as subject to 
otherwordly influences (Friedrichs 1996:215). I have also left out 
biogenetic explanations of criminal behavior since my interest is in 
understanding why biologically normal people engage in wrongdoing. 
Attributing human behavior merely to demons, biogenetics, or personal 
pathologies are too simple explanations of organizational wrongdoing. 
As Friedrichs (p.219) concludes: 
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Altogether, then, there is currently little reason to believe that 
indi vidualistic factors take us very far in understanding white 
collar crime. 
However, individual differences are relevant, too: some people are 
more uncritical to follow authorities and group norms than others, not 
everyone takes her illegitimate chances, and so on. Still, individual 
characteristics must be analyzed in relation to organizational processes 
since human behavior is at the same time biological, psychological, and 
social. Such micro-macro connection of organizational wrongdoing 
will be discussed especially in the 3rd Chapter. 
Braithwaite (l989a:9) contends: 
Criminological theory has tended to adopt a rather pas si ve 
conception of the criminal. Criminal behavior is determined 
by biological, psychological and social structural variables 
over which the criminal has little control. 
I will begin my analysis with the theories that hold quite superficial 
basic assumptions about the human agency. The three approaches to be 
discussed first -control theory, strain/opportunity theory and rational 
actor/crime as choice theory- all imply a rather one-dimensional and 
oversimplified view on the human nature. According to them, people 
rather automatically follow a set of social conditions, be it social 
control, opportunities, or benefit-cost calculation. 
Thereafter, the next theoretical approach is neutralization theory. It 
views human actor in more sophisticated terms, acknowledging the 
human sense of morals which is especially crucial in regard to 
organizational wrongs. Then, the perspective is still widened through 
the concept of culture -which actually incorporates neutralitzations. As 
it is held that various theories offer their share in the overalll project of 
understanding organizational wrongdoing, I finally turn to approaches 
that integrate different theories. Coleman and Sutherland bring 
together organizational and wider societal processes. As a sophisticated 
postlude, Braithwaite builds upon Sutherland's heritage and comes up 
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with a rich framework of old and new components. The last three 
theories have been designed bearing in mind their applicability to white 
collar crime. 
When presenting the theories, I intend to bring forward their very 
cores. However, I also aim at a critical evaluation of their adequacy to 
organizational wrongdoing. In this effort, the theories are interpreted 
and occasionally extended. 
2.1.1. In Search of a General Theory 
There is no consensus of the plausibility of a general theory of white 
collar crime, let alone all criminality. Braithwaite (1989b:333) 
describes the situation: "The scholars who have taken up the challenge 
of explaining the criminality of the powerful generally have eschewed 
the Sutherland program of building general theory that gives an 
account of all types of crime." There are scholars with serious doubts 
towards united explanations of the various forms of white collar crime. 
The common rationale is that white collar crime includes far too many 
different forms basically unrelated to each other (e.g., Friedrichs 
1996:212-3). 
There prevails considerable cynisism towards a general theory of white 
collar crime in its organizational form as well. E.g., Baucus and 
Dworkin (1991:239) state that 
-- we can no longer assume that one theory explains all types 
of corporate wrongdoing. -- few of us would argue that 
theories of ethical or unethical corporate behavior explain 
illegal or criminal corporate activities. 
Simpson (1986:860, cited in Shover and Bryant 1993:162) 
accompames: 
We cannot assume etiological invariance between and within 
corporate crime categories -- Corporate illegality is as diverse 
as street crime --. 
48 
Admittedly, the activities presented in this text are various and may 
seem to have little in common. 
However, there are also theorists who trace a general theory not only of 
corporate, organizational or white collar crime but all lawbreaking. 
Such prominent criminologists as Sutherland and Braithwaite have 
been ambitious enough to invest in a general theory, although they 
regard their hypotheses only as contributions to the grand project of 
formulating a general theory. Braithwaite (1990) wants to give a 
general theory a chance and calls for empirical scrutiny. He argues that 
most crimes may share certain elements without which they would not 
have occurred. However, he acknowledges that the general theory 
needs to be complemented by theories of particular types (Braithwaite 
1989a). Also Sutherland (1983:240) maintained self-criticism, 
admitting the limits of the available data and that his hypothesis "is 
certainly not a complete or universal explanation of white collar crime 
or of other crime, but it perhaps fits the data of both types of crimes 
better than any other general hypothesis." 
2.2. Control Theory 
Control theory is a traditional criminological theory that has been 
applied to white collar crime, too. The basic assumption of the theory 
is that crime is rooted in the human nature. We all are potential 
criminals, and unless internal drives and impulses are restrained by 
external social forces, criminal behavior will result. The social bonds 
between an individual and her society -family, school, church, friends, 
neighborhood, etc.- maintain conformity. In case these bonds are 
weakened, the likelihood of crime increases. (Poveda 1994:91-2; Laine 
1991:63) 
Thus, the question that control theorists pose is: why doesn't one 
offend? According to Hirschi (1969, cited in Braithwaite 1989a:27), 
the key is social control. There are four aspects of the social bond: 
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1) Attachment: emotional connection to other people; 2) Commitment: 
investment in social relationships; 3) Involvement: participation in 
legitimate activities; and 4) Belief: acknowledging the desirability of 
obedience to social norms. 
Critical Evaluation 
Control theory can be criticized as it fails to account for the fact that 
white collar offenders typically hold many ties to the community: they 
have social relationships, participate in legitimate activities, and 
respect the law in general. Furthermore, the theory should acknowledge 
that much wrongdoing in fact follows from sticking to the collective, 
submitting oneself to social control. People in organizations largely 
obey their subcultural norms and may follow their peers and superiors 
even into wrongful courses of action. Therefore, the diversity of social 
control needs to be recognized. Moreover, the functioning of social 
control is not one-dimensional: it can even be counterproductive as the 
labeling approach points out. Clearly, the dynamics, the opposite forces 
embedded in the control need elaboration: how exactly does social 
control work to reduce deviance; what kind of social control is 
effective? (See Braithwaite 1989a:29-30) 
Generally speaking, control theory's view on the human nature is in 
coherence with that of strain/opportunity theory and rational choice 
theory (Friedrichs 1996:228) which are discussed below. Therefore, 
further critical voices emerge as the text proceeds. 
2.3. Strain/Opportunity Theory 
Following the tendency to adapt already existing theories, strain theory 
originates from an explanation of lower-class crime and urban gang 
delinquency. According to the theory, crime results from socially 
structured pressures. Merton (1938) argued that strain is socially 
produced by the unequal distribution of legitimate means by which to 
achieve widely shared cultural goals. Elaborating this theory, Cloward 
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and Ohlin (1960) attributed gang delinquency to the unequal 
distribution of both legal and illegal opportunities and argued that for 
delinquency to result from blocked legitimate means, illegitimate 
means to achieve the aspired goal must be open. (Poveda 1994:87-8; 
Braithwaite 1989b:336-7) 
As Braithwaite (1989b:337) states, the theories of Merton, Cloward 
and Ohlin can be conceptualized so that they apply to individual as 
well as organizational goals and opportunities. The most important 
cultural aspiration -at least in the US- is material success. It has been 
argued that crime derives from the American dream which emphasizes 
universal competition for material success, orientation on achievement, 
and individualism. (Simon 1996a:269-70) The cultural stress on 
economic success arguably leads to greed: new goals are set as soon as 
the old ones are achieved (Vaughan 1983:59, cited in Braithwaite, 
ibid.)13. Thus, although wealth may satisfy, still more is reached for, 
and if not easily attained by legitimate means illegitimate ones may be 
taken. E.g., in competitive bidding, it is uncertain whether a candidate 
will reach the contract. Thus, legitimate means are being threatened 
and a bribe may be offered in order to achieve the goal. 
Braithwaite (1992:80-6) elaborates opportunity theory by pointing out 
that offenders can affect the opportunities that open to them. In 
addition to legitimate opportunities, wealth and power also produce 
illegitimate ones and, at the same time, immunity from accountability. 
Surplus value -that is for exchange rather than for use- can be invested 
in the creation of illegitimate opportunities not available to the poor. 
Organizations are able to use their legal, economic, technological and 
other resources to create opportunities not available to individual actors 
(Shover and Bryant 1993: 145). 
13Simon (1996:271) notes: "No matter what their income level, 
most Americans want about 50 per cent more money." See also Braithwaite 
(1992). 
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Shapiro (1990) emphasizes the concept of trust in relation to white 
collar crime for such crime is facilitated by the confidence we have in 
white collar actors. The organization of an occupation may involve 
little opportunity for supervision, and, in consequence, opportunities 
for misconduct are open. In Shapiro's terms, trustees -providers of 
goods or services- are entrusted to carry out functions ordered by 
principals -clients or employers. E.g., when a consumer takes her car to 
be repaired, her incompetence or indifference may offer the company 
an illegitimate opportunity to overcharge or to do unnecessary repairs. 
Customers may also represent "passing trade" in case they are not 
likely to return: e.g., tourists are vulnerable to misconduct. Some 
occupations provide more opportunities for misconduct than others14. 
(CroallI992:60-2) 
Critical Evaluation 
Shover and Bryant (1993: 144) attribute the attraction of illegitimate 
opportunities to the absence of immediate guardian or effective 
controls. Their proposition of opportunity theory is that the rate of 
criminal participation varies directly with the supply of criminal 
opportunities. What follows from strict interpretations of opportunity 
and control theory -as well as rational actor theory- is that an actor 
automatically would seize available illegitimate opportunities, if 
confronted by the absence of legitimate means, controls or sufficient 
deterrence. These hypotheses need a closer analysis of the human sense 
of ethics. 
Opportunity theory should acknowledge that not all wrongful 
opportunities are taken advantage of. Elaborating this point, it can be 
asked how organizations perceive their opportunities: to what extent 
must opportunities be blocked in order to provide sufficient 
rationalization for misconduct? E.g., if legitimate opportunities to make 
14See classification of occupations according to their criminal 
opportunities by Mars (1982). 
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profit are threatened, a company could invest more resources III 
improving its products or reformulate its business idea. In case the 
legitimate opportunities were completely blocked the theory would 
gain explanatory power: in a collapsed cave, explorers committed 
cannibalism since legitimate opportunities to survive were blocked 
indeed (Douglas 1987:4-5). However, most often this is not the case. 
Rather, the absence of legitimate means is a matter of social 
perception. Wealth can be attained through a variety of means, and 
more specific goals can be altered. So, the question renaains: what 
makes some actors ready to take their illegitimate chances? 
Croall (1992:70) refers to cultural factors, such as "ambivalence 
towards white collar crime" and emphasis on material values, to 
increase illegitimate solutions. However, these factors prevail in 
society in general, and it still needs to be answered what makes certain 
actors follow cultural rationalizations while others follow the law and 
morals. Braithwaite (1989a:34) suggests that the impact of 
organizational subcultures intertwines with that of blocked 
opportunities. Subcultural theories do offer a plausible way to proceed 
and are presented further in this text. 
Shover and Bryant (1993: 147-8) add that a factor that also varies 
directly with the crime rate is the supply of motivated offenders. They 
distinguish three factors that produce firms with personnel predisposed 
to lawbreaking, incorporating the level of market uncertainty, cultures 
of noncompliance, and the qualities of the controls. Also Coleman 
(1987:424) notes that although there is no crime without opportunity, 
the illegitimate behavior must also be psychologically available to the 
actor. He defines opportunity as based on objective social conditions 
while motivation is a subjective construction of one's personal desires. 
Shover and Bryant (1993: 164) argue that direct tests of opportunity 
theory are very few, and that it is not known how well opportunity and 
crime as choice theories actually explain corporate crime. However, 
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opportunity theory can provide some understanding as the examples 
below go to show. 
2.3.1. Empirical Illustrations of the Theory's Explanatory Power 
1) Sutherland (1949) suggested in his study of 70 major US 
corporations that corporations that share the same position in the 
economic structure have a high degree of similarity in behavior. He 
found no other factor to significantly affect corporate lawbreaking, 
concluding that the variations are not due to the corporations' age or 
size nor to the personality characteristics of their executives. Instead, 
Sutherland (1983:258-63) argued that 
-- position in the economic structure determines in a gross 
sense the opportunity and need for violation of the law. -- The 
corporations in one industry tend to have approximately equal 
numbers of adverse decisions --. 
These Sutherland's findings seem to provide support for 
strain/opportunity theory, for it is suggested that a certain position 
rather automatically leads to wrongdoing. 
2) Braithwaite (1989b:337-8) describes an exemplary case to which 
opportunity theory can be applied: In the pharmaceutical industry, it 
commonly costs a fortune to develop a product. In case the product is 
banned around the world due to doubts over side effects, the 
manufacturer's legitimate opportunities would be blocked, or at least 
threatened. The company might be prone to look for illegitimate 
opportunities, such as a health minister in some country who would 
accept bribes in return for allowing the product into the country. 
Braithwaite concludes that the relatively high level of bribery in the 
international pharmaceutical industry can be understood in terms of 
two factors: First, known networks of corruption present illegitimate 
opportunities. Second, the blocking of legitimate opportunities is 
unusually severe for the corporations depend on a small number of 
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successful products, and having spent a fortune on a product, a ban is 
a major cricis. 
Applied to this type of cases, opportunity theory provides fertile 
analysis, yet not the whole story. The same is true of the next example. 
3) Often offered to support strain/opportunity theory are the fraudulent 
auto repairs studied by Faberman (1975) and Leonard and Weber 
(1970) (cited, e.g., in Poveda 1994:88; Shover and Bryant 1993:146; 
Coleman 1992:67). Shover and Bryant state that criminal opportunities 
can be created by the structure of relationships among the firms in a 
certain industry. Inequal or dependent relations between the firms may 
instigate misconduct. In the automobile industry, dealers have to meet 
performance quotas imposed on them by large and powerful 
manufacturers. They are to maintain high sales volumes which keeps 
their profit margins low, thus limiting their legitimate opportunities to 
profit. As a result, the dealers are strained to increase profits in 
nonsales areas where they have more control and illegitimate 
opportunities to make phony repairs or to overcharge are open. 
2.4. Rational Actor/Crime as Choice Theory 
Rationality is often regarded as the guiding feature of modern 
organizations. This line of thinking derives from the Weberian notion 
of bureaucracy and is supported by the rational portrayal of human 
character of utilitarism and classical economic theory. Today, rational 
actor models of organizational action are generally favored in law, 
economics, and management technologies (Rabe and Ermann 
1996:295). Within criminology, this approach views organizational 
misconduct as a result of rational decisionmaking in which costs and 
benefits of available courses of action are calculated and weighed 
against each other, and the conduct that yields the most net benefit for 




It is true that organizational wrongs take place in settings where 
rational deliberation is the general claim. There is reason to believe 
that organizational crime better fits the model of rational goal seeking 
than individual crime generally does (Braithwaite and Fisse 1990:33). 
Legendary is the case of Ford Pinto15 where even human lives were 
reduced to potential costs of legal processes. However, this kind of 
decisionmaking can hardly be defined as rational -let alone wise- or 
profitable in a wider sense. Positive public appearance and content 
consumers are long-term organizational interests. It is also valuable to 
maintain a positive self-image. Furthermore, organizations surely don't 
wish to provoke tighter regulation. Therefore, it is crucial to note that 
rationality in this reference is subjective and bound to a certain 
situational context. It is short-term financial rationality, stemming from 
an incomplete and biased perception of a particular situation. 
The myth of organizational rationality can also be attacked from 
another point of view. The information available to the decisionmakers 
is likely to be limited: not all pieces of information are gathered and 
some things are a matter of chance. E.g., the organization cannot 
accurately assess the costs of violations since even their detection often 
is coincidental (Alvesalo and Laitinen 1994:76; Laitinen and Virta 
1998:20-1). One of the very first to point out the reality of 
administrative decisionmaking was H.A. Simon (1945). He questioned 
the assumptions of the rationality of bureaucratic decisionmaking, 
discovering certain limitations to it. Administrative behavior never is 
wholly rational. In fact, the best possible solutions are not even aimed 
at. Instead, they are replaced by satisfactory ones. All possible goals 
and means are not taken into account; rather, only a few are disussed, 
and the analysis is simplified by rules of thumb. Accordingly, 
administrative decisionmaking has been described as "muddling 
through" (Lindblom 1959). (Berndtson 1993:260-1) 
15The Pinto case is described in the Chapter 1.5.3.2. 
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Rules of thumb are helpful and to a certain extent rational means to 
proceed as quick decisions must be made and not all factors can be 
given proper thought. As Rabe and Ermann (1996:304) state: 
In a world filled with uncertainty and the high cost of 
gathering information, muddling through on the basis of 
limited information and limited planning is rational and 
unavoidable. As part of this muddling through is an optimism 
that things will work out -as they often do. 
However, reliance on rules of thumb may lead to oversimplifying and 
even distorting reality. 
Constant decisionmaking is likely to create patterns of perception. 
These schemas develop out of perceptions and also affect the way 
things are perceived. They aid in organizing and giving meaning to the 
vast flow of information. Schemas further efficiency by releasing the 
decisionmaker from thoroughly processing each detail of each case and 
thus prevent "cognitive paralysis" (Gioia 1996: 152). The danger lurks 
in that following a schema related to a certain category may result in 
overlooking the specific features of an individual case were they not 
coherent with the schema. Furthermore, missing information may be 
replaced by the expected features supplied by the schema. 
Schemas have been used in understanding the Ford Pinto case. The 
reports about the fires were not perceived as extraordinary since they 
were essentially similar to many other reports involving "normal 
accidents". In the continuous flow of reports, the actors had developed 
a schema of a typical report. The Pinto files were interpreted according 
to this schema and misplaced in the "normal" category which did not 
demand recall. The former Recall Coordinator reasons: 
Although the outcomes of the case carry retrospectively 
obvious ethical overtones, the schemas driving my 
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perceptions -- precluded -- ethical terms because the scripts 16 
did not include ethical dimensions. 
Thus, schemas lead also one's emotions as suffocated emotions were a 
typical part of working with safety issues. Finally, seeing a burned 
Pinto shook this employee's script and he took the case to "preliminary 
consideration". However, he was still to convince the other 
organizational members of the potential distinctiveness of the case, in 
which he failed. (Gioia 1996:151-6) 
Thus, rationality may be limited by patterns of perception called 
schemas in the domain of psychology. Berger and Luckman (1994:65-
6) provide an insightful sociological analysis of how institutions 
develop and come to constrain action. They argue that repetition of any 
activity leads to stabilized forms. Conventional action, routine, comes 
to be taken for granted and to shape one's perceptions. In this process, 
the number of perceived alternative courses of action becomes less. 
The effort of making decisions is relieved as one states: "Here we go 
again". In a stable and predictable environment, energy is released to 
be used elsewhere than in questioning the foundations of the action. 
Although this is a reasonable way to cope with the complex reality, this 
view of decisionmaking hardly is consistent with the basic assumptions 
of rational actor theory. The actor concentrates only on a limited set of 
alternatives which are not rationally compared to the whole width of 
possible courses of action. 
In social sciences, it is becoming more common to acknowledge that 
human behavior has multiple causes only one of which is rational 
choice. There are also such decisive factors as emotions and value 
commitments. Collective action is even more complex. (Friedrichs 
1996:226) Accordingly, Braithwaite (1989a:140-1) criticizes the 
abundance of "overly economically rational" conceptions of corporate 
16A script is a "specialized type of schema" that simultaneously 
provides understanding of certain information and a way to behave on the basis 
of it (Gioia and Manz 1985, cited in Ermann and Lundman 1996:151-2). 
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behavior for ignoring that organizations do have values and policies 
related to social responsibility and that they are constituted of 
indi viduals with consciences. Countering the economicall y oriented 
view on human, Braithwaite (p.37) contends: 
Human beings are not mere calculators: -- human beings can 
and often do choose not to engage in crime when biologically 
or socially defined rewards of crime seem to exceed costs. 
They do so out of a commitment to ideas of right and wrong, 
out of sympathy for others, a sense of justice or equity, and 
for many other reasons of conscience. 
Braithwaite (1989a: 140-1) emphasizes that conscience, the sense of 
social responsibility, is a more important safeguard against 
organizational crime than the fear of formal punishment. This point is 
supported by the fact that the monetary benefit of organizational 
wrongs to the offenders is generally high while the risk of severe legal 
sanctions is low. The criminal justice system typically fails to credibly 
deter corporations (for an illustration, see Braithwaite, p.141). Thus, 
moral hindrances may be an important factor to prevent organizational 
wrongs from flourishing even more than they do l7 . In conclusion, when 
making decisions between legitimate and illegitimate ways to proceed, 
the factors to consider include also the weight of moral and emotional 
components. Accordingly, there is an interpretation of the rational 
actor model which incorporates moral pondering (see Paternoster and 
Simpson 1993, cited in Laitinen and Virta 1998:20-3). 
In addition to the criticism above, the assumption of the organization as 
a unitary decisionmaker implied in the rational actor approach is 
unrealistic. It echoes an out-of-date individual perspective which was 
not constructed to apply to present-day complex organizations. (Fisse 
l70r perhaps the actors' morals just reflect an utilitarian 
anticipation that the control agencies would gain resources or the smokescreen 
of legitimacy would be lost were organizations to exploit more of their 
illegitimate opportunities. Moral behavior can also be economically rational. 
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and Braithwaite 1993:73-4) Legitimate organizations have many goals, 
and what benefits a manager does not necessarily benefit the 
organization as a whole. Even though rational choice offers an 
appealingly clear theorization, its application to collective behavior is 
problematic. Rational amoral actor theory may be celebrated in the 
field of economic crime organized by individual crooked businessmen. 
However, there is little reason to emphasize the rational aspect of 
organizational wrongdoing by naming the whole approach as such. 
Even incorporating various, other than economic factors -such as 
morals, emotions, or self-image- in the consideration does not make 
organizational behavior rational due to collective18 and schematic 
constraints. In conclusion, rational actor and crime as choice theories 
need to be supplemented by social psychological and other empirical 
components. 
In fact, what the theoretical approaches discussed so far are all lacking 
is a real organizational perspective. It needs to be recognized that goals 
and opportunities are not perceived and converted into organizational 
outcomes in an automatic, particularly rational, predictable way. As 
Clinard and Yeager (1980:43) so aptly put it: 
-- the first step in understanding corporate illegality is to drop 
the analogy of the corporation as a person and analyze the 
behavior of the corporation in terms of what it really is: a 
complex organization. 
Thus, in order to seize available organizational opportunities, data 
about them must be collected and communicated within the 
organization. Furthermore, the resulting information needs to be 
converted into concerted action in order to mobilize the organization. 
(Rabe and Ermann 1996:296) An inclusive theory must acknowledge 
these particular processes of organizational behavior. 
18Collective constraints on behavior are discussed m the 3rd 
Chapter. 
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2.4.1. Organizational Goals 
What, then, constitute the goals that organizations so eagerly aspire to 
that even crimes may be committed? Of course, corporations strive for 
financial gain. As mentioned earlier, typical of monetary desires is that 
they are never completely satisfied. In addition to need, white collar 
criminals are motivated by greed and the fear of losing what they 
already have achieved. Even if their basic needs were mostly satisfied, 
the pursuit of wealth may continue for many reasons: to compete, to 
express wealth and success, to leave an inheritance. (Braithwaite 
1992:82-5) 
Yet, also other goals than sheer money underlie organizational 
behavior. Actually, any demand for goal achievement can be the 
motivational culprit for misbehavior (Gross 1978, cited in Coleman 
1992:65) and it would be theoretically constraining to attribute 
organizational wrongs merely to the pursuit of profit. E.g., 
governmental, charitable and academic organizations have very 
divergent goals; still they all are capable of wrongdoing. In general, 
organizations are characterized by aspirations to enhance also their 
power, prestige, and size. In practice, these goals covary and 
intertwine. (Jamieson 1994:8) Related to these goals is that 
organizations, like their individual members, seek to create a 
predictable environment (Simon 1996a:277). Gross (1978:209, cited in 
Braithwaite 1988:628) concludes: 
Some organizations seek profit, others seek survival, still 
others seek to fulfill government-imposed quotas, others seek 
to serve a body of professionals who run them, some seek to 
win wars, and some seek to serve a clientele. Whatever the 




As to the divergence of the goals between different organizations, 
Laitinen (Laitinen and Virta 1998:38) argues that the organizational 
level in society has become internally integrated and more distant from 
the civil society. The goals of the powerful institutions have become 
relatively uniform. Generally speaking, organizations more and more 
aim at securing financial goals, economic growth and international 
competitiveness. Therefore, their differences must not be overrated 
either. 
Within organizations, various goals coexist. It is useful to distinguish 
official and inofficial, not always fully conscious goals. Some official 
goals may serve as legitimate facade, lacking more concrete meaning. 
(Sj6strand 1981:40) The goals within an organization may even be 
conflicting. They may contradict each other or more general extra-
organizational norms. It is not evident that a member automatically 
adopts the organizational goals. Therefore, Sj6strand (p.41) suggests 
we look at the collection of each member's efforts in order to grasp the 
organization's real goals. E.g., one of the employee goals might be to 
escape the boredom of the job (Stone 1975:235). Also subunit goals are 
to be acknowledged. In Braithwaite's (1989b:338) words, "we must 
avoid a monolithic, conflict-free conception of the organization and its 
goals." E.g., the legal or the public relations unit may not accept goal-
attainment through illegal means by the corporation's plants (Croall 
1992:62-4; Braithwaite 1989b:349). 
In modern organizations, ownership typically is separated from the 
management, although also managers may own some stock. The 
interests of the stockholders may diverge from those of the managers. 
The executives may not priorize maximizing share values but rather 
have in mind such goals as maintaining their jobs, getting a promotion, 
more power and perks, and expanding the corporation. (Friedrichs 
1996:92) Rabe and Ermann (1996:307) agree: "The profit goals of 
owners compete (often unsuccessfully) with the security, prestige, 
income, and other goals of managers." 
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According to system theory, an organization reflects the goals of 
different interest groups. In addition to managers, owners and 
employees, these groups include customers, financiers, authorities, 
suppliers, consults, trade unions, etc. However, the balance implied in 
this model doesn't mean that these groups would have an equal impact. 
As Abrahamsson (1975) argues, an organization seldom is for common 
interests; rather, it wields power upon the interest groups and actively 
creates those relations. For all that, he nears system theory by 
acknowledging that the quest for organizational goals is limited by 
societal economic and political counterforces. (Sj6strand 1981 :42-4) 
Thus, power is to be interpreted in the Foucauldian sense as a strategic 
situation rather than an absolute wield by a certain actor (Helen 1994). 
Accordingly, and in spite of the iron law of oligarchy, organizational 
goals are produced by an interplay of a variety of actors in a certain 
historical situation. Organizational action is basically independent of 
anyone individual actor. 
What follows from viewing organizational goals as historical and 
dynamic, is that they change over time: new goals are adopted and the 
old ones redefined. With time, different interest groups emerge and 
become attached to the organization. To be noted is that although the 
organization is created to be a tool in achieving certain ends, 
maintaining the existence of the organization becomes a goal in itself. 
(Etzioni 1964, cited in Sj6strand 1981:44) 
Yet a crucial goal is to be mentioned: for all organizations It IS 
important to maintain internal coherence. As Galbraith (1984:69-72) 
noted, an organization's ability to reach its external goals depends on 
the depth and reliability of internal compliance with the organizational 
goals. Thus, organizations generally aspire to subject their members to 
collective aims. It is especially important that those on the higher 
organizational strata conform20. As an indication of this, the payment 
200n the other hand, those with a higher status typically enjoy 
certain privileges in the organization. However, these function to secure their 
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increases as one goes higher. However, more importantly, conformity 
is secured through conditional power -belief in the organizational 
goals. This form of organizational power often is unconscious to its 
object, making it easier to submit oneself to the collective goals. (Ibid.) 
2.5. Neutralization Theory 
Neutralization theory offers a fertile approach to white collar crime. In 
comparison to the theories discussed so far, it views the human agency 
in wider and more plausible, realistic terms: offenders' sense of morals 
and social norms is acknowledged. This is essential in regard to 
organizational wrongs since they are participated in by people with the 
social bond. As the prominent scholars within this approach, Sykes and 
Matza (1957), pointed out, the ones who commit crimes do not 
significantly differ from other people. Similarly to others, they are 
generally committed to conventional values and do feel guilt for their 
wrongdoing. (Laine 1991:77) And, as Braithwaite (1989a:39) contends, 
there usually prevails a wide consensus over the content of criminal 
law, even among those who violate those norms . 
What enables wrongdoing, then, for law-abiding proper citizens? 
Cressey (1953) studied convicted embezzlers and found out that the 
crucial facilitator is rationalization through which offenders can solve 
the contradiction between their deeds and the normative social 
standards. For the embezzlers, the suitable rationalization was that they 
claimed to be only borrowing the money. (Friedrichs 1996:231; 
Coleman 1992:56-7) Sykes and Matza called such rationalizations 
techniques of neutralization and argued in their theory of delinquency 
compliance; in Galbraith's terms, they invoke conditional power. In addition, 
although high status members may be allowed to deviate more from the social 
norms than those with less power, this rather concerns issues of secondary 
importance. 
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that most delinquents employ various such techniques in order to be 
released from the "moral bind of law" (Matza 1964; Sykes and Matza 
1957, cited in Poveda 1994:89). In sum, what enables participation in 
wrongdoing is a set of techniques that neutralize the guilt. 
Rationalizations and neutralizations are psychological mechanisms that 
aid to achieve and defend psychic balance. A priori, one cannot not 
seize one's illegitimate opportunities if one is to perceive oneself as a 
law-abiding and respectable citizen, as white collar offenders typically 
do. As one takes the illegitimate chances, one arrives at the state of 
psychological contradiction. In order to soothe the voice of 
consciousness one can employ psychological defence techniques. Thus, 
they facilitate individual participation in wrongdoing. Furthermore, 
theories of social defences are useful in understanding organizational 
behavior as a whole (Tiuraniemi 1993:76-7; Bar-Yosef and Schild 
1966). 
According to Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance, contradictions 
where two cognitive elements -such as the sense of ethics and 
knowledge of participation in misconduct- are in dissonance are 
stressful and unpleasant situations. Therefore, one will strive for 
neutralizing or avoiding possible dissonances. The strenght of the 
dissonance covaries with the importance and the number of the 
conflicting cognitions. The dissonance can be relieved only by coming 
up with new cognitive elements or changing the ones that already exist. 
(Fe stinger 1964 and 1957; Zajonc 1968, cited in Eskola 1977:86-7) 
What follows, is that an individual wrongdoer with dissonant 
cognitions will have to modify or replace her cognitions. It is unlikely 
that the cognition regarding one's status as a law-abiding citizen will 
be changed. Rather, it is common that white collar offenders do not 
regard themselves as law-breakers, let alone as criminals (e.g., 
Coleman 1987; Sutherland 1949). Neither will one typically terminate 
her membership in the organization, or is able to reform the 
organization (e.g., Rothschild and Miethe 1994). Instead, other 
measures are taken in order to relieve the cognitive uneasyness: one's 
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ethical or emotional notions and the wrongdoing can be modified to 
better fit each other. 
Cogniti ve defences serve this end. As Freedman, Carlsmith and Sears 
(1970:294-5) represent: 
An individual intellectualizes, encapsulates, distorts, denies, 
displaces, and, in general, does whatever he can to minimize 
the stress in a situation. 
They continue that: 
There are virtually unlimited ways of distorting, shifting, 
explaining away discrepancies. They are all quite illogical 
and irrational and probably produce other stresses in an 
individual's cognitive system. But they may also be 
successful III reducing stress due to discrepant 
communications. 
However, there are also relatively logical defences, including refuting 
arguments, producing counterarguments, and attacking the credibility 
of the source. (Freedman et al. 1970:333) 
In general, defence mechanisms are beneficial as far as they further 
psychic balance and the ability to function in the world full of 
disappointments and insecurity. However, much resorting to defences 
restricts behavior and prevents true confrontation with the demands of 
reality. Accordingly, Katz and Kahn (1966:231) distinguish between 
coping and defensive mechanisms: the former are adapti ve, concerned 
with solving the problem one encounters, while the latter protect one 
from breakdown but fail to solve the actual problem. In relation to 
wrongdoing, defences can obfuscate the wrongful nature of the 
activity. This is a central key in understanding organizational wrongs. 
Statt (1994: 113) argues that individuals and organizations have 
difficulties in dealing with strong emotions -and the cognition of even 
criminal processes is likely to encompass remarkable emotional 
arousal. He continues that our need to be psychologically comfortable 
IS 
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often stronger than our need to know the truth and this need 
pushes us to defend our self-image, or ego, from the 
discomfort of experiencing strong emotions. In fact so 
powerful is this need that to satisfy it we are capable of 
believing, literally, anything that will make us feel more 
comfortable. 
In the domain of psychology, the most prominent researchers of 
defences of ego have been Sigmund and Anna Freud. 
2.5.1. Illustrations of Defence Techniques 
Repression is a defence where a cognition, like guilt, that arouses 
uneasiness is repressed from the consciousness. It is a very common 
defense mechanism, often taking the form of a failure to perceive or 
remember something uneasy. Disclosure of the repression may cause 
true astonishment: there are cases where white collar criminals have 
been surprised to hear that their conduct can be labeled wrongful 
(Coleman 1987:423). Also the Ford Pinto case offers a telling example 
of far-reaching repression of the dangerousness of the product as a 
former Ford's Field Recall Coordinator reveales: "The entire time I 
was dealing with the Pinto fire problem, I owned a Pinto. I even sold it 
to my sister." (Gioia 1992:149) 
In a defence called reaction formation a forbidden emotion is 
transformed into its counterpart. A threatening impulse is fought by 
extremely going to the opposite, and vigorously denouncing 
expressions of the denied impulse in other people (Statt 1994:115). 
E.g., the environmental devastation likely is a painful thing to 
acknowledge. Not only may its perception be repressed but one may 
turn the loss of nature into a belief in the superiority of science and 
technology, and romantic dreams about joys in virtual reality. With 
insight, Beck (1990:99-100) grasps the essence: 
Faith in the progress is the dominant attitude -- it 
acknowledges what is inevitably going to happen. -- industry 
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has replaced the former coercive system with a new one. --
Faith in the progress means fawning on such a power that 
cannot be overthrown -- Tyranny that cannot be overthrown 
nor ignored has to be loved. The inevitable must be accepted 
with joy. -- There's a contradiction: the superior force of 
circumstances prevents action and yet democracy and 
enlightment would oblige us to take action. But the faith in 
the progress denies this. --If we must fall, let it happen in the 
glory of human perfection and not out of plain lack of 
alternativei1• 
A related defence is isolation of emotions where uneasy emotions are 
blocked off the issue. Again, the making of Ford Pinto provides a 
graphic example: the anticipated injuries were calculated in an 
objective and insensitive manner. This kind of separating one part of 
the personality is not very healthy psychologically. As Statt (1994: 111) 
points out: "It is -- normal for most people to be asked, implicitly, to 
bring their hands and brains to work and leave their feelings at home. --
If taken far enough that route leads eventually to the condition known 
as schizophrenia -- where people's feelings are typically out of touch 
with their thoughts and behavior --." 
There are numerous other defence mechanisms. Michael Corleone used 
one as he comforted his wife. Dreaming of legimacy was his 
justification to carry on until the bitter end. In case one's sense of 
ethics cannot be put into practice in the work, one may also turn to 
transference of the object or compensation: e.g., godfather John Gotti 
has been described as "a loyal family man who has never cheated on 
his wife", although having personally murdered a number of rivals 
(Simon 1996:271). 
A defence mechanism is revenge. According to Laitinen (Laitinen and 
Virta 1998:16), economic crime often takes the form of a game 
21Emphasis mine. 
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between the state and the business in which each party temporarily 
suffers losses. Thus, violations may be justified as natural responses to 
the harm done to oneself. 
Also cynisism or ridicule can be used to neutralize threatening voices. 
E.g., organizational members who try to maintain higher standards can 
be labeled disloyal and inflexible idealists (see, e.g., J ackall 1996:65). 
Fixation means being stuck to a certain solution which takes place, 
e.g., as a company that traditionally has employed environmentally 
harmful practices fails to reform when challenged by new norms. A 
possible defence is also regression as the wrongdoer refuses to reform 
and regresses to childish behavior instead. 
Through introjection an external phenomenon is internalized as it was 
a characteristic of one's own. E.g., it has become common for 
corporations to boust about being environmentally friendly now that it 
is demanded by the interest groups and can be considered a competitive 
advantage. People in wrongdoing organizations can also relieve their 
anguish through introjecting the features of the succesful who are not 
so sensitive and critical emotionally and morally. Projection, in turn, 
occurs as one projects to other people such features that one does not 
accept in oneself. Accordingly, white collar offenders typically blame 
other people for the wrongdoing and obfuscate one's own 
responsibility in comparisons to more serious wrongs that others have 
committed. 
Typically mentioned in the criminological literature is a typology of the 
neutralization techniques used by white collar criminals (e.g., Laitinen 
and Virta 1998:41-3; Alvesalo and Laitinen 1994:55-6; Shover and 
Bryant 1993:157-60; Laine 1991:77-8; Coleman 1987:4109-14). The 
typology is based on the findings of Sykes and Matza (1957) and 
includes such neutralizations as: 
Denial of the harm. Organizational wrongdoers may deny that their 
activities actually harm anybody. They may claim that the harm is only 
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financial and does not have any specific, real victims. As Beck (1990) 
notes, risks are obscured in the scientific language of calculations and 
probabilities. Critical voices are ignored unless they employ the same 
scientific discourse; yet, if they do refer to scientific findings they are 
subject to refutation. Companies are specialized in their field and, 
consequently, have the resources to prolonge the scientific confusion. 
E.g., the tobacco industry has traditionally denied that tobacco can be 
causally linked to health problems. The Thalidomide disaster offers 
another notorious example: in the trial, the company Chemie 
Grunenthal tried to the very last to contest the claims and to underrate 
the injuries related to the use of Thalidomide (Laitinen and Virta 
1998:41-2). 
Denial of the victim. The producer of a harmful product may put the 
blame on the consumers and claim that the harm resulted from their 
misusing the otherwise safe product. E.g., producers of alcohol may 
refer to the studies supporting the benefits of moderate use. Another 
way to undervalue the victims is to deny them equal human status. One 
of the rationalizations the Nazis employed was that "the Jew is evil": 
the Jews were portrayed as a conspiracy, criminals, dirty and inferior 
people (Hilberg 1996: 173-6). In the similar vein, unsafe products and 
harmful substances have been dumped in foreign countries (see, e.g., 
Cass 1996). It is easier to neutralize victimization when the victims are 
at a distance socially and geographically. Wrongdoers also take 
advantage of the relative powerlessness of the victims: typical victims 
of corporate misconduct are children, women, the aged, and the needy. 
Laws are unnecessary or unjust; condemnation of the condemners. 
Referring to the ideology of laissez-faire capitalism, corporate actors 
may argue that business should be free from governmental inference. 
As they criticize regulation, they may appeal to higher loyalties than 
legal norms. Thus, norm breaking may be justified on grounds of 
allegedly more important issues, such as economic growth and 
international competitiveness which provide employment and other 
social welfare. Economic values may be set above other values which 
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are labeled "soft" and of secondary nature. It may also be claimed that 
occasional norm breaking is necessary to survive (see Coleman 
1987:412). 
Transfer of responsibility from the offender to a large and often 
vaguely defined group to which she belongs. A usual claim is that 
"everybody else is doing it too". Opinion polls indicate that business 
people widely believe their peers to be ready to commit unethical acts. 
In the US 1975, a survey of top officials in 57 largest corporations 
revealed that they believed unethical behavior to be widespread in 
industry (Silk and Vogel 1976). In another study (Madden 1977), it 
was concluded: "Most managers believed that their peers would not 
refuse an order to market off-standard and possibly dangerous products 
--." (Coleman 1987:413) In Finland, a former insurance company 
director has claimed the corporate sense of morals to have shifted 
towards approving any means in goal-attainment regardless of their 
ethical status (Alvesalo and Laitinen 1994:24). These findings may 
reflect a psychological phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, where the 
community members' perception of each other is biased (Eskola 
1977:65-69). A wrongdoer can use such an illusion to comfort herself 
of being ethically normal or even better off than the rest. 
Also the diffused nature of organizational action facilitates neutralizing 
individual responsibility. Organizational wrongs may stem from 
separate and rather lenient misbehaviors as such. A significant 
characteristic of organizations is specialization: the tasks are divided in 
parts and most participants perceive only their little share of the entire 
process. However, usually the actors must not be naive; rather, they do 
know the ultimate outcome of the process they are contributing to but 
choose not to see the whole picture. 
In addition to the cognitive defence mechanisms that were discussed 
above, there are various behavioral defences that apply to 
organizational life. They are reactive and protective actions that 
function to reduce a perceived threat or to avoid an undesirable 
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demand. More specifically, behavioral defences are intended to avoid 
action, blame, and/or change. (Ashforth and Lee 1990) Common 
varieties of these techniques include, e.g., the following types of 
behavior: 
One can hide one's moral conscience in the organization by over-
conforming. Here, ethically correct action is avoided by resorting to a 
strict interpretation of one's official responsibilities. In the similar vein, 
participation in organizational wrongs may be justified by the possible 
lack of any law that would be broken. Legislation may include 
loopholes or be totally lacking in some branches of organizational 
activities. Thus, one may escape independent ethical reasoning and 
soothe the dissonance by sticking to the standard operating procedures, 
managerial demands, precedents, etc. The dynamics of this technique 
are expressed in linguistic phrases like: "1 didn't make the rules", 
"Listen, if it were up to me ... " This form of defensive behavior is also 
discussed by Kelman and Hamilton (1989) as they talk of crimes of 
obedience where routines and authorities are uncritically celebrated22. 
An atmosphere of competence and thoroughness can also be pursued 
through buffing which refers to the practice of rigorously documenting 
activity: written information is exchanged, proceedings of meetings 
recorded, laborious analyses conducted, and so on. Buffing can also 
lead to fabricating documents. (Ashforth and Lee 1990:624-7) 
Passing the buck is defensive behavior that occurs as one shifts the 
responsibility for the execution of a certain task to someone else. It can 
be a form of over-conforming if the passing of the buck is justified by 
interpreting one's duties narrowly by the book. Responsibilities may 
also be avoided by playing dumb: falsely pleading ignorance or 
inability. Alternatively, one can create an appearance of being busy 
through stretching and smoothing one's performance. (Ibid.) 
22To be discussed in the following chapters. 
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Playing safe refers to a practice where a person avoids situations that 
may reflect unfavorably upon her. Such organizational members, e.g., 
take great pains not to offend anyone, seize neutral positions in 
conflicts, share risks through joint decisionmaking, seek approval 
through going along with the majority, and are reluctant to try new 
ideas. Akin to this defence is selective perception of certain 
inconvenient practices. Thus, a participant may deny knowledge of 
harmful organizational activities in order to avoid action, blame and/or 
change. E.g., nurses have been reported to "turn their back on day-to-
day happenings -- and spend their time physically isolated in 
administrative enclaves (Stannard 1973)." (Ashforth and Lee 
1990:627) 
Justifying IS an attributional techniq ue used to rmnnll1ze one's 
responsibility for a certain misbehavior. One may give alternative 
accounts in order to lessen either one's responsibility for the creation 
of an unfavorable condition or the severity of the consequences. Rather 
than being truthful, everyday explanations for failures at work are 
selected according to how acceptable they would be to others (Riordan, 
lames and Runzi 1989). Through scapegoating, external factors or 
actors are blamed for the undesirable outcome. (Ashforth and Lee 
1990:627-8) It is a human tendency to attribute one's own failure to 
external or situational factors, while taking credit for success. 
Futhermore, in the work community, problems tend to be attributed to 
one person rather than on more general factors. (Tiuraniemi 1993:20) 
Ermann and Lundman (1996:30) provide an example where 
organizational people tried to avoid action and blame through 
justifying, scapegoating, and passing the buck: after an oil tank 
disaster, Exxon directed attention to the tanker's captain, asserted that 
the environmental damage was minimal, and claimed that the Coast 
Guard was responsible for the delay in starting to clean up the mess. 
Various defences often intertwine in practice. The more difficult and 
critical the problem, the greater the range of defensive techniques 
employed. Defences are likely to decrease the quality of organizational 
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decisionmaking: Causal accounts are unreliable, need of change is not 
acknowledged and change is delayed if accomplished at all. In general, 
organizational efficiency suffers from the self-interested defensive 
behavior of its members. Since defences are designed in order to avoid 
unpleasant situations, problems are not confronted and really resolved. 
Often people are not aware of their defensive inclination but come to 
believe in myths that support their defences. Iteration turns defences 
into automatic scripts. In this process, defensive routines may become 
institutionalized in the organization; often they become chronic and 
even pathological. Consequently, the organization becomes stagnant 
and unresponsive, isolates itself from the environment, and develops a 
climate of distrust and low morale. (Ashforth and Lee 1990) 
In groups, also collective defence mechanisms are employed. Bar-
Y osef and Schild (1966) describe how organizational units as a whole 
may develop structural mechanisms of defence. For example: 
Decisions that could as well be resolved individually are brought to 
group affirmation. Through this defence, pressures are reduced on the 
person who presents the case in the group and recommends a certain 
decision. The group's stamp approval provides the individual 
decisionmaker with social support consonant with the decision. 
Furthermore, once collectively agreed upon, one comes to feel more 
committed to the chosen course of action. One is inclined to suppress 
critical thoughts that would question the decision made in front of 
others. 
2.5.2. Following the Authority 
One of the most central justifications available to members of 
hierarchic organizations is that they are only following superior orders. 
The sense of obedience is traditionally emphasized in many cultures. 
Individuals are typically demanded to obey in such powerful social 
institutions as family, school, church and army. (See, e.g., Miller 1985, 
Eskola 1977:254) In their quest for efficiency, modem bureaucracies 
largely follow the Weberian ideals according to which it is to be 
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achieved through obedience to rules and centralized authority 
(Jamieson 1994:7; Berndtson 1993:212-3). 
As Milgram's 1963 and 1965 series of experiments on obedience 
impressively revealed, it is a human tendency to follow even highly 
unpleasant authoritative orders (for a review, see, e.g., Kelman and 
Hamilton 1989). All research subjects delivered electric shocks; most 
even shocks labeled dangerous, although often with anxiety. It is 
thought-provoking to consider the experiments' implications in regard 
to organizational life. As Kelman and Hamilton (1989: 152) suggest: 
-- the laboratory situation closely resembles other authority 
situations, in all of which control and responsibility are 
turned over to the authorities in charge of the setting -whether 
they be government officials, military officers, hospital 
physicians, or airline pilots. 
The effect of the authority was more accurately examined as the 
experiment was carried out in various settings. As the distance to the 
authority was varied -the experimenter either was in the same room or 
communicated by the phone- it was found that the closer the authority, 
the stronger the obedience, the more inclined the participants to inflict 
powerful shocks. If the authority was not in the same room, many 
participants claimed to be obeying although actually delivering milder 
shocks. Furthermore, being close to the victim -in the same room vs. 
beyond eye contact- tended to decrease the use of powerful shocks. 
Distance to the victim made it easier to participate in producing 
violence. (Eskola 1977:254-6; Gahagan 1977:91-3) 
According to Kelman and Hamilton (1989: 163-4): 
Opposing forces to an action increase to the extent that we 
see ourselves as personally causing the harmful 
consequences of that action. 
True, opposing forces weaken as the personal causation becomes more 
ambiguous: almost all participants (92,5 %) cooperated to the very end 
in a variation where their task was only subsidiary and the shocks were 
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administered by an assistant playing the role of another testee. 
Accordingly, obedience reduced to 30 % when the task was to 
forcefully push the "learner's" hands on a device that would deliver the 
shock (Eskola 1977:256). The suggestive implications to hierarchical 
and specialized organizations are that most people are ready to 
contribute to violence since they only perform their subtasks and do not 
see the putting of the violence into effect, and that there will be people 
to do the dirty job, too. 
Also other aspects of Milgram's experiments can be used in 
understanding the dynamics of organizational wrongdoing. The high 
levels of obedience have been attributed to the scientific settings that 
implied an aura of legitimacy, alertness and care and created an 
expectation that the participants could not be seriously risked (see, e.g., 
Kelman and Hamilton 1989:150 [footnote No. 9] and 164). However, 
the victims were caused pain which was expressed through their cries 
for help. The surroundings of the experiment were varied to less 
respectable ones in order to further study the status factors. As the 
experiment was conducted in a poorly furnished office in a decayed 
neighborhood and organized by an unknown commercial research 
organization, the obedience did decline: the proportion of the testees to 
go all the way dropped from 65 % to 47.5 %. (Kelman and Hamilton 
1989: 151; Gahagan 1977:93) As any white collar crime, organizational 
wrongs occur in respectable and legitimate settings that support the 
legitimacy of the activity and facilitate individual participation. 
Relevant indeed are also Milgram's findings regarding social support. 
In a series of the experiment, there were two "teachers" to inflict the 
pain. Only one of them was an actual research subject, while the other 
was an assistant of the researcher. When the assistant protested against 
the experimenter and refused to deliver the shocks, the actual subject 
immediately followed the example and refused to obey as well. 
(Gahagan 1977:93) The meaning of social support was tested also in a 
variation with divided authority: Two experimenters ran the 
experiment jointly, expressing contradictory orders to the research 
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subject. As a result, all but one "teachers" chose to follow the authority 
who called for a halt, thus disobeying the other's orders to go on. 
(Kelman and Hamilton 1989:158-9) These findings go to stress the 
moral weakness of an individual and the social and situational 
construction of norms. It is difficult to be the only one or the first to 
disobey. Milgram concluded that our culture obviously does not offer 
suitable ways to refuse to obey orders one finds wrongful (Eskola 
1977:256). 
Kelman and Hamilton (1989:16-7) define authorization as a condition 
to weaken the usual moral inhibitions. Through authorization a 
situation is so defined that an individual is absolvedl of the 
responsibility to make personal moral choices. Kelman and Hamilton 
argue that 
-- when acts of violence are explicitly ordered, implicitly 
encouraged, tacitly approved, or at least pemritted by 
legitimate authorities, people's readiness to commit or 
condone them is enhanced. -- particularly when the actions 
are explictly ordered- a different kind of morality, linked to 
the duty to obey superior orders, tends to take over. 
They share Milgram's notice that people often obey without question, 
regardJess of the harm caused to others or themselves. People don't see 
themselves personally responsible for their actions insofar as they think 
they had no choice. However, a similar mechanism operates when the 
behavior is only approved of by the authorities. In fact, sufficient for 
this guiltless illusion to arise is that the authorities make clear that the 
(otherwise) illegitimate behavior will not be punished. (Ibid.) 
In sum, the rationalization of following superior orders can be used in 
order to defend the ego from cognitive dissonance. However, there are 
individual differences: some view themselves as being more eapable of 
evaluating the legitimacy of orders than others (Kelman and Hamilton 
1989:16). Furthermore, most Milgram's test subjects suffered from 
feelings of uneasyness (ibid., p.152). Although the justification of 
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following orders neutralizes guilt, one may not be able to escape the 
underlying feeling that something is wrong. 
2.5.3. Following the Routines 
Also legitimate routines facilitate participation in wrongdoing. Typical 
of white collar wrongs is that they are committed through the same 
official procedures as the orgapization's legitimate activities. Thus, a 
participant is able to soothe her consciousness through the defence that 
nothing extraordinary is taking place as the required, normal, 
comfortable, every-day practices are being fulfilled. Organizational 
members and subunits reinforce each other's shared illusion of 
legitimacy by proceeding in routine fashion: "-- processing papers, 
exchanging memos, diligently carrying out their assigned tasks 
(Kelman and Hamilton 1989: 18) 
Kelman and Hamilton (1989:16-8) state: 
Through routinization, the action becomes so organized that 
there is no opportunity for raising moral questions. -- the 
likelihood of moral resistance is greatl y reduced by 
transforming the action into routine, mechanical, highly 
programmed operations. 
Routinization reduces the need to make decisions. Thus, occasions 
where moral questions might arise are minimized. Routinization also 
facilitates repression: the implications of the activity are avoided more 
easil y as the actor focuses on the details rather than on the meaning of 
the job. (Ibid.) Also the busy space of work can be used to keep the 
focus off moral contemplations. 
Routinization operates on two levels: 1) On the individual level, the job 
performance is "-- broken down into a series of discrete steps, most of 
them carried out in automatic, regularized fashion." 2) Through 
organizational routinization, the performance is divided between 
different offices, each with only a partial responsibility of the overall 
task. As responsibility is diffused and decisionmaking limited in scope: 
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There is no expectation that the moral implications will be 
considered at any of these points, nor is there any opportunity 
to do so. (Kelman and Hamilton 1989:18) 
Routinization is a method to relieve moral controversy involved in 
organizational wrongs -although the dilemmas are rather suppressed 
than confronted. Holding tight on the routines, following the same 
patterns day by day, is likely to prevent seeing the activity in a broader 
context. As energy is released from ethical poundering it can be 
addressed to other functions of the organization, such as raising 
efficiency, productivity or group cohesion (Ibid.). 
2.5.3.1. Language Rules 
The true essence of organizational activity can be obscured through so 
called language rules -or, as Arendt (1964:85, cited in Kelman and 
Hamilton 1989:18) puts it straight, lying. Thus, the reminders of the 
actual nature of the action are minimized which makes it easier to 
accept the claims about legitimacy and to repress the threatening 
cognition of the immorality one is contributing to. 
Notorious code names for killing and torture were employed by the 
Nazis. The vocabulary of destruction was camouflaged with 
expressions like "final solution of the Jewish question", "special 
treatment", "evacuation". Furthermore, it was considered inappropriate 
to talk about the killings in social conversation among the closest 
participants. Although widely recognized, the destruction was a taboo, 
and especially critical voices were silenced. (Hilberg 1996: 171-3) 
Language rules prevailed also in Ford's legal office in the Pinto case: 
"problem" and "component failure" were prohibited words, the 
preferred periphrase being "condition". (Gioia 1996:143-4) 
Scientific language can be used in order to obfuscate hazards. 
According to the logic of expert language, risks can be objectively 
dealt with and finally obscured in comparisons to other risks -for there 
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will always be something that inflicts even a greater risk. Ethical 
discourse has been superseded by a technical one. (Beck 1990) E.g., 
Ford Pinto was treated as just another potential recall issue and its 
dangerousness normalized in comparisons to other competitors' small 
cars. The Ford's representatives did not define Pinto as significantly 
different than the other cars. (Gioia 1996:146) 
2.6. CulturaUSubcultural Theory 
Cultural approaches to crime offer a wide framework for understanding 
how a community can foster wrongful patterns. Subcultures are 
criminologically relevant as they may convey neutralization 
techniques, social approval, role models, and know-how in support of 
offending. Although such subcultures may challenge the legitimacy of 
legal norms, most often they approve of the legislation in general but 
offer neutralizations to legitimize a certain deviation from the general 
norm. (Braithwaite 1989a) 
As with numerous other concepts in this thesis, there are various 
approaches to organizational culture. Usually, culture refers to patterns 
of behavior and thought that prevail in a certain community at a certain 
time. The concept incorporates values, norms and beliefs. Culture also 
affects the way its members perveive reality. (Juuti 1992b) Subcultures 
provide their members with status elevation, development of identity, 
and shelter (Laine 1991:67-70). 
The concepts of climate and culture are near to each other, concerning 
somewhat similar phenomena. Organizational climate refers to the 
individual depiction of the characteristics of her community; it is the 
personnel's view on the organization. Climate can be seen as a 
reflection of culture which is a concept of less consciousness and a 
higher level of abstraction. (Juuti 1992b:79-83) Victor and Cullen 
(1987:51-2) define corporate ethical climate as "shared perceptions of 
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what is ethically correct behavior and how ethical issues should be 
handled." (Shover and Bryant 1993:157) 
Coleman (1987:422) distinguishes three types of subcultures that can 
intertwine in occupational settings: 1) Every complex organization has 
its own subculture. 2) Industry subcultures include attitudes, beliefs 
and definitions commonly shared in a certain economical sector. 3) In 
addition, there are occupational subcultures among those who share the 
same careers, although working in various organizations and industries. 
Statt (1994:37-8) stresses that since there is often very little that all 
members of the organization are able to agree on, it is preferrable to 
talk about organizational cultures or subcultures in plural. Further, 
there are both official as well as inofficial aspects in organizational 
culture: the official "business idea" may become distorted along with 
the organizational processes of interpretation. (Tiuraniemi 1993:71) 
According to the cognitive view, culture stems from shared processes 
of thinking. Culture is a mode of perceiving events, behavior, emotions 
and other phenomena. The adopted pattern of thinking determines what 
information is considered important and what kind of behavior 
legitimate. The symbolic approach, in turn, defines culture as a system 
of shared meanings and symbols. Symbols constitute coherent 
networks of meaning and affect organizational behavior. Accordingly, 
culture can be understood as a set of values that are hidden in the form 
of myths and symbols. Thus, culture is information transferred from 
one generation to the next through various signs, images, and 
associations. (Juuti 1992b:23 and 31-2) 
Schein (1985 and 1987) defines organizational culture in terms of basic 
assumptions a community has developed in order to cope with the 
external reality, simultaneously maintaining its internal coherence. The 
basic assumptions carry the fundamental view on the nature of action, 
reality, time and space, and of the relationship between the 
organization and its environment. Certain basic assumptions have 
proved useful with time and become transmitted to new organizational 
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members who, thus, come to know how to perceive, think and feel in 
regard to different problems the organization confronts. (Tiuraniemi 
1993:70; Juuti 1992b:27-30) 
Schein distinguishes cultural processes on different organizational 
levels. The highest level of organizational culture consists of artefacts 
such as technology, architecture, art, public documents, and visible 
patterns of behavior. Values form a deeper level of organizational 
culture while cultural basic assumptions are still more unconscious. 
When a certain solution successfully and continuously works, it 
becomes unquestioned, self-evident truth. In this gradual process, 
successful action first turns into values which slowly become basic 
assumptions. In order to understand organizational action, one must 
look at the underlying basic assumptions that guide it. (Ibid.) 
2.6.1. Cultural Products and White Collar Crime 
Culture can be studied through its products. Cultures produce language 
systems and metaphors, myths and tales, symbols, ceremonies, rites 
and rituals, as well as value systems and codes of behavior. 
(Shrivastava 1985: 104) Myths, which are not necessarily truthful, 
include heros and traitors and convey a culturally valued way to 
resolve problems. Moreover, myths function to mask the uncertainty 
underlying the community's activities (Kluchohn 1942:66; Scheid-
Cook 1988:162-3). (Juuti 1992b:33 and 138) In fact, all cultural 
products relieve confrontation with insecurity and enhance the feeling 
of rationality through explaining and simplifying complex social 
reality. (Juuti, pp.137-8) 
Poveda (1994:4-9) talks about the myth according to which white 
collar citizens refrain from crime, whereas the myth of the criminal 
classes applies to a certain social type with such characteristics as 
lower class or minority standing. Such a truth-distorting myth may be 
used to decrease the insecurity about the morality of an activity taking 
place in legitimate organizations. Crucial is that the false dichotomy 
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makes a sharp distinction between criminals and non-criminals. As a 
morally conscious dealer of used cars accounts in regard to his 
colleagues who engaged in questionable practices: 
-- these people were unanimous in their denunciation of 
gangsters, robbers, burglars, and petty thieves. They never 
regarded themselves as in the same class and were bitterly 
indignant if accused of dishonesty: it was just good business. 
(Sutherland 1983:242) 
Also other products of organizational culture, like symbols, rituals, and 
language, can be utilized to highlight belonging to the legitimate side 
of the dichotomy. Accordingly, the term white collar crime derives 
from such symbols: legitimacy is implied through the strict high status 
dressing code. The expressive and anxiety-controlling functions of rites 
are powerfully conveyd in the motion picture Godfather Ill: dramatic 
indeed is the opening scene where Michael Corleone seeks purity 
through religious ceremonies. Furthermore, organizations commonly 
resort to symbolic acts in order to promote their good will and to be 
associated with socially valued activity. For positive images they may 
invest in charity. (See Ermann and Lundman 1996:28-30) 
Culturally valued ways may favor wrongdoing. As Sutherland 
(1983:240-5) described, employees may confront demands for 
misconduct. Myths can support these demands: in the culture 
prevailing in the used car business, getting away with "a crooked deal" 
was not only organizationally tolerated but admired and praised as 
"shrewdness". Similarly, in shoe sales business, culturally valued and 
demanded practices included that shoes were to be sold in a highly 
active and insisting, even aggressive way. Unethical manipulation was 
not worried about, while reaching a purchase was highly appreciated. 
(Ibid.) 
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2.6.2. A Typology o/Corporate Cultures 
Shover and Bryant (1993: 157) present a typology to distinguish 
between different corporate cultures. A culture characterized by 
amoral calculation prevails in firms that regard profit-seeking as their 
paramount and unrivalled objective and where the law is violated when 
it is financially worthwile to do so. Second, corporate culture may 
emphasize political citizenship. In these corporations, the law is 
followed out of respect or obligation. However, public policies may be 
resisted in case they are regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable. Finally, 
in a culture of organizational incompetence the management often fails 
to properly supervise its subordinates, to wisely assess risks, or to 
otherwise further compliance. 
Cultures of noncompliance have been argued to distinguish industries 
rife with noncompliance. Barnett (1986) defines a culture of 
noncompliance as a "set of commonly shared attitudes, techniques, and 
rationalizations which condition the likelihood that owners, managers, 
and employees -- will use illegal means to pursue corporate goals ." 
(Shover and Bryant 1993: 150) Accordingly, Shover and Bryant 
(pp.150-2) suggest cultures of noncompliance to increase the supply of 
offenders, whereas cultures of compliance reduce illegal conduct. A 
culture of noncompliance encourages and justifies criminal conduct as 
normal business practice. On the other hand, in spite of the 
considerable consensus on the covariation of cultural factors and 
criminal participation, compelling direct evidence is still lacking 
(p.165).23 
23Shover and Bryant seem to employ the terms illegal and criminal 
interchangeably which is not correct but makes it unclear what phenomena they 
are actually referring to. 
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2.6.3. Organizational Discourses of Neutralization and Restraint 
In analyses of the cultural contributors to wrongdoing, techniques of 
neutralization are commonly referred to. However, techniques of 
restraint as their counterpower need also to be acknowledged. These 
dynamic forces are linguistic devices in the construction of 
organizational reality, affecting the perception of what is possible and 
preferrable. Techniques of restraint emphasize the moral and the legal 
dimensions of behavior and thus reduce the probability that the 
members of the organization will choose illegitimate means. 
Countering this discourse, techniques of neutralization increase the 
availability of illegitimate means as they function to diminish the moral 
inhibitions to violate the societal standards of proper conduct. (Shover 
and Bryant 1993: 157 -60) Various forms of neutralization were 
discussed earlier in this text24. 
The dialectical forces of neutralization and restraint are in a continuous 
struggle for dominance in the organizational culture. Essential in 
Sutherland's (1949/1983) theory of differential association is that 
where definitions favorable to misconduct exceed those in favor of 
compliance, violations will occur25 . According to Braithwaite (1989b), 
typically definitions favorable to the law are donnnant, and 
organizations generally follow the law since it is considered to be of 
value in itself. Although corporations commonly misbehave at some 
points of their existence -e.g., all 70 corporations studied by Sutherland 
had adverse decisions against them- Braithwaite (1989b:347-9) argues 
that most large corporations still comply most of the time. (See also 
Croall 1992: 64) 
24Chapter 2.5. Neutralization Theory. 
25The theory will be discussed in the Chapter 2.8. 
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2.6.4. Organizational Crimino genesis 
Sutherland (1983:240-5) discusses accounts of young businessmen who 
are looking for their positions in the job market. One found moral 
scruples in all three jobs he had tried: selling typewriters, sewing 
machines and finally used cars. The subculture in each of his 
workplaces demanded unethical behavior towards the clients. Various 
occupations include peer as well as superior pressure to engage in 
unethical conduct. In Needlemans' (1979:517) terms, such 
organizations can be described as criminogenic as 
-- features of their internal structures -- play a role in 
generating criminal activity within the system, independent at 
least to some degree from the criminal's personal motives. 
Needlemans (1979) distinguish two forms of criminogenesis: crime-
coercive and crime-facilitative systems. The accounts presented by 
Sutherland fall into the category of crime-coercion, since it was 
necessary to play the game on other people's wrongful conditions. As a 
manager told one of the employees: 
I expect you to do the same (undertake unethical action). If 
you do not like this, some one else can have your job. 
(Sutherland 1983:243) 
Thus, crime-coercive organizations are viewed as 
-- tight little worlds in which the individual system member is 
essentially a pawn, with few choices -- (Needleman and 
Needleman, p.520). 
Crime-facilitative systems, in turn, do not exactly compel their 
members to crime but present 
-- extremely tempting structural conditions -high incentives 
and opportunities, coupled with low risks- that encourage and 
facilitate crime --. 
Characteristic to these systems is that the wrong doesn't necessarily 
benefit the organization but, however, is organizationally tolerated 
since the measures needed to control the harmful behavior are assessed 
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to be possibly even more injurious to the system. Since misbehavior in 
crime-facilitative systems is not essential to the organization's goals, 
Needlemans suggest a third type to emerge: crime-resistant systems in 
which the structures rather prevent crimes. (Needleman and Needleman 
1979:520-6) 
2.6.5. Occupational Crime in Cultural Terms 
Also harming the organization by the employees has been explained 
through cultural factors. Croall (1992:64-6) presents that subcultures 
are 
-- often interpreted as a more or less organized response on 
the part of employees to organizational structures, managerial 
policies ot payment systems. 
The technological and social organization of work may feed 
subcultural responses as psychological defences against the inhumane 
conditions. Often workers have little discretion or freedom, which can 
lead to boredom, frustration, alienation. Workplace subcultures have 
been associated with employee theft, restriction of organizational 
output, and even direct sabotage. However, they may not only nurture 
violating the organization but also cause wider harm as they involve 
neglecting safety regulations and quality standards. (Ibid.) 
The management may tolerate workplace subcultures since they 
provide employees with some satisfaction, thus hindering more serious 
forms of protests from the management's point of view. Employee 
responses may be individual as well as collective. The responses are 
likely to be individual where workers are isolated, and subcultural 
where the job is performed in groups and cooperation is required. 
Furthermore, what may enhance subcultural informal responses is a 
lack of formal and legitimate opportunities to address grievances, such 
as trade union negotiations. (Ibid.) 
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2.6.6. Are People Products of Organizational Culture? 
Occupation is central in one's overall identity. Typically, work 
provides Western life with meaning, acknowledgement, and financial 
security . Work most often takes place within some organization. In 
general, the ideological basis of organizations has been argued to have 
become unified (Laitinen and Virta 1998:38). Therefore, organizational 
influence is rather inescapable. Subcultures also tend to isolate their 
members from external social constructions of reality. Corporate 
executives' contacts both in and out of the workplace tend to be limited 
to "people of the same set". (Coleman 1987:422-3) Also more 
generally, professional people are expected to identify with their 
profession, and disproportionally interact with the members of the 
same subculture. 
Is individual behavior, then, merely determined by the social influence 
within her organizational subculture? Coleman (1987:423) notes: "Of 
course, the formulation of criminal motivation depends on far more 
than the definitions to which an individual is exposed by virtue of his 
or her occupational position." One is also subject to much other 
socialization than that of the workplace and adopts the occupational 
culture in terms of one's personality. Principal factors in the 
socialization process are one's upbringing and memberships in various 
groups and institutions. 
Organizations commonly evade responsibility through attributing 
harms to accidents and human error. The actual fault can still be argued 
to belong to the managers for don't they affect the organizational 
culture by organizing the working conditions, distributing resources, 
and setting the overall ethical tone (see Clinard 1985; Clinard and 
Yeager 1980)? However, the managers' influence in imposing the 
ethical tone upon their organizations reminds the famous chicken/egg 
dilemma. They have themselves gone through a powerful socialization 
process within the organizational world, either in the very organization 
they manage or in general. Furthermore, they have been recruited by 
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the organization and there are cultural expectations that constrain them, 
too (see Ermann and Lundman 1996:6-7; Poveda 1994:91). Still, it is 
true that managers wield more power on the prevailing interpretations 
of the organization's functions, principles and measures than the 
personnel do (Tiuraniemi 1993:71-2), and they provide their 
subordinates with role models (Shover and Bryant 1993: 155). 
2.6.7. Cynical Accounts on Organizational Life 
Robert J ackall (1996) describes how managerial work reqUlres 
compromising one's personal sense of ethics. He views life in 
organizations as highly competitive and centered on the pursuit of 
material values. One of his key observations is "a pervasive mediocrity 
in big organizations" which refers to a lack of any fixed criteria within 
organizations according to which to assess the quality of the products 
or the performance. The measure is highly political since it depends 
only on social construction, "interpretive judgments of shifting groups 
in an ever-changing social structure", and since individual fates depend 
on it. Thus, creating the standards is a function of a political struggle 
within the organization. In order to impose a consensus of proper 
standards, leadership must be skillful and able to 
-- resist pressures for short-term expedient solutions -- be 
willing to confront others, both in private and in public, who 
espouse or embody in some way variant, undesirable 
standards; and enforce one's judgment -- such insistence on 
standards of excellence can quickly earn one enemies and the 
feared label of being' inflexible' . 
For it is socially so difficult to uphold high standards, J ackall comes up 
with the concept of leveling process which produces "a comfortable 
mediocrity". Thus, lower standards of performance corne to be 
tolerated in organizations. (Ibid.) 
The organizational members may take the organizational standards as 
granted and slip into normative isolation from extra-organizational 
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perceptions. E.g., as Richardson-Merrell Company employees 
concealed tests which showed harmful side effects to be linked with 
one of their company's drugs: 
No one involved expressed any strong repugnance or even 
opposition to selling the unsafe drug. Rather, they all seemed 
to drift into the activity without thinking a great deal about it. 
(Carey 1978, cited in Coleman 1987:423) 
I ackall (1996) notes that many managers come to view their work 
largely senseless, although the success and the prestige they enjoy 
provide some relief. The senselessness increases as one goes higher 
and the work becomes more abstract and ambiguous, and as one has to 
leave behind "comforting concreteness, -- visible enactment of one's 
rational schemes --". lackall elaborates: 
The more abstract the work becomes -- the greater the 
likelihood that one's rational efforts to improve an 
organization will meet with and even beget various kinds of 
irrationality. One's rational systems -- fall to others for 
implementation -- One's best laid plans are always subject to 
ambush by random events, fickle markets, recalcitrant or, 
worse, well-intentioned but incompetent subordinates, rival 
managers, or simply the weariness that work produces. One's 
best intentioned schemes sometimes produce exactly the 
opposite of what one wanted to achieve. 
As a result of this disillusionment, most managers share the view that 
"the main chance" , the real meaning of work, is maintaining and 
furthering one's career. This entails "our surrender of ourselves to 
groups", "unrelenting attentiveness" to social relations in order to gain 
"access to key managerial circles", and "continual compromises with 
conventional and popular notions of integrity". Also needed is an 
"inexhaustible capacity for self-rationalization" to relieve the 
discomfort that follows since managerial work involves self-denial: 
-- a willingness to discipline the self -- to stifle spontaneity --
to conceal emotion and intent, and to objectify the self with 
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the same kind of calculating functional rationality that one 
brings to the packaging of any commodity. (Ibid.) 
The characteristics of persons who are more likely than others to enter 
the leading organizational positions have been discussed by a variety of 
scholars. J ackall argues for the narcissism of high rank executives, 
resulting from the continuous focusing on self-improvement in the 
constant goal-attainment (ibid.). Presthus (1978, cited in Simon 
1996a:286) describes the characteristics particularly suceessful in 
making it to the top of organizations. Such a person: 
-- exudes charisma via a superficial sense of warmth and 
charm. He or she is able to make decisions easily because 
matters are viewed in black-and-white terms. 
It is of common wisdom that one must not take business personally in 
order to be able to cope with the stress. To be effective and 
acknowledged in the workplace, one must be capable of quick and 
crude decisions. As a former Ford Recall Coordinator accounts, the job 
was extremely busy and complex, including a vast aJffiount of 
information. At first, he used to take his responsibility so seriously that 
he sometimes woke up at night, worrying about his job performance. 
However: 
That soon faded -- To do the job 'well' there was little room 
for emotion. Allowing it to surface was potentially paralysing 
and prevented rational decisions -- On moral grounds I knew I 
could recommend most of the vehicles on my safety tracking 
list for recall -- We could not recall all cars with potential 
problems and stay in business. (Gioia 1996: 144-5) 
*** 
The contributions above illustrate how organizational wrongdoing can 
be understood in cultural terms. Cultural factors underlie 
organizational behavior and wrongdoing. Culture guides its members, 
but its impact also depends on individual factors. Human behavior 
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derives from the particular mixture of socialization as a whole and 
personal inheritance. 
While J ackall' s accounts illuminate managerial culture, they can also 
be viewed as criticism of organizational rationality. They also near 
political theory and the paradoxes of political collective action. 
Actually, what emerges while looking at cultural approaches to 
organizational wrongs is that various theories intertwine. They may not 
be very distinct after all; they have various interpretations and 
reformulations, somewhat overlapping each other. E.g., subcultures 
may have developed due to a lack of legitimate opportunities or 
labeling, defences are a central part of a subculture, and yet each of 
these factors is considered a theory of its own. The benefit of various 
theories is that they describe different specific processes of 
organizational wrongdoing. Therefore, different theories can be applied 
at the same time. (Laine 1991:88) 
Accordingly, many criminologists (e.g., Braithwaite, Coleman, Box) 
have integrated elements of various theories in order to gain more 
explanatory power. Next we will turn to the prominent criminologists 
who explicitly aim at understanding white collar crime and approach 
this goal through building on several theories. Coleman will be 
discussed next as he employs a cultural explanation of the ultimate 
source of criminal behavior. Like cultural theorists, Sutherland's 
learning theory accounts for how a community maintains and conveys 
criminogenic patterns. Braithwaite intends to collect the viable 
components of a number of theories together into his integrated 
understanding of organizational crime. 
2.7. Coleman: the Culture of Competition 
In his hypothesis of white collar crime, Coleman (1987) combines 
elements from opportunity, rational actor, neutralization, cultural, and 
social psychological theories. As a general theory of white collar 
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crime, his account is directed also to organizational crime. Although 
white collar crime includes a wide range of behavior, Coleman argues 
for the plausibility of a general theory for the various forms "-- share 
many important similarities and require treatment as a single 
phenomenon for many analytic purposes." According to his definition, 
white collar crime includes violations of criminal as well as civil law. 
(Pp.407-8) 
Research on white collar crime involves studies of micro- and 
macrolevel factors. Coleman (1987) draws these levels of explanation 
together into a single theoretical framework. (P.408) On the 
microlevel, explaining the social psychology of organizational crime, 
his point of departure is the interactionist approach. According to the 
interactionist theory, meanings are attached to social reality and this 
social construction determines which courses of action are appropriate 
and socially desirable. (P.410) In case the organizationally constructed 
reality clashes with more general social norms and ethical principles, 
techniques of neutralization are employed to smooth the contradiction 
(pp. 410-4 and 420-1). 
According to Coleman's (1987) hypothesis, criminal behavior results 
from a coincidence of appropriate motivation and opportunity (p.408). 
Motivation is a subjective contruction of individual desires, while an 
opportunity derives from objective social conditions (p.424). Coleman 
argues the motivation for white collar crime to originate from the 
structural macrolevel (p.414). His key concept is culture of 
competition which emphasizes wealth and success as central human 
goals. This system of beliefs holds each person as a freely choosing 
autonomous actor with reason and responsibility for her own condition. 
Achieving economic self-interest through competition prevails. 
Competition is believed to develop character, measure personal worth, 
stimulate individual achievement, and to ultimately profit society as a 
whole. (Coleman 1992:61 and 1987:416) 
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Fear of failure is another central feature in the culture of competition 
to provide motivation for white collar crime. Coleman argues that the 
sense of insecurity reaches every stratum of industrial capitalist 
societies. In the 20th century, the desire for wealth and success as well 
as the fear of failure have become stronger. Although acknowledging 
also other factors to contribute to the white collar crime motivation, he 
concludes: 
However, when analysis is extended beyond single 
individuals to encompass the entire group that sustains such 
criminogenic attitudes, the influence of the culture of 
competition reappears. (Coleman 1987:416-8) 
The culture of competition is due to the structural characteristics of 
market economy. Competition is based on growing amounts of surplus 
wealth, societal class system and high mobility between the classes. 
Money facilitates comparison and competition by providing an 
objective standard for measuring profit and loss. (Coleman 1987:418-
20) 
In addition to motivation, opportunity is needed for crime to occur. 
Coleman suggests at least four factors to affect how attractive one 
perceives an opportunity: 
1) The value one expects to gain from the opportunity. 
2) The perception of potential risks involved in a certain 
course of action. Coleman considers law and 
enforcement crucial shapers of opportunities. 
3) The perceived compatibility of the opportunity with the 
actor's ideas, rationalizations and beliefs. 
4) Finally, the actor evaluates her total opportunity 
structure. In case attractive legitimate opportunities are 
not available, the attractiveness of illegitimate chances 
typically raises. (Coleman 1987:424-5) 
94 
Critical Evaluation 
Coleman importantly acknowledges that organizational violations are 
due to a dynamic interplay of various forces. However amlbitious and 
many-sided, his theoretical approach still oversimplifies celtain points. 
Generally speaking, the theory overly relies on the macro structures 
while the microlevel should be more accurately studied. 
Coleman overlooks the diversity of organizational goals as he 
emphasizes the relevance of financial goals. Although the achievement 
of financial goals surely provides motivation for much wrongdoing in 
and out of white collars and organizations, it must not be 
overemphasized at the expense of other accounts. Organizational 
wrongs do occur also in settings without monetary goals: e.g., state 
schools, hospitals, nursing homes, police, and army can nurse patterns 
of misbehavior that are not sufficiently explained by the "culture of 
competition". Goals to motivate organizational misbehavior may 
involve expressing power or superiority also in other than monetary 
terms, escaping undesirable tasks, pleasing others, simply getting 
entertainment, etc. Actually, the range of relevant goals mlay be wide 
indeed; what matters is not the goal but the means through which it is 
achieved (Braithwaite 1988:628). Academic glory is an acceptable goal 
but may motivate falsification of test results. Betterment of human kind 
is a legitimate goal, too, but turns criminogenic when tried to 
accomplish through medical experiments on coerced victims or 
sterilizing mentally ill people?6 
Furthermore, basing his analysis on the political economy of industrial 
capitalism, Coleman fails to acknowledge that organizational crime 
flourishes also in socialist countries (see Braithwaite 1988). Countering 
this critique, Coleman (1992:62) argues the origins of crirninogenesis 
to actually lie in industrialism, whether in capitalist or communist 
societies. He also refers to the reality of the communistic societies: in 
260rganizational goals were also discussed in the Chapter 2.4.1. 
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spite of the official ideology, considerable inequality and social 
mobility prevails, resulting in status competition. People are driven to 
crime by their individualistic desire for personal gain, and exhortations 
to work for the common good are ignored. 
As a result, Coleman becomes further restricted theoretically for also 
cooperation can motivate wrongdoing. The core of organizational 
wrongs is collective behavior, not necessarily competition. Braithwaite 
(1988:629) illustrates: 
Even a utopian, perfectly democratic commune can have a 
cooperative goal -feeding the collective- that is frustrated by 
environmental contingencies that can be overcome by 
breaching laws controlling irrigation, soil conservation, or 
use of pesticides. 
Organizational wrongs may take place also in conditions free of 
money, capitalism or competition. 
Yet a crucial blind spot in Coleman's theory must be noted: he 
understates the value of social psychological explanations in 
illuminating the collective creation of biased perceptions. Coleman 
(1987:414-5) claims that the interactionist theory is not able to account 
for the origins of criminal moti vation. Yet, organizational goals and 
moti vations do develop in the social discourses on the micro level. 
Goals cannot be derived from the "culture of competition" without 
organizational processes in which they are adopted, interpreted, 
disseminated, and finally turned into organizational outcomes. It is not 
a fertile approach to view organizational wrongs as a function of any 
given goals. Furthermore, Coleman nears rational actor theory as he 
views the actor as a calculator of the net benefits of opportunities. 
However, as discussed earlier27 , organizations are not unitary actors 
comparable to individuals and their decisionmaking seldom is 
distinctively rational. (See Rabe and Ermann 1996) Wrongful 
outcomes may as well stem from sticking to schemas, faults, 
27Chapter 2.4. Rational Actor/Crime as Choice Theory. 
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disinformation, lack of communication, high group cohesion, and other 
factors that intervene in the rational goal-attainment. 
2.8. Sutherland: Differential Association 
Sutherland developed the theory of differential association in order to 
account for all types of crime, including white collar crime. 
Differential association is the most influential learning theory of crime 
(Braithwaite 1989a:34). Its key idea is that criminal behavior, like any 
behavior, is learned from other people. An individual is subject to 
influence of other people and criminality occurs when that influence 
primarily is favorable to crime. Sutherland argues that 
-- white collar crime has its genesis in the same general 
process as other criminal behavior, namely, differential 
association. The hypothesis of differential association is that 
criminal behavior is learned in association with those who 
define such criminal behavior favorably and in isolation from 
those who define it unfavorably, and that a person in an 
appropriate situation engages in such criminal behavior if, 
and only if, the weight of the favorable definitions exceeds 
the weight of the unfavorable definitions. (1983:240) 
As mentioned in reference to cultural theories, Sutherland draws from 
personal documents which reveal how businessmen with no criminal 
background are induced into white collar crime as a part of learning 
business in practice: managers and colleagues teach and demand 
employees to commit wrongs, and newcomers learn specific techniques 
how to commit wrongs as well as an ideology to justify them. 
(Sutherland 1983:240-6) 
Differential association theory's explanatory power is supported by the 
notion that wrongdoing spreads. Sutherland argues that as a firm adopts 
an illegitimate method for increasing profits, other firms become aware 
of it and adopt it, too, in order not to let the other firm to benefit from 
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the unfair practice. E.g., a chemist who had been employed in a food 
manufacturing firm accounts that the members of the firm frankly 
deplored the misrepresentations in their advertisements but considered 
them necessary to attract customers since the other firms employed 
extravagant statements about their products, too. Sutherland provides 
also other examples: practices of restraint of trade spread as firms 
interact, sometimes even through coercion. In addition to certain 
practices, the diffusion of misbehavior also occurs on the level of 
attitudes. (Sutherland 1983:245-50) 
Businessmen are not only influenced by definitions favorable to 
wrongdoing, they are also relatively isolated and protected from 
unfavorable definitions to it. Traditionally, the media and the 
governmental bodies have focused on the misbehavior of the lower 
socio-economic class and failed to address white collar crime with the 
same rhetorical and functional energy. The business has also been able 
to employ a powerful set of linguistic devices against critical voices, 
such as condemning them "communists", "socialists", "bureaucracy", 
and hyper-patronizing in general. Although the system of free 
competition and enterprise must give way to governmental regulation, 
"it retains great force as an ideology, which has been designated 'the 
folklore of capitalism'." (Sutherland 1983:250-6) 
From the societal point of view, Sutherland's hypothesis for explaining 
crime is social disorganization28 • The concept supplements differential 
association theory by accounting for the source of the attitudes learned 
through differential association. Social disorganization results from 
conflicting attitudes, values and standards that prevail in the 
contemporary Western society. The principal agencies of social control 
-large family and homogenous neighborhood- have broken down as 
mobility and individualism have increased. Personal worth has come to 
28However, in the last edition of his work "Principles of 
Criminology" (1947), Sutherland preferred the term "differential social 
organization" to social disorganization (Coleman 1992:54). 
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be measured through wealth which creates materialism and encourages 
crime. Underlying this development is industrialization and the growth 
of capitalism. (Sutherland 1934, cited in Coleman 1992:54-5) 
Sutherland (1983 :255-6) distinguishes two types of social 
disorganization: anomie -a lack of standards of behavior- and conflict 
of standards where the prevailing norms of behavior are contradictory. 
Social disorganization is being nurtured through the difficulty to 
control business behavior which is complex, technical, and takes place 
in relative secrecy. In addition, the norms are changing along with new 
political ideologies, which creates uncertainty as to what set of norms 
to follow. (Ibid.) 
Critical Evaluation 
Like Coleman, Sutherland integrates micro and macro explanations. 
Also the same criticism applies: understanding organizational behavior 
cannot rely on societal macrolevel factors such as materialism, 
capitalism, or indi vidualism. 
Clearly, contradictory norms may be confusing: governmental 
regulation is escalating, the social responsibility of business is widely 
called for and active social movements argue for new codes of business 
behavior. Quite obviously, there are different perceptions of ethical 
behavior among different social actors, and it is not much to assume 
that crime is a function of these conflicting standards. Rather, it 
reminds a tautology to argue that crime follows its label: the ability of 
one group to label another group that employs a different set of norms. 
How about the lack of standards, then, as an explanation of white collar 
crime? The problem with anomie is that surely white collar criminals, 
and wrongdoers in general, are following some set of norms. Thus, a 
step forward would be to focus on the origins of these in proper codes 
of behavior. Rather than macrolevel products, the wrongful norms are 
an organizational phenomenon. 
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Sutherland's psychological merit is in acknowledging that human 
beings are subject to powerful social influence. Coleman (1992:56) has 
problems with this notion: "In one sense, Sutherland's assumption that 
all crime is learned from criminally oriented groups denies the 
possibility of true deviance, since everyone is seen to be conforming to 
the expectations of one group or another." But that exactly is the case: 
human behavior derives from human associations. Even the deviant 
ones who do not conform to criminogenic pressures of their 
organizations deri ve their thinking from certain assocIatIOns. 
Therefore, it must be recognized that social influence exists also 
beyond intimate, personal groups that Sutherland emphasized: one's 
behavior may also be shaped by literature, political leaders, 
philosophers. Although Sartre is not a personal friend of mine, I would 
think of his existentialist writings while being confronted with undue 
collective pressures. 
However, it is true that Sutherland's view on the human agency and the 
social psychology of organizations need elaboration. He was vigorous 
to deny that white collar crime can be attributed to immorality or other 
psychological characteristics of the criminals (Coleman 1992:54). Still, 
whether one submits oneself to wrongful organizational pressures is 
due to one's psychological characteristics indeed. Although it is 
important to acknowledge how communities construct their standards 
and demand obedience from their members, human actors not 
necessarily choose the wrongful path even if its social rewards would 
exceed the costs in that very situation. Power always creates its 
counterpower (Galbraith 1984:87), and human beings are not mere 
calculators (Braithwaite 1989a:37). Therefore, more sophisticated 
analysis is required if the intention is as ambitious as to account for 
organizational misbehavior. 
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2.9. Braithwaite: Differential Shaming 
Braithwaite has been a very productive writer on white collar crime. 
The reason for turning to him last is that he constructively builds on the 
other theories, yielding a systematic integration. He incorporates 
elements from control, opportunity, labeling, subcultural, and learning 
theories of crime. Furthermore, the view on the human agency adopted 
in his theory is sophisticated and psychologically sensitive. 
Braitwaite's work is valuable not only because of his extensive field 
research but also for his ambitious programme of creating a general 
theory of crime. Drawing from an analogy to family, he argues for a 
wide concept of social control that does not crucially rely on formal 
punishment. For Braithwaite, the critical concept in explaining deviant 
behavior is shame. In its simplicity, the basic argument is that one is 
not likely to do something that makes one feel ashamed. (Braithwaite 
1989a) 
Braithwaite (1989b:340) defines shaming as 
an expression of disapproval that can be enacted in an infinite 
variety of verbal and nonverbal cultural fonns. -- The 
disapproval is expressed with the intention or effect of 
invoking remorse in the person being shamed and/or 
condemnation by others who become aware of the shaming. 
He adds that shaming can be effective be it direct or indirect: even a 
suspicion that others are gossiping may be a powerful form of social 
control. The most important shamers are within interdependent 
communities such as family or workplace. Also the state can shame, 
especially through the criminal justice system (see Braithwaite 
1989a:69 and 100; 1989b:342-3). 
According to the theory of shaming, actors find it more difficult to 
break the norms in case other people come to know about it -unless the 
others represent a subculture approving of such deviance. Sunlight is 
"the best disinfectant", and organizational offenders do not want their 
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symbolical white collars tarnished (Fisse and Braithwaite 1983). Thus, 
organizations can more easily sustain subcultures of noncompliance 
with the wider social norms if they manage to cover the misbehavior 
"so that members of the organization can go out into their 
neighborhoods, their churches, their social groups without suffering 
accusations that they are criminals." Braithwaite notes an important 
facilitator of organizational misbehavior: it is too easy to escape 
publicity and conceal the wrongs as well as to obscure where, in the 
complex organization, the responsibility actually lies. (Braithwaite 
1989b:341) 
Braithwaite (1989a:l00-l; 1989b:341) distinguishes shaming into two 
types: Reintegrative shaming maintains respect and is followed by 
"gestures of reacceptance or forgiveness." The wrongful act is 
condemned while the actor is regarded as essentially good. The other 
type of shaming, disintegrati ve stigmatization, treats offenders as 
outcasts and the shaming ceremonies are not followed by efforts to 
reintegrate the offender to society. 
According to the research on convicted white collar offenders, they 
experience contradictory emotions: embarrasment and shame vs. 
hostility and rage (Benson 1989). In order to survive the crisis of being 
caught doing wrong, organizations as well as individuals employ 
certain defence mechanisms. An undesirable one is to raise rage and 
hostility against the enforcement, while a more creative way to cope 
with the situation is for an organization to reform, for an individual to 
repent. (Braithwaite 1989b:345-6) 
In order to promote reintegrative shaming, Braithwaite analyzes the 
role of the enforcement agencies in affecting the rate of organizational 
violations. Citing Bardach and Kagan (1982), he maintains that an 
enforcement style that is "unreasonable, uncooperative, rulebook-
oriented and litigious" contributes to the formation of business 
subcultures of resistance. Such subcultures nurture rationalizations and 
know-how for misbehavior. Citing Matza (1964), he moves on: "Being 
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pushed around puts the delinquent in a mood of fatalism. -- he is 
rendered irresponsible." If the enforcement is experienced as unjust or 
oppressive, the offender "might transcend that mutilation through rage" 
and lose the moral bond of the law. Furthermore, if organizational 
actors are stigmatized as untrustworthy and unworthy of cooperation, 
they might turn to resistant subcultures for social support. (Braithwaite 
1989b:343-5) 
Therefore, Braithwaite argues for a regulatory style that is firm but 
cooperative: 
-- trusting toward cooperating organizations, tough toward 
cheating organizations, and forgiving toward cheaters who 
switch to cooperation. 
If mutual respect is maintained also informal control has effect. As we 
know, relying solely on the formal court-based control has not been an 
effective response to organizational violations. Still, occasional use of 
legal weapons may increase the regulators' credibility in the eyes of the 
organizations. Accordingly, organizational wrongs are facilitated by 
the fact that the most common regulatory style is cooperative but too 
permissive. Thus, organizational actors may not regard the regulators 
as significant others. (Braithwaite 1989b:343-5) Lack of respect 
enables playing games with the regulators where a punishment is 
considered a temporary game loss with no severe irnplications 
(Laitinen and Virta 1998:16). 
Braithwaite emphasizes the role of societal interest groups in providing 
the regulators a fertile middle-ground standing in the political 
discources on the standards of organizational behavior. Interest groups 
may also have a more direct impact on organizational behavior as they 
launch new ideologies to base assesment of "reasonable" business 
behavior and shaming on. (Braithwaite 1989b:342 and 344) 
Central in Braithwaite's theory is integrating seemingly contradictory 
traditional criminological theories. He (1989a) seeks greater 
explanatory power through integrating "the modest explanatory 
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successes of existing sociological theories of crime" (Preface) and 
"through the addition of just one element -the partitioning of shaming-
as a shunt to connect these diverging theoretical tracks" (p.107). The 
shunting is needed in order to combine labeling theory that suggests 
social control to create deviance (Lemert 1967), and control theory that 
makes the opposite argument: social disapproval by the important 
others reduces deviance (Braithwaite 1989b:340). Braithwaite 
disentangles these dynamics through a "theory of tipping points": 
Organizational behavior involves forces which either favor compliance 
with the law or a subculture of resistance. In the tipping points, 
differential shaming is the variable to determine which way to go: if the 
significant shamers share a subculture of resistance, shaming integrates 
the actor into wrongdoing; if one's significant others think highly of 
the law and morals one is more likely to be deterred from wrongs. 
(Braithwaite 1989a:107; 1989b:345 and 348) 
Critical Evaluation 
Braithwaite seems to be on a prOlIDsmg track. Organizational 
wrongdoing often is facilitated by the absence of official condemnation 
-the greatest crimes tend to escape the criminal label and punishmene9-
and by the fact that in the actual situation where a wrong is committed 
the participants do not perceive their behavior wrongful -at least not as 
a real or serious violation. Thus, there may not prevail sufficient 
shaming to deter one from what is defined as wrong in a wider context. 
Clearly, extra-organizational actors and memberships are significant in 
pointing out altemati ve bases for shaming. 
Support to the explanatory power of shame as a significant deterrent to 
guide human behavior can be drawn, e.g., from Milgram's 
29There is no lack of examples to support this argument. E.g., no 
high-level official was ever prosecuted for engaging in the pursuit of the 
Vietnam War (Friedrichs 1996:127). 
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experiments3o. In his obedience experiments, the participants had no 
reason to fear punishment -apart from the possible loss of the 
participation fee- but were afraid of embarrassment. \Vhen the 
experimenter was out of the room it was easier to disobey since direct 
confrontation could be avoided. Kelman and Hamilton (1989:157) 
conclude that 
-- the fear of embarrassment is functionally equivalent to the 
fear of punishment -- stigmatization and isolation of 
dissidents as troublemakers, deviants, or traitors- is a binding 
force available to political authorities as much as to 
experimenters, airline pilots, or supervisors in the workplace. 
Braithwaite (l989a:69-71) comes up with other, equally convincing, 
evidence in support of the power of informal punishments in 
comparison to the formal ones. 
Shame is an effective means of social control for it relies on the very 
fundamental human need to be in contact with other people. In addition 
to social disapproval, pangs of conscience are the crucial punishers 
incorporated in the theory. Reintegrative shaming funtions to make the 
actor her own shamer so that external controls are "resorted to less and 
less". (Braithwaite 1989a:72-5) 
Is the community that Braithwaite aspires after, then, a Foucauldian 
nightmare? The power of the community Braithwaite is suggesting 
reminds of Foucault's modem biopower that relies rather on discipline 
than punishment and the core of which is normalization (Helen 
1994:276). Controls are to invade our very personalities, and an 
individual is rejected unless she conforms to the social norms and asks 
for forgiveness for her deviation. Would a community of reintegrative 
shaming stultify individualism and have neurotically inhibited 
inhabitants with too strong superegos? Is it right to foster feelings of 
30 Milgram's experiments were discussed earlier in the Chapter 
2.5.2. Following the Authority. 
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shame, for shaming implies a negative feeling of oneself and 
degradation of self-esteem? 
Braithwaite (1989a) counters this line of critique by admitting that 
shaming "surely limits autonomy" (p.lO) and that it can be "cruel, even 
vicious" (p.lOl). He acknowledges that shaming is "a dangerous game" 
that can be misused for thought control and stultification of human 
diversity (p.12). Therefore, only behavior that risks or harms other 
people is to be shamed or punished, always with human respect and 
without stigmatization. Shaming is justified for the moralizing restricts 
our autonomy in a well-grounded manner, 
-- by inviting us to see that we cannot be whole moral persons 
through considering only our own interests -- We are shamed 
if we exercise our own autonomy in a way that tramples on 
the autonomy of others. (P.ll) 
Actually, the sense of communitarian morals the theory invokes is a 
necessity of contemporary life on a globe with limited resources and 
enormous inequalities of power. A way to define wrongs is that they 
deny others their humanity and render them powerless (Henry and 
Milovanovic 1994). Organizational wrongs do this to an overwhelming 
extent, as was seen in Chapter 1. Powerful shaming is justified and 
needed in order to fight organizational wrongs. Unfortunately, 
conscience has to be acquired (Braithwaite 1989a:7l); it is not inherent 
in human behavior. Therefore, it must be taught in active shaming 
processes in the interdependent community, and required from 
individuals and their organizations. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BEHA VIOR 
In this 3rd Chapter, it will be discussed what kind of social 
psychological forces affect human behavior in social settings such as 
organizations. Although the dynamics of collective behavior underlie 
organizational life, they have been neglected in the criminological 
theory. I will focus on the question whether collective outcornes differ 
from the members' individual behavior and preferences. Various social 
psychological phenomena will be presented in order to provide further 
understanding of organizational wrongdoing. Finally, means to avoid 
the pitfalls of collective decisionmaking will be brought out. It is also 
important to acknowledge the organizational dialectics of power: much 
as individual members are affected by the collective, the human agency 
must still be taken into account. Thus, resistance is a theme to be 
incorporated, too. 
3.1. Methodological Individualism vs. Holism 
When approaching organizational behavior, the basic choice is between 
the atomic view -which views organizations as nothing more than a 
collection of individuals- and the organic view -where organization is 
not reduced to its members (Wells 1993:85). Methodological 
individualism regards organizational action merely as a sum of its 
individual parts: only individuals are real and act, while social 
phenomena such as organizations are abstractions beyond direct 
observation (Fisse and Braithwaite 1993: 18-9). Accordingly, Cressey 
(1989) argued that the idea of corporations committing crimes merely 
is a legal fiction. He claimed that "so-called organizational crime is 
committed by corporation executives, not by organizations." (Geis 
1992:44) 
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Cressey's view has been challenged by a number of scholars. E.g., 
Braithwaite and Fisse (1990: 19) make it straight: "The notion that 
individuals are real, observable, flesh and blood, while corporations are 
legal fictions, is false." Rather, the whole always is more than the sum 
of its parts, and in each case there is a need to build upon reductionism 
to study how the parts interact to form wholes (Fisse and Braithwaite 
1993:20-1). Opposite to methodological individualism is 
methodological holism. This view was notably presented by Durkheim 
who saw an individual as a product of social forces. Straighforward is 
the rejection of individualism in the Balinese culture: 
Physically men come and go, mere incidents in a 
happenstance history -- But the masks they wear, the stage 
they occupy, the parts they play, and, most important, the 
spectacle they mount remain -- (Geerts 1983, cited in 
Braithwaite and Fisse 1990: 19). 
Also crude methodological holism can be attacked for it denies 
indi vidual wilful freedom thus leading to determinism. Therefore, an 
intermediary stand would be reasonable: individuals and their 
institutions shape each other. Individualism ignores the social forces 
that constrain organizational behavior while holism overlooks the 
individual capacity to resist and reshape the community's "thought 
world". (Fisse and Braithwaite 1993:19-21) Because the collective 
impacts its members' behavior the whole transcends the sum of 
isolated individual actions. 
What, then, must be added to the sum of the individuals in order to 
grasp the whole; what exactly constitutes the difference between the 
individuals and the organization? The answer is the organization which 
constrains human behavior. Also being a group member affects human 
behavior; in fact, so does the mere cognition of co-workers. In social 
psychology, different phenomena of human behavior in social settings 
are recognized. E.g., social facilitation occurs as the presence of other 
people enhances productivity, social loafing being its counterforce 
(Franzoi 1996: 522-7). 
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Within organizations, individuals do things they would not do 
individually. Army may be the most radical example. Organizations 
guide their members conduct through their routines, history, continuity, 
role expectations, status hierarchy, depersonalized relationships, and 
norms in general. In groups, decisionmaking yields something else than 
a mere combination of individual voices. 
Stone (1975:3-5) illustrates the difference between individual and 
organized behavior with an example of the jury. The jury may come up 
with a verdict that results from compromises and does not correspond 
to any member's initial preference. Everyone's individual decision 
might differ from the group's decision even after the joint deliberation. 
To belong to an institution like the jury means that one's behavior is 
fitted into an institutional framework with "a whole series of formal 
constraints". Stone specifies various formal constraints the jury 
confronts: they only have a limited set of appropriate judgemental 
categories to decide between, there are rules on the vote, the time and 
the information for the decisionmaking are limited, the jurors' number 
and the physical setting are fixed, there is a formal role structure, and 
there are general qualifications for the post. In addition to the formal 
factors, there are informal constraints inherent in all group behavior. 
For example, jurors are affected by the sense of the jury's societal role 
involving expectations of what the jury is supposed to do in the 
particular case or in general. 
In the similar vein, Braithwaite and Fisse (1990:22) note that 
institutional procedures distinguish collective action from individual 
preferences. As in regard to the board of directors: "-- while each 
member -- can 'vote' for a declaration of dividend, only the board as a 
collectivity is empowered to declare a dividend." 
Organizations are capable of outcomes far beyond individual capacity. 
For a single isolated individual, it would be impossible to impose such 
threat and damage as, e.g., nuclear disasters or the Nazi administration 
have been able to produce. Organizations encourage and employ 
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specialized skills that would otherwise be of little use. In addition, as 
an organization brings the pieces together, the social psychological 
phenomena of collective action further separate group working from 
what an isolated individual would do. 
Stone (1975 :6-7) concludes that in order to institute a change in the 
performance and the fuctions of the jury as a social institution the 
relevant level of analysis would not be the individual actors but their 
institutional framework. The institutional approach even more 
powerfully facilitates understanding corporations: 
For while a jury brings together on an ad hoc basis for a 
rather limited time, and with rather limited aims, and in a 
rather flat hierarchical structure, the corporation brings 
together men, machines, and patterns of doing things into an 
enormous sociotechnical system that is far more complex, 
overwhelming, and powerful. (Ibid.) 
Stone nears Durkheimian holism as he describes individuals in 
corporations as "fitted parts of elaborate subsystems" whose wants, 
perceptions, and emotions are swayed by the institutional structure. His 
delicate point is that the participants do not plainly serve the employer, 
but, more importantly, the general process as a whole. Similarly to the 
Jury: 
There is no reason to suppose that -- (the corporate) decisions 
and the way it arrives at them - will coincide with those of 
anyone person within it, not even necessarily those of the 
president. (Ibid.) 
In sum, these arguments strongly support the view that an organization 
cannot be reduced to its individual parts. 
3.1.1. The Irrelevance of Persons 
As mentioned in the introduction, Galbraith (1984) stresses the role of 
organizations as he analyzes the modem sources of power. 
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Accordingly, the importance of personality and property -the two other 
sources of power- is diminishing. Corporations have lost the visible, 
powerful, dominating leaders. They have been replaced by 
management groups, "faceless organizational men" . Accordingly, 
organizational decisionmaking depends on continuous cooperation 
rather than the abilities of one single person. (Pp.142-5) Now that the 
days of the prominent "robber barons" have passed, "faceless" is the 
expression that also Geis (1993: 19-20) generally attributes to business 
leaders. Galbraith (1984: 191) concludes that products of bureaucracy 
have replaced the manager's will. As an indication, when the 
management personnel changes, no notable political or functional 
changes are usually expected in large corporations nor in public 
institutions. 
Ermann and Lundman (1996:4-5) describe large organizations as 
collections of positions that powerfully constrain the work-
related thoughts and actions of the replaceable lpeople who 
occupy these positions. 
Organizations commonly substitute their members at all levels with 
little effect on the organizational processes. Ermann and Lundman 
apply an analogy to basketball teams: although players and coaches 
change, the same game still goes on. The same is true of universities: 
each year a number of students and professors leave while new ones 
come in. Still, universities continue to operate as if nothing had 
happened. (Pp.5-6) 
Sharing these views, Coleman (cited in Ermann and Lundman 1996:6) 
claims that the structure exists independently of the persons occupying 
the positions within it, and that obligations and expectations, goals and 
resources associated with the positions exist apart from the individuals. 
Accordingly, the one who has initiated the wrongful pattern may have 
moved on to new positions as so often happens. Then, the replacer may 
find that the wrong is an expected part of the job. (Ermann and 
Lundman, p.22) And indeed, in many corporations that Sutherland 
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(1983 :262) examined, the wrongdoing continued despite the persons 
had changed: 
-- many corporations which violated the antitrust law forty 
years ago are still violating that law, although the personnel 
has changed completely. 
Thus, people are incidental in the structure that only consists of 
positions and is not dependent on particular persons. Coleman 
(1982:59-60) illuminates this through the in-basket game, a common 
method in management training programs. In the game, management 
trainees are to assume that they unexpectedly have replaced the 
previous plant manager and have to reply to the mail in their 
predecessor's in-basket. The idea is to make the change of the manager 
unnoticeable, which is considered good for the smooth functioning of 
the plant. Using the game in training managers is a telling example of 
how irrelevant persons in organizations really are. One is expected to 
play the organizational role with no personal variation. One is not 
significant as a person but as an occupant of a particular position. 
Futhermore, one is aware of being replaceable: one is trained for the 
position, and should one fail to meet the standards, there are others 
with a similar training. This is a dehumanizing realization (Simon 
1996a:281). 
3.2. Human Behavior in Groups 
Social psychology investigates how the presence of other people -
concrete or imagined- affects individual thinking, emotions and 
behavior. Social psychology clings to the micro-macro connection 
between the individual and her collective so crucial in sociolegal 
analyses of organizational behavior. In addition to its members' 
features, an organization can be analyzed on the collective level, e.g., 
on the basis of its structure and interaction. (Tiuraniemi 1993:3-5) 
Various social psychological experiments have been carried out in 
order to study and explain human behavior in social situations. 
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Working in a group is a central social situation. An organization is a 
major group which may also be constructed of various specific groups. 
(Tiuraniemi 1993 :45) Organizational behavior takes place in groups, 
and therefore social psychological research on groups is relevant in this 
study. 
3.2.1. Bystander Apathy 
A public-place murder in New York 1964 gained wide publicity and set 
forth much research. The victim's struggle with the murderer lasted 
over half an hour. None of the at least 38 witnesses took action to 
prevent the crime and not even called the police until the scene was 
over. (E.g., Franzoi 1996:487; Gergen and Gergen 1981:255) 
Bystander apathy is a situation where the sense of social responsibility 
collides with the situational norms (Gahagan 1977:94). In order to 
study this very phenomenon, Latane and Darley (1969) arranged a 
research setting in which the subjects confronted situations that 
demanded immediate action: e.g., smoke began to pour into the room, a 
person in the next room seemed to get injured, or another testee seemed 
to have a serious fit. It was found that when alone in the room, the 
research subject usually acted properly: took action, helped or seeked 
help. However, when there were many people in the room often 
nobody acted. (Eskola 1977:82) It has been concluded that when others 
are present, people are less likely to define a potentially dangerous 
situation as an emergency. Furthermore, the response is likely to be 
slower. (Franzoi 1996:490) 
Bystander Intervention Model 
Latane and Darley distinguish two processes that prevent action in 
social settings: 
1) Definition. "Emergies don't come wearing signs saying 
'I am an emergency.' In defining an event as an 
emergency, one looks at other people to see their 
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reactions to the situation and interprets the meaning 
that lies behind their actions." 
2) Diffusion. When many people are present in the 
situation, the responsibility for acting does not clearly 
focus on one person. (Franzoi 1996:488) 
Latane and Darley (1970) have further developed a model of various 
steps. Taking action during an emergency involves a series of 
decisions. Should one fail in any of these decisions, one will not 
intervene. First, one must label a certain course of action as something 
unusual and not desirable. Thus, a participant in an organizational 
wrong must perceive the scene as ethically or legally wrongful. Then, 
one must determine one's responsibility to intervene. In case other 
potential actors are present, one may not define oneself as the 
responsible one to take action. This is especially the case when 
authoritative actors are present. However, the mere presence of the 
neighbors prevented action in the above mentioned murder case: 
people surely had thought of calling the police but estimated that 
"thirty people have probably called by now." (Franzoi 1996:487-90) 
Typically in complex organizations, there are many other people of 
various status levels who would be responsible for acting as well. 
Therefore, one may neutralize individual responsibility by thinking: 
"Why should I be the one to make an effort and risk being labeled 
ridiculous and a troublemaker?" 
Furthermore, even if one notices a violation and defines oneself as 
responsible for intervening, one must come up with a potential form of 
action to take. According to Latane and Darley, if the actor is not able 
to think of an appropriate course of intervention, she will fail to take 
action. Finally, should one pass all the preceding gates towards 
intervention, the last decision required is whether to implement the 
course of prosocial action. However, there are many inhibitions at 
work even if one fully recognizes the situation. (Franzoi 1996:488-90) 
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The audience inhibit effect prevents people from helping as they fear 
that the other bystanders would evaluate them negatively if they do 
intervene and the situation turns out not to be an emergency. Thus, one 
is likely to be concerned about embarrassing oneself by overreacting. 
However, some people are more sensitive to embarrassment than 
others. (Tice and Baumeister 1985, cited in Franzoi 1996:492). In case 
people are not sure how to define a particular situation, proper action 
may also be prevented as the participants tend to become dependent on 
the others in defining social reality: in order to make sense of the 
ambiguous situation, people look for cues in the others' behavior. 
Apathy follows since inaction is commonly preferred due to such a 
mode of thought as "doing nothing is relatively safe because it is 
noncontroversial" (Benveniste 1977: 110, cited in Ashforth and Lee 
1990:624), and since people tend to define situations collectively. 
(Franzoi, pp. 490-2) 
Freedman et al. (1970: 196-8) refer to diffused responsibility as 
deindividuation. People may do such things together that they would 
not do alone -including keeping passive. The effect of deindividuation 
is increased by anything that makes the members of the group less 
identifiable: the more anonymous the participants, the more 
irresponsibly they may behave, and the less they feel they have an 
identity of their own. There is experimental evidence suggesting that 
the loss of individuality contributes to violent or antisocial behavior 
exhibited by groups. (Ibid.) 
3.2.2. Group Cohesion and Conformity 
Conformity means yielding to social pressure, whereas group 
cohesiveness refers to the degree to which group members are attracted 
to one another and to the group as a whole (Franzoi 1996:556-7; 
Gergen and Gergen 1981 :492). As mentioned earlier, organizations 
have a stake in conformity since their external power can be argued to 
depend on their ability to maintain internal conformity (Galbraith 
1984). Also cohesion is argued to benefit the organization: it is likely 
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that a cohesive group is productive and its members enjoy their work 
and share the institutional goals. Cohesion provides social satisfaction. 
However, cohesion and conformity have their part to play in producing 
organizational wrongs since the wrongs stem from concerted action and 
inaction. 
J uuti (1992a: 111-5) agrees that group cohesion also has undesirable 
consequences. The level of the cohesion implies the extent to which the 
group is able to affect its members' voluntary action. In a cohesive 
group, more social pressure is prone to develop. Groups create their 
way of perceiving the world, and a cohesive group more forcefully 
imposes that view on its members. This manipulation constrains 
indi vidual members' freedom to act. 
Group cohesion is likely to increase as the meaning of the membership 
increases in value to the participants (Tiuraniemi 1993:47). The more 
the group members are attracted to one another and to the group as a 
whole and share the group's goals, the greater the group's cohesiveness 
-and success (Freedman et al. 1970:94). Cohesion increases as the 
group succeedes in satisfying its members' needs, and cohesion 
typically leads to better goal-attainment as well as to greater personal 
devotion to the collective goals (J uuti 1992a: 111-4). Thus, cohesion 
feeds itself. 
Persons with similar backgrounds and interests are prone to build 
coherent groups. However, cohesion can also develop with time: 
persons who work together are likely to adopt common values, norms 
and beliefs which contribute to coherence. Other factors to invoke 
coherence include external respect that the group enjoys. Also an 
external threat unites the group and joint efforts against the threat 
further solidarity and identification with the group. In addition, 
coherence is enhanced by mutual dependence of the actors. 
(Tiuraniemi 1993:47; Juuti 1992a: 112) 
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It is seen that coherence tends to prevail in settings similar to those of 
white collar crime: White collar offenders typically share a legitimate 
background and are better educated than the conventional ones. 
Although organizational action involves employees from various social 
classes, a certain organization or a subunit often attracts, employs and 
cultivates people with shared characteristics. Also achieving 
organizational goals furthers coherence, and goals can be reached 
through white collar crime the net profit of which typically exceeds 
that of conventional crime (see, e.g., Laitinen and Virta 1998:24-5). 
Being respected belongs to white collar crime by definition, fostering 
cohesion. Furthermore, organizational offenders share an enemy: 
illegitimacy is always lurking around the corner since the line between 
right and wrong is an eternal dilemma. The organizational actors 
typicall y also depend on each other as the performance is divided into 
parts and specialization prevails. In conclusion, the settings of white 
collar crime are in many ways similar to those that nurture group 
coherence which suggests coherence to be a variable in understanding 
collecti ve wrongdoing. 
3.2.2.1. Key Experiments on Group Conformity 
As stated above, in ambiguous situations people tend to look for cues 
in the others' behavior. Traditionally cited in this context are the 
experiments of Sherif (1935) and Asch (1956). In Sherifs experiment 
the participants were to observe an immobile luminous point on a 
screen. The experiment bases on the autocinetic effect, an optical 
illusion that the point seems to be moving. There is personal variation 
in how much the point seems to move. In the first part of the 
experiment, each participant's personal variation was measured. In the 
second part, the same phenomenon was measured in group settings 
where the group members became aware of the others' assessments. 
This was the only interaction between the participants. The result was 
that the individual perceptions became to resemble each other, and 
each group developed a unitary level of the illusory movement. 
(Gahagan 1977: 80-4) 
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Asch studied group conformity through an experiment where the task 
was to compare the lenght of the lines drawn on cards. The groups had 
from seven to nine persons, only one of whom was an actual subject of 
the study. The others were Asch's assistants and strangers to the testee. 
Each member was delivered two cards: one with the standard line and 
the other with three lines from which to choose the one equally long 
with the standard. A line was clearly as long as the standard, and when 
the control experiment was conducted individally, nobody erred. 
However, when the research subject was to answer after the others who 
had been instructed to give a uniform incorrect reply, in one third of 
the cases she followed the others and supplied the wrong answer. 
(Gahagan 1977:84-5) As many as 76 per cent of the research subjects 
adjusted themselves to the misleading majority at least once (Juuti 
1992a:118; Statt 1992:128). 
The experiment has been modified by Asch as well as other researchers 
in order to reach more specific results. It has been found that the 
likelihood to follow the erroneous majority increases as the task 
becomes more difficult. When encountered by a difficult arithmetical 
problem, up to 80 per cent of the subjects conformed to the faked group 
consensus (Crutchfield 1955, cited in Statt 1992:129-30). However, if 
the issue lacks the right answer and rather concerns personal opinions 
or taste, the level of the conformity is argued to be lower (Gahagan 
1977:85). Still, in Crutchfield's experiment, over half of the testees -
compared to less than a · fifth of the control group- agreed with a 
political statement according to which it is proper for a society to 
suspend free speech whenever it feels itself threatened. Thus, a 
considerable group bias took place although the argument regarded 
personal opinions. (Statt, ibid.) 
How strong a group bias can we expect in ethical questions? At least 
ethical matters are difficult which suggests more reliance on others. 
E.g., a key participant in the Ford Pinto process, the Recall 
Coordinator, was thoroughly confused what would have been the right 
thing to do. He isn't even sure in retrospect what he should have done! 
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Furthermore, moral tones are often denied and reduced to arguments 
about technical details. Accordingly, the Ford management excluded 
discourse that would have relied on moral terms. (Gioia 1996:148-51) 
The pressure to conform becomes stronger as moral questions are 
obfuscated and transformed into questions of natural science because 
characteristic to natural science is that the right answers do exist and 
can be proven. (See Beck 1990) Besides, although certain ethical 
dilemmas clearly are acknowledged to raise divergent voices, different 
groups tend to perceive their own views superior. In this subcultural 
sense, ethical issues fall into the category where the right answers can 
be approached -and socially demanded. 
In the Asch studies, the issue was very objective by nature. One could 
have been expected to be quite confident with one's perceptions since 
the lines were easily observed. Yet a considerable bias took place. In 
ethical questions, the social influence can be expected to be even 
greater since they are social constructions produced through political 
discources. The social nature of morals already follows frmll the fact 
that ethical norms function to enable harmonious societallife. 
The level of conformity also has to do with the size of the mt:~ority. As 
Asch varied the majority in size, he found that when it consisted of 
more than three persons, its size ceased to matter. Also Juuti 
(l992a: 116) states that conformity increases with the group size to a 
certain limit. Conformity has reached its maximum level when the 
group has four members. 
An important factor is whether the wrongful majority is unanimous. If 
even one participant agreed with the naive subject, yielding to group 
pressure was sharply reduced. (Statt 1992:129) As was seen earlier, an 
analogical result was reached in Milgram's experiment: obedience 
reduced as the research subject received social support in resisting the 
h 
. 31 aut onty . 
31See Chapter 2.5.2. Following the Authority 
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In interviews following the Asch experiment, the ones who had 
conformed to the majoritarian view gave different accounts why they 
had done it. A few reported having followed their actual perception 
(which was false). Thus, most of them who had shared the majority's 
view thought that the answer was not correct. They thought that they 
somehow had mistaken and did not want to ruin the experiment, 
followed their image of the experimenter's wishes, wanted to appear 
positively in front of the others or simply felt uneasy challenging the 
majority. (Gahagan 1977:86-91; Eskola 1977:42) Analogically to 
lackall's (1996) observations, a leveling process takes place: people do 
not consider it worthwhile to express their divergent views which 
would disturb the enjoyable balance, the "comfortable mediocrity", and 
expose themselves to the effort of confronting adverse views and to the 
risk of being labeled unfavorably by the others. An individual always 
assesses how the group views her and is deterred from deviation 
because it feels unpleasant (Bion 1967, cited in Tiuraniemi 1993:56) 
Accordingly, Asch and his successors found that in case the answer 
does not go public, conformity to the faulty majority decreases 
(Gahagan, ibid.). 
What kind of people, then, are especially prone to conform? Variations 
of the Asch experiment suggest that the weaker the research subject 
perceives her skills to be in relation to the other group members, the 
more prone she is to give in to the majoritarian view (Gahagan 
1977:87). People who yield to group pressure are lower in self-esteem 
than those who do not give in (Statt 1992:129). Accordingly, luuti 
(1992a: 116-7) contends that those who are most likely to conform are 
not very self-confident and their intelligence only amounts to the 
average of the group. Referring to research findings, he argues that 
intelligence is in inverse relation to the frequency of conforming. Also 
personality is significant: authoritarian persons conform more likely 
than those with less authoritarian personalities. Being dependent on the 
other group members increases the likelihood of conformity, too. 
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3.2.2.2. Absorption into Organizational Wrongdoing 
Usually people enter new groups insecure and anxious. A new member 
wants to be accepted and respected by the group. Newcomers worry 
about such matters as whether the others like them and listen to what 
they have to say. (Juuti 1992a: 134) In order to be an influential 
organizational member taken into account in important organizational 
processes and decisions, one has to comply with the organizational 
norms. Hamilton and Biggard (1985:13, cited in Braithwaite 
1989b:348) illuminate the core of the organizational power dynamics: 
Being powerful rests on being included in calculated 
strategies and ongoing decisions; being included in strategies 
and decisions rests on others' evaluation IOf one's 
accountability, which in turn rests on one's willingness to 
obey group standards of behavior. 
In the similar vein, Galbraith (1983: 172) states that the one to advance 
one's career and to collect the highest official honours is the one who 
completely approves of the organizational goals. An individual only 
maintains her influence over the organizational use of power to the 
extent that she is willing to subordinate herself to organizational 
aspirations (p.192). 
Organizational life is filled with norms and only a proportion of them 
are explicit and formal. Formal means of control rather provide the last 
resort of controlling behavior (Braithwaite 1989b:348). Galbraith 
(1983: 172) presents a military illustration: The insubordinate will 
confront official punishments such as being discharged from the 
service or, ultimately, sentenced in a court-martial. Yet, the primary 
everyday inofficial sanctions include such deterrents as not being 
promoted, not being invited to collegial work nor to social occasions, 
and not being trusted anymore. 
It can be theorized how one becomes absorbed into organizational 
wrongdoing. As a typical newcomer is insecure and wants 
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acknowledgement and experiences of success in her new society, she 
must play the game by the organizational rules. These rules are being 
imposed on her by official accounts as well as by practical episodes. In 
case one recognizes immoralities, at first one has such a low status in 
the organization that one lacks the power to influence the way things 
are done. Nor is one very likely to resign for many reasons: e.g., giving 
up is culturally despised, and a new job may be hard to find -especially 
if one is labeled as a troublemaker. By time, one will become more and 
more adjusted to the organizational perceptions and is less likely to 
even recognize possible misconduct. 
In the competition for success in the organizational world one may 
engage in misbehavior. Then, the wrongs tend to continue for other 
reasons than why they had started. The Nazis employed a strategy 
where they wanted to make everybody engaged, so that the participants 
would be inhibited from blowing the whistle (Hilberg 1996:171). 
Commitment escalates.32 Individuals who are responsible for a failing 
course of action often "throw good money after the bad" when they try 
to win back their losses and justify their initial decision (Ashforth and 
Lee 1990:629). This phenomenon belongs to the infamous category of 
heuristics in decisionmaking. Once so much resources have already 
been spent, in fear of losing them people may be attracted to go on with 
the wrongful path. Once people have gone trough the "gate region" and 
got their hands dirty, various forces that originally deterred them from 
the situation begin to keep them in. The wrongful nature of the action 
32For an illustration, see John Grisham's novel The Finn (1991). 
Although imaginary, it provides a thought-provoking example of organizing an 
escalating commitment. Starting in legal work, the new recruit is gradually 
socialized into the organizational world. The firm wants its employees to be 
bound to the status quo -by family, collegial and financial ties- so tightly that 
they would not be ready to challenge it when they eventually realize that they 
are expected to commit wrongs. The story will also do as an example how 
difficult it can be to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate 
organizations. Mafia may have the whitest collars! 
122 
may lead to further involvement in efforts to justify or conceal the 
action. (Kelman and Hamilton 1989: 17-8) 
3.2.3. Groupthink 
By groupthink Janis (1972, cited in Simon 1996a:282-3) refers to 
a mode of thinking that people engage in where they are 
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, where the members' 
striving for unanimity overrides their motivations to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of action. 
Groupthink tends to increase as group cohesiveness increases. It 
involves nondeliberate suppression of independent critical thoughts. 
Groupthink is likely to lead to poor decisionmaking and to irrational 
and dehumanizing actions directed against other groups. (Chell 
1987:92-3) 
The dynamics of group think include various factors that defend the 
group from the demands of the complex reality. Negative feedback is 
discounted through collective rationalizations. Were the critique really 
faced, the group would have to question their underlying assumptions. 
Instead of critical evaluation, the members may believe in the inherent 
morality of their group. Along with the unquestioned morality comes 
an illusion of invulnerability which leads to unrealistic optimism and 
facilitates risk-taking. At the same time, outgroups are viewed in 
stereotyped terms, preventing true cooperation with thelffi. (Chell 
1987:93-4) Characteristic to groupthinkers is that they believe persons 
outside the group to be less capable and less aware of the significant 
information (Fisher 1981 :45). 
Groupthink limits rationality as it restricts discussion to certain courses 
of action. Suffering from groupthink, a group fails to re-examine the 
decision initially preferred by the majority even if they leaITI of risks 
and shortcomings they had not considered in the first place. 
Accordingly, the prevailing course of action is reinforced by a failure 
to recognize the non-obvious gains of the rejected alternatives or ways 
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to reduce the alternatives' costs. Communication is limited by not 
hearing external experts. As discussed in reference to the Ford Pinto 
case, being stuck in one view is facilitated by collecting and 
interpreting information according to the existing schema. Thus, 
groupthinkers show interest in facts and opinions that support their 
preferred policy, and ignore divergent voices. (Chell 1987:93-4) 
In a groupthink situation, doubting members are pressured to conform. 
This tends to lead to self-censorship: deviation is avoided by 
undervaluing one's misgivings and keeping silent. Then, the silence is 
interpreted in coherence with the prevailing shema to signify 
agreement, reinforcing the illusion of unanimity. Any doubts the 
members may come across are quickly dispelled, e.g., through 
rationalization (Fisher 1981 :45). Groupthinkers may go as far as to 
serve as mindguards, protecting the group and its leaders from adverse 
information that could risk the shared complacency. (Chell 1987:93-4) 
Accordingly, organizational wrongs are facilitated by blocking the flow 
of critical information. Many companies have systematic policies to 
protect their chief executives from knowing about violations. 
Executives may not even want to know about the misconduct taking 
place in their organizations and expect the subordinates to "get it done 
but don't tell me how you did it." (See, e.g., Braithwaite 1989a:146) 
Typically, groupthinkers are not aware of being victimized by such a 
phenomenon. However, discerning members may sense that something 
is wrong. Fisher (1981 :45-6) cites a member of a group suffering from 
groupthink: 
Everyone in the group gets along almost too well. Ideas that 
come about -- are shallow and unclear. Members of my group 
are afraid to challenge or question ideas. 
What follows from the uncritical adoption of a certain course of action 
is that the group does not prepare for the fact that the chosen and 
protected policy might fail. Hence, if the decision turns out to be risky, 
harmful or against the law, the group may lack means to properly cope 
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with the situation. Starting the process all over again would be costly 
and humiliating, and the easiest escape in the short run is to go on with 
the doomed show. In addition, by the time the negative consequences 
hit the organization, the initial decisionmakers may have lTloved on, 
retired, or the organization itself may have ceased to exist. 
3.2.4. Group Polarization 
Social psychologists have suggested that people favor more risky 
choices in a group than when deciding individually. Thus, a goup tends 
to select the alternative with a bigger payoff but also a greater risk of 
undesirable consequences. This phenomenon is called the "risky shift". 
Of the many explanations for the risky shift the most plausible ones 
include such as: in groups, less individual responsibility is experienced; 
the social proximity may create an atmosphere that alleviates fears and 
initial conservatism of the members; in the state of groupthink a group 
may share powerful illusions which result in unrealistic risk-taking. 
Furthermore, actual or assumed social norms may contribute to taking 
risks: group members may think that courage is socially respected and 
preferred to conservatism. (Fisher 1981:61-2; Freedman et al. 1970:199-
202) 
However, further studies have shown that groups can produce decisions 
that are biased into the other direction as well: group outcomes may be 
more conservative than individual preferences. This can be called the 
"caution shift". (Statt 1994: 136) In conclusion, group discussion may 
polarize decisions: decisionmaking in groups tends to produce more 
extreme positions than the average of the members' individual 
judgments (Johnson and 10hnson 1994:228-9). Group polarization 
refers to an increased extremity of the average response of the group, 
not to a split within the group (Chell 1987:99). 
What, then, determines which way to go? Chell (1987:99) notes that 
the polarization occurs in the direction of the already favored pole and 
must therefore be distinguished from extremization regardless of 
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direction. According to Statt (1994: 136), the group norm bases on the 
views that are first expressed. Then, the view that is supported by the 
majority will be confirmed. In the similar vein, lohnson and lohnson 
(1994:229) state that the direction of the shift depends on what initially 
was the dominant point of view. E.g., if the initial opinions of the 
group members favor conservatism, the shift in the group discussion 
will be toward a more extreme conservative opinion. 
In the polarization process, coherence and conformity serve to silence 
deviant voices. Even though cohesiveness and conformity are 
beneficial to a certain extent, they may lead to a premature closure of 
the group's options. The group may suppress doubts and be lulled into 
a delusion of omniscience. Information that doesn't fit the emerging 
majoritarian schema makes the members feel uncomfortable and will 
be discredited or ignored. (Statt 1994:136-7) 
lohnson and lohnson (1994:230) present explanations that have been 
offered for the group polarization effect. They often occur in 
combination (Franzoi 1996:536). The explanations can be divided into 
two categories: 
1) Normative Influence. Members want to create a favorable 
impression on the others and modify their appearance in the direction 
they consider socially more desirable. According to social comparison 
theory, group members tend to compare themselves to others. Through 
this comparison, they may find that they are not as extreme in the 
socially valued direction than they thought. As they want to be 
evaluated positively, they shift toward more extreme positions. Related 
to normative influence, polarization can also be explained through the 
members' aspiration to identify with the group and to reinforce their 
membership. 
2) Informational Influence. Polarization may also follow from the new 
information the members have learnt in the group. Primarily discussed 
in groups is the commonly shared information, while an individual 
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needs social support for introducing her unique ideas or information. 
(Johnson and Johnson 1994:230) If most members initially support a 
particular view, the group discussion mainly serves to confirm this 
view. Actually, the success of the initial majority opinion has been 
attributed to greater normative as well as informative influence the 
majority has at its disposal. Group discussion is more likely to focus on 
the majority's views than on minoritarian or individual voices as the 
majority can impose more social pressure than the minority. (Franzoi 
1996:533-6) 
Normative influence is especially strong when the issue is ambiguous 
or concerns values and tastes rather than facts. Informational influence 
most likely prevails in groups working on intellective tasks, ie. on tasks 
with demonstrably correct solutions. (Franzoi 1996:533) However, 
these often intertwine in the organizational costruction of reality as 
values are transformed into facts. 
As to the informational explanation, cognitive learning is supplemented 
by group processes. Active discussion produces more attitude change 
than passively receiving information. Attitudes are shaped through 
processing information and publicly expressing arguments. As a result 
of such active processes, the arguments become incorporated in one's 
personal cognitive framework and the sense of commitment to a certain 
stand increases. (Che1l1987:101) 
3.2.5. Ethnocentrism 
It is a human propensity to view the groups one belongs to (ingroups) 
more favorably than other groups (outgroups). Poveda (1994:26) 
defines ethnocentrism as a tendency to view one's own culture and 
institutions as superior to others. Ethnocentrism is manifested in the 
powerful desire to have faith in our own leaders and institutions. It is 
reassuring to believe that the true criminals are those haunted by the 
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police in the streets and that our legitimate institutions are "beyond 
good and evil,,33. Also a member in a wrongdoing organization is 
inclined to escape the cognitive dissonance through failing to label her 
organization wrongful. One builds one's identity and self-esteem 
through the distinction between in- and outgroups (Eskola 1996: 108). 
The split between "good" ingroups and "bad" outgroups is one of the 
psychological defence mechanisms to facilitate organizational 
wrongdoing: in black and white terms, uncritical confidence is directed 
to one's authorities and organizations, while the victims and "the real 
criminals" are placed into separate and inferior categories. 
One tends to seek similarities with the ingroup members and 
differences with outgroups (Statt 1994:138). In the organizational 
process of depersonalization, the members of the same group tend to 
play down the differences between them and rely on the very basic 
social categorization: member in their own group - member in an 
outgroup (John son and 10hnson 1994:380). 
Ingroup members are seen as more similar to oneself even if the 
membership is based on chance (Fiske and Taylor 1984:164). 
Experimental minimal groups have been selected according to some 
trivial criterion such as lottery or eye color (Franzoi 1996:398). Even if 
the membership in a given group is arbitrary and the members strangers 
to each other, the ingroup is preferred to an outgroup: in group members 
are rewarded more, they are viewed as having nicer personalities and 
looks, as well as less responsibility for failing on a task and more 
responsibility for success (Fiske and Taylor, ibid.; Turner 1975, cited 
in Statt 1994:138-9). The tendency to give more favorable evaluations 
and greater rewards to ingroup members is called ingroup bias 
(Franzoi, ibid.). In an experiment, random membership in the roles of 
prisoners and guards lead to an unexpected level of hostility toward the 
outgroup. In fact, the research subjects played their parts so intensely 
33I.e., beyond critical assessment in moral terms. 
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that the experiment had to be interrupted. (Zimbardo et al. 1973, cited 
in Statt, ibid.) 
To be noted is that the view on the in- and outgroups is self-
confirming: the prejudiced schema guides searching and processing 
information. Thus, one tends to perceive and remember the ways the 
ingroup members are similar to oneself and how the outgroups are 
different. Negative behavior of the ingroup is often ignored while that 
of the outgroups is noticed and remembered. (Fiske and Taylor 
1984: 162) As Franzoi (1996:398) states, social and cognitive factors 
intertwine in producing prejudiced evaluations. 
3.2.5.1. Intergroup Competition 
Intergroup competition for scarce resources tends to exaggerate 
ingroup favoritism and lead to hostility towards outgroups. In a well-
known series of experiments, Sherif and his colleagues observed how 
in the summer camp of 11- and 12-year-old boys competing groups 
developed hostility and prejudice against each other (E.g., Sherif et al. 
1961, cited in Franzoi 1996; Statt, 1994; lohnson and lohnson 1994; 
Gergen and Gergen 1981). 
Generally in intergroup conflicts, loyalty to the in group increases and 
prejudiced attitudes towards the opposing groups become incorporated 
in the group norms. Positive acts towards the outgroup members are 
punished by one's ingroup, while criticizing the opposing group may 
increase one's favor in the ingroup. The members are satisfied with 
their group and may even adopt an autocratic leader to lead the 
competition against the outgroups. Interaction between the conflicting 
groups decreases. (Ibid.) lohnson and lohnson (1994:381) state that the 
group that wins becomes more cohesive, self-satisfied, uninhibited, 
even playful. The leader is consolidated. Members believe that there is 
little need to re-evaluate their perceptions and actions because the 
winning has confirmed their positive stereotype of their ingroup and 
the negative stereotype of the outgroups. 
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Organizational wrongdoing can be analyzed in terms of conflict or 
competition between the organization and the external agencies of 
control. Since the wrongs most often go undetected and the gains can 
be vast, there may prevail a triumphant atmosphere in the organization 
after a successful cover-up. The frequent inability of the control 
agencies to "win" the wrongdoing organizations is likely to reinforce 
the harmful schemas. -In fact, since organizational wrongs are so 
immune to controls, win-lose confrontation should be avoided as it is 
likely to just deepen the harmful patterns of thought. 
Sherif studied how to overcome intergroup confrontation and tested 
different incentives to cooperation. Simple non-competitive contact 
between the groups (joint events such as meals or movies) did not 
invoke positive cross-group interaction. It was concluded that contact 
between the groups does not in itself decrease the intergroup tension. 
Furthermore, providing correct and positive information of the 
outgroups may not be a successful remedy against the stereotyped 
attitudes either since the schemas of the conflicting groups are not 
easily penetrated (Eskola 1996: 109). 
Instead, in Sherif's experiment, effective was a superordinate goal 
which could not be ignored by the antagonist groups and the attainment 
of which was beyond the resources of either group alone. Such 
situations were tested and cooperation resulted, e.g., as the problems 
with the food supply had to be solved. However, groups tend to 
continue with their adverse attitudes once the critical situation is over. 
Still, a series of activities that demand interdependent action gradually 
reduce intergroup conflict and hostility. 
Thus, in order to overcome mutual confrontation the groups must share 
a common interest that cannot be reached by separate action. Can this 
line of argumentation be applied to organizational wrongs? For 
example, however serious, limitless and lasting the environmental 
problems, they still are reproduced by organizations. Although the 
welfare of the consumers and the general public lies in the long-term 
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organizational interests and fighting environmental devastation clearly 
requires continuous joint efforts, the high rate of wrongdoing suggests 
that these connections are not genuinely acknowledged. Environmental 
problems are not truly perceived as everybody's business as they 
should. In order to overcome the barries to cooperation, distorted 
schemas of the wrongdoers must be invaded by powerful and 
reiterative counter rhetorics. 
3.3. Towards Healthier Decisionmaking 
In order to reach for better organizational outcomes, it must be 
discussed how to overcome such threats to group work as presented 
earlier in this chapter. There are various obstacles to better 
decisionmaking, and members of the organization may not even be 
aware of groupthink and other phenomena that reduce the quality of the 
organizational output. Furthermore, the actors are usually rnore or less 
constrained by limited time and other resources, which makes schemas 
necessary for decisionmaking. Obviously, also the human need of some 
social support is beyond change. As a consequence, complete 
rationality is a goal that can be approached rather than achieved. A 
number of scholars have given their contribution in this aspiration. 
All decisions involve controversy since decisionmaking is a choice 
between alternative courses of action. It is an important step in problem 
solving to identify and analyze alternative solutions. (Johnson and 
J ohnson 1994:272) In groupthink situations, consensus and harmony 
are preferred to real discussion. Thus, the conflict is denied although it 
would be crucial for high-quality decisions. (Fisher 1981 :46) In 
breaking the prejudiced schemas, needed is new, schema-discrepant 
information which inevitably produces conflict (Fiske and Taylor 
1984:163). 
Janis and Mann propose certain measures in order to avoid the 
undesirable consequences of groupthink (J anis and Mann 1977 and 
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1983; lanis 1971, cited in lohnson and lohnson 1994:274; Chell 
1987:94-5): An open inquiry is facilitated if the high status members 
initially adopt an impartial stance and encourage critical evaluation of 
all ideas. The leader should abstain from expressing her position at the 
outset so that the members cannot adopt it uncritically but are lead to 
objective and wide investigation. Issues can be discussed in different 
groups and under different chairpersons. In order to prevent a narrow 
view, outside experts should be heard. In addition to outsiders, some 
members of the group can be assigned to represent unpopular positions 
and to challenge the majoritarian view. Options should not be 
prematurely closed. Thus, a further meeting should be arranged for 
expressing any second thoughts . Also lohnson and lohnson (1994:275) 
argue for a second-chance meeting in order to prevent too hasty 
decisions and to allow the members to express their remaining doubts. 
Clearly, diversity of arguments in decisionmaking should be 
guaranteed by demanding critical and free discussion. The group 
should not be let develop a narrow and uncritical position out of the 
mere comfort of harmony, and internal and external divergent voices 
should be encouraged. However, setting extra groups and prolonging 
the decisionmaking process may not be realistic options due to the 
current emphasis on efficiency and low costs. It can also be questioned 
to what extent a further meeting can provide a real opportunity to 
change the course that has already been agreed upon. Although another 
meeting may bring distance to the initial decisionmaking, it is still 
likely to be difficult to admit the faults, to break the schema and try 
another path. 
The qualities of an effective management that avoids groupthink 
situations have been discussed by organizational psychologists. Maier 
(1970, cited in Chell 1987 :95-6) suggests how managers could elicit 
the best from their groups and improve the communication: For 
example, the leader should share with the group members all the 
information that is at her disposal. She should also encourage the 
members to express their views and to produce alternative solutions. It 
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is useful to try to prevent the dominant personalities from having a 
disproportionate influence and to minimize blame-oriented statements. 
In case the discussion slips out of the focus, it should be guided back to 
the actual issue. Furthermore, the evaluation of the alternatives should 
be delayed until all of them have been presented. 
Postponing further discussion of the options is beneficial in order to 
prevent too early commitments. Were an option thoroughly discussed, 
the participants might be inclined to reject subsequent alternatives 
since so much resources would already have been spent on the previous 
one. Also being aware of the other options may decrease the risk of 
immature commitment. As to the other measures, it is much to demand 
that in the everyday continuous flow of decisions, all, even the lowest 
status voices would be invoked and given proper thought. Low status 
members most diverge from the dominant cultural appreciations. If the 
cultural emphasis is on material values, it is not likely that "safety 
first" voices will be raised after being continuously defeated -no matter 
how officially encouraged. 
3.3.1. Braithwaite on Forging Responsible Decisionmaking 
Braithwaite (l989a and b) incorporates both organizationally internal 
and external agencies of control in his theory of shaming. Shaming is 
facilitated by communication: it is important that the information of 
possible violations spreads. Accordingly, wrongdoing is facilitated by 
the ability to conceal it. In his 1985 study of the internal compliance 
systems of the companies with the best coal mine safety records in the 
US, Braithwaite found internal punitiveness not to be their distinctive 
feature. Instead, all five safety leaders had clearly defined 
accountability for safety performance, and they rigorously monitored 
that performance and communicated possible shortcomings. 
Braithwaite (l989a) concludes: 
-- I suspect effectively self-regulating companies are those 
with means of drawing everyone's attention to the failings of 
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those who fall short of corporate social responsibility 
standards (shaming) __ 34. 
Often organizational subunits do not approve of law violations in the 
other subunits. Braithwaite calls for an "organization full of antennas" 
where shaming would be ubiquitous, actively imposed by the 
organizational actors. In a communitarian culture, everyone is the 
guardian of everyone else; compliance with the law is everybody's 
responsibility. Also occupational colleagues outside of the organization 
can impose shaming on their peers who violate the professional 
standards. Societal interest groups and investigative journalists are also 
significant as they scrutinize organizations and impose public shame on 
the wrongdoers. (Braithwaite 1989a and b) 
To be noted is that in addition to the knowledge of possible violations, 
effective shamers must have "organizational clout": wrongdoers must 
somehow be dependent on the shamers (Braithwaite 1989a: 135). 
Consumers have clout as far as their satisfaction is in the 
organization's interests. A mistreated customer may boycott or defame 
the organization. In general, a positive image is of value to 
organizational actors. Thus, prominent journalists are likely to have 
organizational clout, too. The role of the organizational members' other 
memberships is also significant. E.g., occupational peers may exert 
great influence on their deviant colleague for doing the job well 
probably is a matter of honor. 
Groupthink and related phenomena are facilitated by organizational 
structures that shelter the decisionmakers from dissonant information. 
As mentioned earlier, groupthink typically involves mindguards to 
protect the others from unfavorable pieces of knowledge. Subordinates 
may employ illegitimate means in the pursuit of organizational goals 
and shield the top management from the tainting knowledge. There are 
policies to fight such concerted ignorance: Braithwaite (l989a: 146-7) 
34Parentheses in the original. 
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proposes that all reports of the quality control director should be in 
writing, and should the manager overrule the quality recommendations, 
her signature would be needed. Thus, the body that chooses the 
organizational courses of action should provedly come to know about 
the safety issues. As a consequence, the decisionmakers might be 
deterred from risky or harmful alternatives out of fear of the shaming 
that could be targeted on them. Consolidating this policy, all employees 
should be reminded of their right and obligation to report cover-ups of 
offences, first internally, and independent of whether the violation falls 
in their specific domain of responsibility. Then, if the decisionmakers 
do not prevent the illegitimate practice, there should be mechanisms to 
enable blowing the whistle also more widely. (Ibid. See also 
Braithwaite 1989b:349-53) 
3.4. Resistance in Organizations 
Having said all this, it has become clear that individual actors are 
strongly guided by collective constraints. Does it mean that individual 
responsibility is rejected? How far should we follow the Marxian view 
that the worker's consciousness is infiltrated through the work? At his 
most pessimistic, Marx (186711972:817, cited in Jermier, Knights and 
Nord 1994:3) stated: "The organization of the fully developed 
capitalist process of production breaks down all resistance." On the 
other hand, Marx did acknowledge the worker capability of resistance, 
ultimately in the form of revolution. As discussed earlier, the 
Durkheimian holism must not be overrated. An individual has capacity 
to resist and reshape her organization. Yet, this capacity must not be 
overstated nor overromanticized either. As Jermier et a1. (1994:8-9) 
argue, it is widely recognized in the current debates on the labor 
process that "-- most employees in advanced capitalist societies are 
neither class-consciousness revolutionaries nor pass! ve, docile 
automatons. " 
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According to Galbraith (1984:87), individual resistance will be exerted 
in organizations for almost any expression of power creates its 
counterpower. Any effort to subdue a person will encounter resistance 
in some form. Therefore, organizational top-down control is likely to 
be counterproductive and to frequently generate resistance -which in 
turn may lead to more managerial control (Collinson 1994). 
Management reprisals that aim at silencing the protesters may actually 
support and even radicalize their view on the wrongful nature of the 
organizational practices. (Rothschild and Miethe 1994) 
Collinson (1994) distinguishes two opposite strategies of workplace 
resistance. Subordinates resist through distance as they try to escape or 
avoid the authoritarian demands and distance themselves from the 
organization and its power structure. This is the case when workers 
escape the boredom and the disillusion of depersonalized and highly 
specialized organizational life through work avoidance, indifference, or 
even sabotage (see Stone 1975:234-5). Organizational wrongs may 
stem from this type of resistance. There are far-reaching 
interpretations: 
There has to be, among the workers (who participate in 
producing harmful products), a level of downright hostility -
not just to the employer, but to the entire society, which as 
they see it, has cast them in a role barely above, perhaps 
subordinate to machines. (Ibid.) 
By resistance through persistence the organizational members rather 
confront the issues they are protesting against. They seek to gain 
greater involvement in the organization and to render the management 
more accountable by acquiring information, monitoring practices and 
challenging decisionmaking processes. While there are rather limited 
possibilities available to passive opponents who escape true 
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confrontation35, actively insisting on more managerial responsibility 
can yield more effective and creative results. However, although these 
forms of resistance indicate the individual power to interpret the 
organizational world, both of them are likely to leave the fundamental 
power structure unchallenged. (Collinson 1994) 
Confrontation with organizational practices that one does not approve 
of commonly leads to grumbling horizontally at peers, friends, spouses. 
In the minority of cases, the protesters actually blow the whistle. 
Whistleblowing is likely to be first internal reporting to the qualified 
organizational organ. (Rothschild and Miethe 1994) If this doesn't 
prove an effective remedy, one will face the awkward question whether 
to conform, resign, or go public. Those who conform and follow the 
wrongful organizational expectations may come to be haunted by 
anxiety and uneasiness. Suppressed feelings may generate alienation 
and diffuse, unfocused, bottled-up aggression. Such a state of 
inauthenticity may involve major personal problems like 
psychosomatic symptoms and substance abuse. It is a state of mental 
stress -although often unconscious- and self-deception as one fails to 
understand one's own experiences. (Simon 1996:285-7) 
On the basis of his research, Glazer (1996) classified public 
whistleblowers into three categories. The mildest form of 
whistleblowing only takes place as one has left the wrongdoing 
organization. These reluctant collaborators seek expiation of having 
been deeply involved in what they privately condemn. Also implicated 
protesters first acquiesce to the pressure but then expose the 
wrongdoing. Unbending resisters, in turn, maintain strict commitment 
to their principles all the way. As the organizational efforts to cajole or 
coerce them as well as their individual efforts to reform the 
organization have failed, they take a public stand. 
35Escapism must be discerned from passive resistance that fights 
injustice through non-violent means. Exerting power that relies on different 
means than that of the opponent can be highly effective. (See Galbraith 1984) 
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Certain characteristics have been associated with whistleblowers. In 
making the critical decision, Glazer (1996) considers crucial personal 
courage and circumstances of life. According to research, 
whistleblowers are highly competent and respected employees who 
belong to the central professionals in their organizations. Thus, they are 
in strategic positions which enables them to obtain knowledge of 
possible wrongs and gives them confidence that they will be heard. 
They often want the organization to maintain positive reputation and 
are devoted to the organization's actual mission which is undermined 
by the misconduct. Often they initially expect that the organization will 
appreciate exposing the wrongdoing and take constructive action. 
Unsurprisingly, one of their characteristics has been argued to be 
naivety. People who are inclined to blow the whistle also have a stake 
in following extra-organizational norms. Clearly, that is the base to 
question the organizational practices on. (Rothschild and Miethe 1994) 
A potential whistleblower is affected by her particular mixture of 
negative and positive consequences. The organizational sanctions have 
strong personal implications: a whistleblower risks losing her job and 
the related monetary and social benefits. While the deviation is 
strongly punished, the protester's peers are rewarded for their 
conformity. In consequence, the dissident will lose positive coworking 
atmosphere and peer support. Insecurity about the future is likely to 
cause fear. The protester may blame herself for being too sensitive and 
feel inferior to the others who can play the game with at least seeming 
JOY· 
However, despite the inherent difficulties of being a dissident, the 
personal positive experience is the motive for the protest. According to 
Glazer's (1996) interviews with whistleblowers, they have rebuilt not 
only their careers but also their belief in their integrity and competence. 
Also Rothschild and Miethe's (1994:268) research suggests that 
personal identity is profoundly shaped by the experience of blowing 
the whistle. Often whistleblowers come to feel strong and moral, and 
free of the organizational abuses. Doing the right thing and following 
138 
one's conscience is likely to be an empowenng and emancipatory 
experience indeed. 
Organizational sanctions may be positive in organizations that claim to 
demand their emploees to report violations. E.g., a police officer who 
revealed police corruption was supported and encouraged by the 
government prosecutors (Glazer 1996:273). However, there: are also 
powerful degradation ceremonies for an informer within the police 
organization. Generally, many are likely to remain sceptical about 
speaking out in spite of its normative status. Actually, it is often the 
informer who finds herself being investigated rather than the reported 
violations. Efforts to foster the employee voice may be merely 
symbolic gestures in order to legitimatize the organization in the eyes 
of the employees, external agents of control, and general public. 
Rothschild and Miethe conclude that organizations that honestly 
reward critical information are rarely found, even if the reporting is 
internal. (Rothschild and Miethe 1994) 
Effective managers employ a variety of strategies in order to secure 
compliance. These tactics include persuasion through promises, 
rational arguments, threats, negotIatIOn, lying or withholding 
information, claiming superior knowledge, etc. (Rothschild and Miethe 
1994:257-8) Managers typically are the advantaged ones in these 
discoursive struggles and capable of wider dissemination of their 
definitions due to their greater access to material and symbolic 
resources (Collinson 1994). 
It is frequently observed that once an employee expresses to have 
information that can potentially be used to challenge the management's 
views, organizational reprisals will immediately be launched on her. 
Not only may one's employment be terminated but one may also be 
blaclisted in and out of the organization. The resisters are typically 
marginalized through managerial efforts at negating the legitimacy of 
the grievance and neutralizing the information that has been revealed. 
Such discrediting takes place, e.g., through attributing the protest to 
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personal problems or illegitimate motives. Breaching the taboo of 
loyalty may carry stigmatization as cracy, unreliable, incompetent, 
embittered, ridicilous, and a troublemaker. (Rothschild and Miethe 
1994; Collinson 1994) 
Bay ley (1983: 154, cited in Braithwaite 1989a: 134) describes the 
disciplinary diversity in the police organization: 
-- the police organization has a more extensive, subtle, and 
discriminating set of controls over its members than do 
external agencies. In addition to formal disciplinary 
punishments involving pay, postings and promotions, it can 
exhort, slight, harangue, praise, embarrass and so forth. 
It is devastating to be continuously punished by the vast range of 
official and inofficial means of control. A telling anecdote of the vast 
mental pressure on the deviant is the view of a psychologist who has 
set up a support centre for whistleblowers in the US. Basing on 
numerous actual cases, he advices potential whistleblowers not to do it 
unless they are able to leak the information anonymously. In his view, 
the personal suffering transcends the benefits of the disclosure. 
(Rothschild and Miethe 1994:267) 
In conclusion, organizational wrongdoing is facilitated by effective 
deterrents from blowing the whistle. Communicating hazards is often 
restricted and discouraged even within organizations. As a result of the 
above discussed constraints, whistleblowers remain statistically 
unusual. According to a study (Rothschild and Miethe 1992) on 158 
workers in a high-security manufacturing industry, only a third of those 
who observed illegal and unethical conduct reported it to their 




An organizational member who observes misconduct is subject to 
contradictory norms. Both participation in the wrongdoing and 
protesting against it carry considerable harmful implications. If we are 
to increase the human ability to resist abusive practices, we must not 
merely rely on those with the right personality and appropriate 
circumstances of life but have to actively create conditions favorable to 
resistance. 
In the first place, analogically to the bystander intervention model, the 
perception of abuses must be improved through sensItIzmg 
organizational people in ethical terms. Knowledge of extra-
organizational ethical principles furthers recognizing misconduct. Self-
assurance facilitates confrontation with the collective construction of 
reality. As we learned from the studies of Asch and Milgram, giving in 
to social pressure diminishes as the dissident finds at least some social 
support. Therefore, in order to support ethical construction of 
organizational reality, moral examples and ethical advisors must be 
present. Moral associations must be made more available through 
widespread social discourses. 
Ethical knowledge is completed by being aware of constraints and risks 
inherent in human behavior in groups. Sensitivity to recognize how 
one's behavior is affected by the group can be furthered by raising 
consciousness of such tendencies of social settings that were discussed 
in this text. 
In order to guide a potential resister to opt for prosocial action, she 
must be informed how to blow the whistle, and its negative personal 
implications must be minimized. Anonymous informing is a way to 
cripple the subcultural social control. 
The critical factor in bystander intervention is how to enhance the 
individual sense of responsibility so that one would define oneself as 
responsible for taking action. How to raise less authoritarian persons 
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confident with their ethical judgements? Ultimately, one's behavior 
deri ves from personal interpretations of different courses of action, and 
conformity and resistance are a function of individual value 
preferences (see the chapter on freedom in Saarinen 1983). 
We learnt that intergroup cooperation can be invoked by a 
superordinate goal that is important for the different groups and cannot 
be achieved by any group alone. For the harms and risks of 
organizational wrongdoing are ubiquitous and cannot be overcome by 
any separate agency of control, their policing should be recognized as a 
common enterprise. After all, avoiding the wrongs lies in the interests 
of society as a whole, including organizations. Were this pattern of 
thought more widely acknowledged, controlling organizational 
wrongdoing would be a little more realistic. 
This kind of analysis of organizational white collar crime may be 
criticized in the similar fashion than Sutherland's theory of social 
learning that it is limited to explaining rather the individual 
assimilation into wrongful collective patterns than the actual incentives 
that gave birth to the wrongdoing (see, e.g., Friedrichs 1996:229). 
However, social psychological dynamics affect the decisionmaking on 
the organizational courses of action. Concerted behavior and wrongful 
outcomes stem from the social construction of reality which may 
involve conformity, groupthink, group polarization, and other 
difficulties in turning individual preferences into organizational 
outputs. In joint decisionmaking, group dynamics obfuscate individual 
responsibility, and the social construction of reality manipulates the 
line between right and wrong. Thus, organizational goals and means 
are subject to the meaning that is socially given in group processes. 
Theories that rely only on certain aspects of organizational action -such 
as rationality, greed for money, or competition- are likely to provide 
only very partial understanding. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
4.1. On Organizational Wrongdoing in General 
It was seen in Chapter 1 that organizational actors are growing in 
societal importance. Organizations have become more prevalent than 
ever before; they pervade social life. Correspondingly, the 
organizational capacity to produce risk and harm far transcends that of 
an individual. Therefore, it is time to change the criminological 
paradigm: the study of organizational wrongs should be awarded the 
resources that it deserves. 
A fruitful point of departure in studying reprehensible organizational 
behavior is to recognize that wrongs are always lurking round the 
corner: No organization is safe from failures and questionable conduct, 
however immaculate their white collars and well-defined their 
acti vities in general. The line between right and wrong is under 
constant demarcation in social discourses. A collective may slip into 
wrongful patterns without perceiving them as such. Furthermore, to a 
great extent, organizations are constituted of ordinary people with a 
confused view on the law; what matters to them is not only the act's 
legal category but also the organizational perception of its right/wrong 
status. Norms are given meaning through social processes. 
In regard to white collar activities, the label of crime essentially is a 
political product, and organizational actors have much political and, 
thus, legislative clout. In conclusion from this line of argUlnentation, I 
argue that we must not limit the study according to such non-
ontological categories as crime in its legalistic sense. It is rather the 
task of ethical argumentation to determine when certain behavior is 
legitimate or wrong, and it is the task of sociolegal studies to determine 
the dynamic forces that play part in crossing that critical border. 
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4.2. On the Theories 
Now that the main criminological white collar crime theories and 
various other theories of social science have been brought under a 
common roof, it is time to draw some final conclusions. As it has 
become quite clear along the way, I argue that criminological theory 
that seeks to explain wrongful organizational outcomes is not viable 
without resorting to such empirical social sciences as social 
psychology. Although each of the criminological theories presented 
surely holds some truth, on the basis of this theoretical analysis it 
seems justified to claim that mostly they cannot offer wide enough a 
perspective. Organizational wrongs can hardly be explained by anyone 
variable; rather, they stem from an interplay of various factors. 
Therefore, multidisciplinary integrated approach is needed. 
At least through interpretation, many criminological theories can 
provide their share towards understanding organizational wrongdoing. 
Coleman points out how certain wrongful patterns can be understood in 
terms of competition. An important measure in this competition is 
money, while more generally the competition can be argued rather to 
be for power, "your way of doing things" as a manager expressed it in 
lackall's (1996:62) account. However, the most plausible view is that 
criminogenesis is not exclusively a fuction of any given goal. What 
counts is the way goals are strived for: social discources facilitate 
wrongdoing as fas as they put disproportionate emphasis on the goals 
and not on the means of attaining them (see Braithwaite 1988). 
Scholarly attention must, therefore, be focused on the organizational 
processes in which goals are adopted and the means of their attainment 
defined. In the similar vein, organizations are not automatically guided 
by their opportunities: organizational action rather stems from the 
social perception of opportunities and their conversion into collective 
behavior. (See Rabe and Ermann 1996) 
In order to maintain the criminogenic patterns, they must be 
disseminated to the organizational members and newcomers. Here, 
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Sutherland's differential association theory becomes relevant. His 
theoretical merit is in pointing out how wrongful patterns are nurtured 
in many occupations, and that organizations and their individual 
members learn these behaviors from each other. 
Cultural theories account for how organizational wrongs may be 
embedded in the cultural foundations of an organization. Subcultures 
are crucial transmitters and facilitators of wrongful patterns. An 
organization may be filled with cultural products that facilitate 
wrongdoing by manipulating the perceptions and other cognitive 
processes of the organizational members. Wrongs may so easily be 
committed since cultural products create a comfortable atmosphere of 
legitimacy. 
Also the theoretical approaches that were presented under 
neutralization theory offer a plausible set of explanations for 
organizational wrongdoing. Various psychological techniques can be 
employed in order to obfuscate one's personal moral responsibility: 
other people can be blamed and true perception of the situation avoided 
through resorting to authorities, routines, and outright self-deception. 
Organizational wrongs flourish due to the relative psychological 
easiness to commit them -as known, the participants are intelligent like 
any of us, and surely able to come up with a variety of ways to defend 
themsel ves. 
Braithwaite's theoretical contribution and its practical implications 
form a coherent unity. He attributes crime to insufficient reintegrative 
shame. Although Braithwaite's conceptualization is so general, 
shaming is a useful tool in understanding organizational wrongdoing 
and provides viable social policy solutions to more effectively control 
organizational behavior. The idea of ubiquitous shaming underlies my 
practical suggestions, too. 
As social scientists generally agree, collective human behavior differs 
from individual behavior. Already Sutherland (1949) argued for the 
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psychological normality of organizational offenders. Therefore, the 
criminogenesis lies in the organizational processes. These processes 
involve such phenomena as obedience to authority, diffusion of 
responsibility, group cohesion and conformity, groupthink, group 
polarization, modes of defensive behavior, ingroup bias and other 
distortions of reality. In general, the criminological literature I got 
acquainted with is lacking the social psychological perspective. In 
social psychology, scholars have been widely investigating phenomena 
related to organizational behavior. This domain of research is relevant 
in understanding human behavior in collective settings such as 
organizations. The social psychological studies presented in this thesis 
offer at least some aspects of the dynamics of collective behavior that 
the criminological inquiry should come to terms with.36 
4.3. Shortcomings of this Study 
I realize that my conclusions are somewhat speculative and largely lack 
direct empirical evidence. I did not conduct any empirical research of 
my own. In addition, many times the information is of second hand 
nature. After all, there are practical limits to every thesis, and the 
original sources are not always achieved without unreasonable efforts. 
In cases I cited data from other than its original source, the source that I 
really used is mentioned, and I naturally have been on my guard against 
any distortions. 
An additional problem with the data was that since my topic is 
interdisciplinary, literature had to be searched in more than one 
domain. I am not a specialist of sociology nor of psychology; I have 
36 For the subject matter is multidisciplinary, also other relevant 
branches of science could be named, e.g., organization theory and management 
studies. Regardless of the label, I am interested in studies of organizational 
behavior. 
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primarily studied law -i.e., mostly the Finnish legislation. This may 
have lead to my neglecting some central theories of social science and 
to a failure to find the best sources. However, I guess that this is a 
rather common difficulty in multidisciplinary work, and I hope to 
develop in this sense in the future. 
As I set forth with this project, I actually had in mind carrying out 
empirical research of my own. However, as I was not familiar with the 
academic branch of white collar crime, I first had to get acquainted 
with the topic. I came to find out how complex these issues are, and 
how many divergent views are prevailing on the very basic concepts. 
Even the phenomena that should be studied are subject to serious 
controversy. Therefore, I felt that before I can even think of empiria, I 
must make more sense of these issues. As I proceeded and adopted an 
unusually wide approach, it came evident that the relevant theories are 
too voluminous to leave room for new empiria in the scope of a thesis. 
Since I wanted to capture the phenomenon of organizational 
wrongdoing in its totality, I came to include a number of theories in my 
work. I recognize that trying to reach too far is a common shortcoming 
when it comes to writing theses. Of course, a thesis could be written on 
the basis of just one theory, or just one case. Accordingly, I surely have 
failed to discuss some theories in the depth they would have deserved. 
However, I still argue that a wide approach is grounded in order to 
show that these phenomena are interrelated and can and ought to be 
analyzed as an entirety. It is a challenge for the criminology of the new 
era. Indeed, I find the merit of this dissertation in bringing together 
theories from different scientific domains, and looking for answers to 
the problem of white collar crime in places that too much have been 
overlooked. 
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4.4. The Need of Further Research 
Clearly, there is much research to be carried out. Largely, studies on 
the white collar crime etiology have been argued to be "a hodgepodge 
of studies looking at different crimes from different levels of analysis 
(Coleman 1987:408)." There is a lack of deep case studies that would 
examine organizations from the inside to see how the dynamics of 
control actually operate. Accordingly, Shover and Bryant (1993: 167) 
argue for procedures that would enable the investigator to become 
immersed in the internal world of corporate firms. Such ethnographic 
studies would aid theory refinement. 
Therefore, much in the same vein as studies in social psychology (e.g., 
on defences, such studies as Ashforth and Lee 1990; Bar-Y osef and 
Schild 1966; Menzies 1960), an actual case of organizational wrong-
going could be studied in depth. In the study, the dynamic 
organizational processes that played part in creating the wrongful 
outcomes could be analyzed on the basis of such social psychological 
and organizational phenomena that were presented in this thesis. 
Often the research on organizational wrongs has focused on egregious 
and extremely harmful crimes and industries where illegal conduct has 
flourished (Shover and Bryant 1993:167). However, as wrongs are 
potentially present in every organization, various organizations can be 
investigated in order to find out what kinds of processes and 
procedures there prevail in regard to violations. Thus, in addition to 
organizations that have nurtured wrongdoing, any organization could 
be analyzed in order to investigate how its members perceive potential 
wrongs and try to prevent them. 
In sum, I argue for studies on the organizational level. As Coleman 
(1992:70-1) notes: 
Perhaps because it is the newest field of interest among 
students of white-collar cnme, the research on the 
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organizational level is the most scattered and lacking in 
coherent focus. 
Further, because the official statistics do not provide reliable enough 
data to base analysis on: 
The best work done so far in this field is the case studies that 
carefully analyze the conditions in particular organizations or 
industries -- this approach offers the brightest hope of future 
progress in the years ahead. 
4.5. Shedding Light On Organizational Wrongdoing 
As the final remarks, I would like to express some fundamental means 
of controlling organizational wrongdoing. To reiterate, it is crucial how 
activities are socially defined. In order to fight misconduct, wrongful 
acts must be named correctly in the first place. Thus, organizational 
wrongs must be demystified: we must raise consciousness of the fact 
that legitimate organizations are capable of wrongdoing and that it is 
everybody's task not be blinded by front activities or other smoke 
screens but to genuinely face what is going on. 
Moral questions are largely turned into technical questions; these must 
be demystified and their moral implications must be brought out. In 
order to be able to perceive wrongs when they are present, people must 
acquire information on the effects of organizational activities -and try 
not to be overwhelmed by the technical language. 
The general level of moral consciousness in society must be raised. 
Important arenas and actors in this programme are families, schools, 
social interest groups, professional communities, journalists. In fact, 
writing this thesis is a contribution to raising consciousness of 
organizational injustice. Academic debates play an important part in 
producing societal knowledge -and in stimulating progressive politics. 
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It must also be secured that one takes action as one perceives wrongful 
behavior. The feeling of powerlessness is a common facilitator of 
organizational wrongs. Therefore, potential whistleblowers must be 
supported, and one's belief in her own ethical judgement must be 
enhanced. Individual readiness to question authorities and group 
processes must be cultivated. Personal moral responsibility must be 
reiterated along the way in the socialization process. I believe that it 
would provide strong social support for potential whistleblowers if 
they associate organizational wrongs with such horrors as the Nazi 
regime or the Chernoby I disaster. 
In sum, social debates and awareness must be enhanced in order to 
penetrate the internal organizational worlds. Wrongful schemas and 
defences can only be invaded by reiterative counter rhetorics. 
Demystification of organizational wrongdoing would make it more 
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